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Abstract 
 
Using the Independent Labour Party (ILP) as its case study, this thesis examines the 
relationship between the labour movement’s interpretations of internationalism and its 
attitudes towards Zionism during the interwar years. The study locates responses to 
developments in Palestine within the broader framework of the labour movement’s 
conceptualisation of internationalist thought and practice with regard to issues such as 
immigration, imperialism and nationalism. Moreover, it examines the phenomenon of left-
wing anti-Zionism, which has often been inadequately explored in the existing 
historiography of the interwar period.  
The ILP contained within it a broad spectrum of opinion; its intra-sectional debates 
therefore frequently reflected the diversity of thought within the labour movement. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the ILP’s debates requires a consideration of transnational 
perspectives because of the party’s involvement in networks and organisations such as the 
League Against Imperialism (LAI). Because of the party’s manifold links to variety of 
actors on political scene, it can serve as a prism through which we can explore the breadth 
of political debates within the left, both within Britain and at an international level. 
The thesis is divided into five thematic chapters, starting with a broad discussion of 
internationalist thought within in the ILP. The second chapter examines internal ILP 
debates on Palestine, while the third analyses how international left-wing organisations – 
notably the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) and the LAI – approached the issue. 
This is followed by an analysis of how ILPers interpreted the role of League of Nations 
Mandates, with particular focus on Palestine. Finally, the question of anti-Semitism and its 
influence on the ILP’s stance regarding mandatory rule and Zionism is considered.  
This study draws extensively on records relating to the Labour Party, the ILP, the LSI and 
the LAI, using sources such as conference reports, pamphlets, and newspapers. In addition, 
the personal papers and correspondence of key figures such as Ramsay MacDonald and 
James Maxton have been consulted. 
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Introduction 
 
This study examines the relationship between the labour movement’s interpretations of 
internationalism and its attitudes towards Zionism during the interwar years. 
Internationalism is an important and intricate concept in the history of the labour 
movement.1 As such, the study is concerned with one overarching question: how was the 
idea of internationalism, in all its various forms, applied to Palestine? The thesis seeks to 
locate responses to the question of Mandatory Palestine within the broader framework of 
the labour movement’s conceptualisation of issues such as international socialist 
interaction, imperialism, nationalism, and immigration. Its central objective is to explore 
the debates within the labour movement at both national and transnational levels and 
understand how it came to adopt various positions towards Palestine. This is of 
significance because, as Stephen Howe has noted, ‘There has been no single international 
issue on which British socialists, and indeed socialists in all countries have been more 
deeply divided than on the question of Palestine’.2 
 
This approach appears appropriate given that as Marcel van der Linden has written, labour 
history has always been global history, since the growth and spread of the labour 
movement was intrinsically a global phenomenon.3 Zionism too is an inherently 
international movement. These observations have important implications for my 
methodology; as Michael Hanagan has argued, labour historians ‘must follow processes 
where they lead’ rather than be constricted by borders.4 Given that the British labour 
movement has often been viewed through the prism of ‘exceptionalism’, by broadening the 
scope of study, it will be possible to examine the degree to which organised Labour’s 
discourse on Zionism was a product of transnational rather than exclusively national 
developments. In addition, it provides a case study for how the British and international 
 
1 See Fritz von Holthoon and Marcel van der Linden, ‘Introduction’ in Fritz von Holthoon and Marcel van 
der Linden (eds.) Internationalism in the Labour Movement 1830-1940 (Leiden, 1988). As R.M Douglas 
noted, the term is ‘susceptible to a variety of definitions and associations’, Douglas, The Labour Party, 
Nationalism and Internationalism: 1939-1951 (London, 2004), p. 4.   
2 Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964 (Oxford, 
1993), p. 148. 
3 Marcel van der Linden, ‘New Approaches to Global Labour History’, International Labour and Working-
Class History 66 (2004), p. 2. 
4 Michael Hanagan, ‘An Agenda for Transnational Labor History’, International Review of Social History 49 
(2004), p. 466. 
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labour movements, with their ‘anti-imperialist’ tradition, reacted to a Labour government 
administering the British Empire for the first time. 
 
From the outset, it should be acknowledged that recent developments in labour history 
demand a radical shift in our approach to the subject of international (and indeed national) 
labour. The proponents of ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ labour history such as Marcel van der 
Linden, contend that previous ‘international’ histories are all too often disproportionally 
Eurocentric and focus excessively upon the institutional aspect of the international labour 
movement.5 Instead, transnational history attempts to examine ‘the flow of people… (and) 
ideas between nations involving concomitant networks across political borders’.6 Even 
more fundamentally, it is also claimed that the majority of categories used by labour 
historians, including the very concept of ‘the working class’ should be reconsidered.7  
 
In order to achieve this, one section of the British labour movement, the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP), will be the focus of the study. It might seem counterintuitive to place 
such emphasis on the ILP rather than on Labour’s policies. In the view of some scholars, 
the ILP became increasingly marginalised during the interwar years, culminating in 
disaffiliation from Labour in 1932 – a development which it has been argued effectively 
rendered the ILP irrelevant.8 However, one key reason for this approach is that although 
the ILP was not the most influential element within the labour movement, it was the most 
self-consciously internationalist section, and accordingly contained a number of ‘fervent’ 
internationalists within its ranks.9 Thus, a wealth of material relating to the intricacies of 
internationalism was produced by leading ILP members such as Ramsay MacDonald, H.N. 
 
5 Marcel van der Linden, ‘Introduction’ in Transnational Labour History: Explorations (London, 2003), p. 6-
7.   
6 Melanie Nolan, Donald MacRalid and Neville Kirk, ‘Introduction’, Transnational Labour in the Age of 
Globalisation, Labour History Review 73 (2010), p. 9. 
7 Marcel van der Linden, ‘Labour History: An International Movement’, Labour History 89 (2005), p. 229. 
8 Arthur Marwick, ‘The Independent Labour Party in the Nineteen-Twenties’, Historical Research 35 (1962), 
p. 62. 
9 David Howell, A Lost Left: Three Studies in Socialism and Nationalism (Manchester, 1986), p. 270. In 
addition, Howell states that the first Labour government in 1924 came into conflict with ILPers as its 
‘disconcertingly national’ direction was at odds with the ILP’s ‘internationalist… traditions’. Idem, p. 265. 
This ‘tradition’ has been recognised by several scholars. For instance, Paul Ward has noted that the ILP 
‘prided itself on expressions of internationalism’. Paul Ward, Red Flag Union Jack: Englishness Patriotism 
and the British Left, 1881 - 1924 (1998), p. 114. Chris Wrigley has demonstrated that from its inception, the 
ILP was, for a number of reasons, ‘attracted’ to internationalism. See Wrigley, ‘The ILP and the Second 
International’ in D. James, T. Jowett and Keith Laybourn (eds.) The Centennial History of the Independent 
Labour Party (Halifax, 1992), p. 306; John N. Horne has written that at the outbreak of war in Europe, the 
ILP was the ‘driving force behind Labour internationalism’. See Horne, Labour at War; Britain and France 
1914-1918 (Oxford, 1991), p. 30.  
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Brailsford and Fenner Brockway. Furthermore, questions pertaining to internationalism 
featured prominently in the ILP’s newspaper the New Leader, the party’s publications, as 
well as being a central point of discussion at its annual conferences and the meetings of its 
National Administrative Council. 
 
There are several important reasons why the ILP allows us to gain a sense of the wider 
debates within the labour movement. First, for a significant period of the interwar years, 
the ILP contained within it a broad spectrum of opinion; its intra-sectional debates 
therefore often reflected the diversity of thought within the labour movement. Secondly, 
from the mid-1920s onwards, the leadership of the ILP increasingly came into open 
conflict with the Labour Party. Crucially, however, these disputes did not simply take the 
form of unconstructive denunciations, rather, the ILP attempted to win over Labour Party 
members to a particular political position, based on its interpretation of what the labour 
movement’s response should be to key tenets of internationalism. If we were simply to 
chart the mainstream policy of the interwar Labour Party in government and in opposition, 
the internal debates would not be as apparent. Thirdly, whereas the Labour Party largely 
dismissed the communist section of the labour movement, the ILP engaged in serious and 
sustained dialogue, and even joint activity with communists, at local, national and 
transnational levels. Thus, from this we will be able to gauge the nature of discussion 
across a relatively wide spectrum of the labour movement’s political thought.  
 
Furthermore, on a theoretical level, an analysis of the ILP enables us to examine more fully 
the interwar labour movement from a transnational perspective. This is because the ILP 
were considerably more willing to engage in transnational activism than were the Labour 
Party. The term ‘transnational’ refers to forms of internationalism which emphasise the 
role of networks and non-state actors and organisations.10 For instance, while Labour 
sought to secure its objectives through the League of Nations, the ILP often attempted to 
solve the challenges of the interwar years through involvement in non-state networks such 
as the League Against Imperialism (LAI), the Congress Against War and Fascism and the 
International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist Unity (IBRSU). The time period is 
 
10 See Daniel Laqua, ‘Preface’, in idem (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and 
Movements Between the World Wars (London, 2011), p. xii; Furthermore, Laqua notes that, ‘internationalism 
often relied on transnational structures and movements’ and ‘transnational action was driven by a particular 
understandings of internationalism.’ Idem, p. xii. 
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apposite as the interwar years proved to be a particularly vibrant period for various forms 
of internationalism.11 
 
In contrast to the mainstream of the Labour Party, leading ILP activists such as James 
Maxton and Fenner Brockway took seriously the issue of anti-colonialism, which very 
often translated into support for anti-colonial nationalist movements and, in the 1930s, 
notable anti-colonists such as George Padmore and C.L.R. James were closely associated 
with the ILP.12 This is particularly relevant and complex in the case of Palestine, given that 
Palestinian Arab nationalism and Zionism constituted two competing nationalist 
movements, both of which perceived themselves to be struggling for self-determination 
against an imperial power.  
 
This study uses a variety of primary material, as well as drawing on, and critiquing, 
existing secondary literature. The main centre for the history of transnational labour is the 
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam (IISH), containing extensive records 
relating to key organisations such as the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) and the 
League Against Imperialism (LAI). The LAI records that have been consulted include 
resolutions, minutes of national and international conferences and its executive committee, 
as well as its official publication the Anti-Imperialist Review. Such material allows us to 
gauge the inter- and transnational dimensions of British debates on Palestine, the Mandates 
system and national self-determination. 
 
For the British labour movement, the People’s History Museum in Manchester holds the 
most comprehensive and wide-ranging source material, including the ILP’s theoretical 
journal The Socialist Review and publications issued by Poale Zion. The London School of 
Economics (LSE) holds the ILP’s annual reports and National Administrative Council 
minutes as well as a considerable number of party pamphlets and copies of its newspaper, 
the New Leader. These records allow us to examine the breadth and scope of debates 
within the ILP. The annual reports contain not only the resolutions which formed official 
party policy, but also the minutes of the debates in which minority views were expressed. 
 
11 Patricia Clavin and Glenda Sluga (eds.) Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History (Cambridge, 
2017); Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge, 2012). 
12 Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964 (Oxford, 
1993), p. 71. 
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Similarly, the New Leader provides us not only the official editorial line but also a range of 
perspectives such as the articles by regular columnists and letters and correspondence from 
ILP activists. Personal papers such as MacDonald’s, Maxton’s and Reginald Bridgeman’s 
will also be consulted. In addition, the memoirs, and autobiographies of some of the key 
protagonists such as Fenner Brockway will be critically evaluated. Where possible, claims 
made in these autobiographical accounts will be scrutinised with reference to other 
contemporary sources. There are, however, certain gaps in the documentary record as 
many ILP records were destroyed after its offices were bombed during the Second World 
War.13 This included many of Brockway’s papers and accounts for the fact that there is 
very little material in Brockway’s papers relating to Palestine in the interwar years.14  
 
Another key primary source is contemporary newspapers, including several Anglo-Jewish 
community newspapers such as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and the Jewish Chronicle, 
as well as American-Jewish publications such as the Jewish Criterion and the Canadian 
Jewish Chronicle, all of which reported extensively on matters relating to Palestine. The 
pro-Zionist stance of many of these publications will be taken into consideration when 
utilising these sources. The records of the League of Nations held at Geneva will also be an 
important source when addressing the question of British administration of Mandatory 
Palestine. For example, the records of the debates of the Assembly provide an insight into 
the interventions made by MacDonald as a statesman on a global stage, and the minutes of 
the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) are insightful in terms of the interaction 
between the interwar Labour governments and the League. 
 
The thesis takes a thematic approach, with a largely chronological structure within the 
chapters. The first chapter is a broad discussion of the developments of internationalist 
thought within the ILP, with a particular focus on the issue of anti-colonialism. The second 
chapter examines debates within the ILP on Palestine, while the third analyses how 
transnational organisations such as the LSI and LAI approached the issue. This is followed 
by an analysis of how League of Nations mandates were interpreted, with particular focus 
on Palestine. Finally, the question of anti-Semitism and how this informed the discourse is 
 
13 Chris Cook, Sources in British Political History 1900-1951 Volume 1: A Guide to the Archives of Selected 
Organisations and Societies (London 1975), p. 109. 
14 Fenner Brockway, Towards Tomorrow: The Autobiography of Fenner Brockway (London, 1977), pp. 140-
141. This was confirmed by viewing Brockway’s papers held at the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 
FEBR. 
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considered. In this way, the issue of interwar Palestine will be viewed through a variety of 
‘lenses’, which will allow for a detailed exploration of the complex factors which informed 
the debates. 
 
While located within the field of labour history, the focus traces how ideas were articulated 
and contested. In this respect, the thesis also sheds light on the intellectual history of the 
interwar years.15 In analysing debates within the ILP, Michael Freeden’s influential model 
of ideological morphology is applicable to this study in several important ways. Freeden 
argues that ideologies are constructed from ‘clusters’ of political concepts. Some of these 
concepts are ‘core’ or ‘ineliminable’ to the ideology, whereas others are ‘adjacent’ or 
‘peripheral’.16 He posits that ideology should be analysed via a ‘close study and 
comprehension of the units of political thinking… those fundamental political concepts 
which shape political argument’.17 Furthermore, Freeden argues that these concepts 
possess an ‘essential contestability’.18 Thus, when we examine debates over certain issues, 
we will explore how socialists thinkers sought to ‘decontest’, that is, assign specific 
meanings to particular political concepts.19  
 
The nature of this study means that we will deal with several historiographies which often 
overlap. To begin, a discussion of interwar British labour movement, followed by a section 
which deals explicitly with the British Labour Party’s foreign policy, including the 
question of empire and the mandates system. This is followed by a survey of the literature 
relating to the interwar international labour movement. The academic literature dedicated 
to the study of Zionism is very extensive. Therefore, it will be necessary to restrict the 
discussion to two aspects which constitute distinct but not entirely unrelated 
historiographies. The first of these is a selection of the scholarly literature relating to the 
 
15 In the field of intellectual history, internationalism and the development of international thought have 
attracted growing attention over the past two decades. To cite but a few examples: Paul Rich, ‘Reinventing 
Peace: David Davies, Alfred Zimmern and Liberal Internationalism in Interwar Britain’, International 
Relations 16 (2002), pp. 117–133; Lucian Ashworth, International Relations Theory and the Labour Party: 
Intellectuals and Policy Making 1918–1945 (London, 2007); Tomohito Baji, ‘Zionist Internationalism? 
Alfred Zimmern’s Post-Racial Commonwealth’, Modern Intellectual History 13 3 (2016), pp. 623–51; 
Tommaso Milani, ‘Retreat from the Global? European Unity and British Progressive Intellectuals, 1930–
1945’, International History Review 42 (2020), pp. 99–116. 
16 Michael Freeden, ‘The Morphological Analysis of Ideology’, in M. Freeden and M. Stears (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford, 2013), pp. 124-125. 
17 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theories: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford, 1996), pp. 13-14. 
18 Ibid., pp. 55-60. 
19 Ibid., p. 82; Freeden argues that in turn, concepts possess several ‘micro-components’ which also have 
many possible meanings, see Idem, ‘The Morphological Analysis of Ideology’, pp. 124-125. 
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theory and practice of Zionism, with particular reference to the key developments which 
have taken place in Israeli scholarship. The second section concerns the literature relating 
to the British labour movement and the Zionist movement as well as an examination of the 
relationship between international labour and Zionism. 
 
The British Labour Movement 
Before engaging with the historiography of the ILP, we will first examine the labour 
movement as a whole. The interwar period proved to be a momentous time for the British 
labour movement. These years witnessed a number of crucial domestic developments 
ranging from the formation of the Communist Party, the election of two minority Labour 
governments, the general strike of 1926, the hunger marches, Ramsay MacDonald’s 
‘betrayal’, the disaffiliation of the ILP from Labour, the emergence of an anti-fascist 
movement to the creation of ‘Little Moscows’. Accordingly, a voluminous and wide-
ranging historiography has been produced. Biography for instance, has long been, and 
continues to form, a key element of history regarding the labour movement, particularly its 
‘high politics’. Influential politicians like Ramsay MacDonald, George Lansbury, Clement 
Attlee and James Maxton have each been the subject of more than one biographical 
study.20 However, there are notable absences, such as Fenner Brockway, who was a major 
figure in labour, anti-war and anti-colonial movements for an extensive period of time.21 
Furthermore, in the cases of Maxton, MacDonald and Brailsford, the biographical studies 
have not explored the question of Palestine in much detail. In other important respects, the 
scholarly literature appears deficient. For example, curiously, given that it is the most 
important electoral expression of organised labour, Matthew Worley was able to write 
prior to the publication of his own study in 2005, that there had ‘never been a general 
history of the Labour Party concentrated specifically on the years between 1918 and 
1939’.22  
 
 
20 See for example Lauchan MacNeil, Ramsay MacDonald: A Political Biography (London, 1938); Kevin 
Morgan, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 2006);Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London, 1982) and Trevor Burridge, 
Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (London, 1985); Jonathan Schneer, George Lansbury (Manchester, 
1990); John Shepherd, George Lansbury: At the Heart of Old Labour (Oxford, 2002); Gilbert McAlister, 
James Maxton: Portrait of a Rebel (London, 1935); John McNair, James Maxton: The Beloved Rebel 
(London, 1955), William Knox, James Maxton (Manchester, 1987). 
21 There are, however, several autobiographical accounts by Brockway, which are referred to in this study. 
22 Matthew Worley, Inside the Gate: A History of The British Labour Party Between the Wars (Manchester, 
2005), p. 1. 
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The initial historiography relating to the interwar years did not analyse the labour 
movement as a whole but confined itself to the parliamentary electoral fortunes of the 
Labour Party. Much of the scholarship on the party itself was in turn narrow in its scope, 
examining the leadership, the parliamentary party and conference decisions and constituted 
a ‘markedly internalist’ approach which attempted to explain policy shifts ‘in terms of 
conflicts of power and personality within the party’.23 Nevertheless, it is worth outlining in 
order to properly chart the key historiographical developments. Francis Williams’ The Fifty 
Years March: The Rise of the Labour Party produced in the late 1940s was one such 
work.24 Williams and others argued that the interwar Labour Party had ‘come of age’ by 
1918 and thus was in a position to challenge for power. The interwar years were 
characterised by gradual electoral progress and its two minority governments, which 
although hampered by inexperience and a lack of authority within the House of Commons, 
did achieve notable successes in foreign policy as well as in domestic legislation such as 
Wheatley’s Housing Act of 1924.25  
 
In the 1960s this approach was challenged by sections of the so-called ‘New Left’ as 
scholars such as Ralph Milliband, John Saville and Raymond Williams emphasised that 
Labour could not be treated like any other political party because it was not merely a party 
but a movement.26 Therefore, it could only be properly understood in such terms. 
Furthermore, these historians criticised the parliamentary party’s strategy of ‘gradualism’ 
which was in their view not only ineffective, but also weakened Labour’s electoral appeal 
by undermining its distinctiveness.27 Ironically, according to this view, the leaders’ 
willingness to compromise and appear ‘respectable’ did not prevent their Tory opponents 
from scaremongering the electorate about Labour’s radicalism.28 The dominance of what 
was termed ‘labourist’ ideology i.e. the primacy of the trade unionism and the total 
acceptance of parliamentary methods ensured the subordination of the left wing of the 
party and rendered illusory the notion of the Labour Party as a force for socialism.29 In 
 
23‘Editorial: The Labour Party and Social Democracy’, History Workshop 12 (1981), p. 2. 
24 Francis Williams, The Fifty Years’ March: The Rise of the Labour Party (London, 1949). 
25 Richard Lyman, ‘The British Labour Party: The Conflict Between Socialist Ideals and Practical Politics 
Between the Wars’, The Journal of British Studies 5, no. 1 (1965), p. 141. 
26 Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour (London, 1961). 
27 Ibid., p. 143. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Madeline Davis, ‘Labourism and the New Left’ in John Callaghan, Steven Fielding and Steve Ludham 
(eds.), Interpreting the Labour Party: Approaches to Labour Politics and History (Manchester, 2003), pp. 
44. 
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fact, Saville even went so far as to denounce ‘labourism’ as ‘the theory and practice of 
class collaboration’.30 Nevertheless, there was a significant similarity in both accounts, as 
the notion of ‘the forward march of Labour’ heavily informed these two otherwise 
contrasting perspectives. This decisive assumption was made, as James Cronin has noted, 
‘despite the fact that the record from the 1930s was anything but encouraging’.31  
 
In more recent years, the idea that Labour was the ‘inevitable’ product of ‘the rise of class 
politics’ has come under serious criticism from historians such as Jon Lawrence who has 
claimed that this argument was ‘as much about legitimising current struggles as it was 
analysing past politics’.32 Works by Jon Lawrence, Miles Taylor and Duncan Tanner have 
stressed that rather than being passive beneficiaries of social forces, political parties ‘not 
only have a role in making their own fortunes’ but also ‘in constructing social and political 
identities and redefining their audience’.33 Thus, more recent scholarship has taken a new 
direction, in the sense that whilst restoring the focus onto the party, it does not mean a 
return to ‘high politics’ but rather the role of the Labour Party at both national and local 
levels in creating its own fortunes. Central to the current historiography is a theoretical 
discussion as to the extent to which the rise of British labour politics was a product of 
social forces or whether it was the party and movement itself which played an active role 
in shaping the political culture in which it operated.  
 
Turning to the history of the wider labour movement broadens the scholarly literature even 
further. For example, works by Nigel Copsey, David Renton and Lewis Mates have all 
examined the role of the labour movement in interwar anti-fascist activity, exploring issues 
such as the sharp differences between Labour and the CPGB over anti-fascist theory and 
strategy and the effectiveness of popular anti-fascism versus anti-fascist legislation.34 
Philip Coupland explored the previously overlooked dynamic between the labour 
movement and support for fascism. He demonstrated that although the British Union of 
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Fascists (BUF) ultimately moved to purge its ‘radical’ elements, the organisation attempted 
to infiltrate and then imitate the trade union movement, which was not only led by a former 
ILPer and Labour MP Oswald Mosley but also involved former senior ILPer John Beckett 
and even ex-Communist Party organisers.35  
 
The ILP 
As Gidon Cohen has shown, the early histories of the ILP placed the party within the 
‘forward march’ narrative.36 According to this view, the ILP’s significance was its central 
role in the foundation of the Labour Party, acting a reconciling force between socialists and 
trade unionists.37 Scholars such as Robert Dowse argued that in an era before individual 
party membership, the ILP was the main route through which socialists joined the Labour 
Party.38 He also highlighted how the ILP had produced much of the early Labour 
leadership such as Hardie, MacDonald and Snowden.39 Moreover, it was argued that the 
ILP played an integral role in the rise of Labour at the expense of the Liberal Party. Thus, 
Dowse wrote that the defections from the Liberals to the ILP left the former ‘robbed of 
their brains’ and enabled Labour to engage with foreign policy which ‘helped to convince 
the electorate that Labour was the rightful heir of Liberalism’.40 However, so the argument 
went, in 1918, with Labour’s constitution adopting an overtly ‘socialist goal’ and allowing 
individual membership, the ILP became increasingly marginal.41 This was followed by its 
supposedly ‘suicidal’ decision to disaffiliate in 1932, after which the party rapidly faded 
into political obscurity.42 
 
Some of the later studies of the ILP moved away from this framework and focused on the 
party’s activities within a regional context. Scotland in particular has featured prominently 
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36 Cohen, The Failure of a Dream: The Independent Labour Party From Disaffiliation to World War II 
(London, 2007), pp. 1-2. 
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in this literature and above all the ILP’s role in the era of ‘Red Clydeside’ in Glasgow.43 
The Centennial History of the ILP followed suit, primarily focusing on regional and local 
studies of the party. Only one essay in this volume was dedicated to internationalism, and 
this only dealt with the early years of the party.44  
 
Cohen has perhaps done the most to challenge the prevailing views regarding the ILP. He 
has argued that while some of the key claims were sound, much of the existing literature 
was problematic for several reasons. For example, Cohen pointed out that Henry Pelling, 
author of the influential text The Origins of the Labour Party, had spoken directly to the 
early ILP leaders and had ‘accepted much of their interpretation’ not only of their own 
achievements but of their characterisation of other socialist groups such as the SDF.45 
Secondly, Cohen noted that much of the historiography of the ILP has been highly 
politicised, with disaffiliation seen as a ‘cautionary tale’ for the prospects of left wing 
groups operating outside of the Labour Party.46 As a result, the literature had ‘overplayed 
the speed and extent’ of the ILP’s decline.47 Thirdly, he argued that disaffiliation itself had 
been wrongly ‘characterised in ways that made it seems almost inexplicable’ and that the 
post-disaffiliation ILP had either been completely neglected or caricatured.48 Cohen 
maintained that the party, both pre- and post-disaffiliation was worthy of serious scholarly 
attention, as it provided ‘spaces or arenas’ in which individuals could ‘express themselves 
and develop ideas and identities’.49 Therefore, Cohen has in a sense, rehabilitated the post-
disaffiliation ILP as an area of scholarly inquiry. Cohen’s work also discussed the ILP’s 
post-disaffiliation international affiliations and policy positions on some of the major 
international questions of the 1930s, such as the Spanish Civil war and Italy’s invasion of 
Abyssinia.50  
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Recently, Ian Bullock has published a study of the ILP in the interwar years, including a 
detailed analysis of the post-disaffiliation party. Bullock argues that the ILP essentially 
preserved a democratic socialist tradition and thus made a valuable contribution to the 
post-war Labour Party and British political culture more generally.51 However, the book 
omits any in-depth discussion of international issues and erroneously assumes that there 
was unanimity on these questions. Bullock writes ‘many of the party’s positions, were 
accepted with something close to unanimity among ILP members themselves such as 
opposition… to imperialism’ and ‘support of internationalism in the wider world’.52 This 
framing typifies a tendency to assume that there was a consensus on what 
‘internationalism’ and ‘anti-imperialism’ meant. Therefore, one of the aims of this study is 
to explore the complex and contested nature of socialist internationalism, both in theory 
and in practice. The ILP’s engagement with Zionism, Arab nationalism and mandatory rule 
in Palestine has the potential to shed fresh light on how socialist internationalisms were 
theorised and practiced and elucidate the differing visions of internationalism which were 
prevalent during the interwar years. 
 
The ILP’s newspaper, the New Leader, has been the subject of scholarly debate. F.M. 
Leventhal, biographer of H. N. Brailsford, favourably contrasted his time as editor to 
Brockway’s subsequent efforts.53 However, a more recent article by Hazel Kent has 
revaluated Brockway’s record, pointing out that comparisons with Brailsford’s reign are 
unhelpful in the sense that while the literary standards and scope may have declined, the 
NAC had specifically requested that the nature of the paper should alter into a more narrow 
party paper.54 Moreover, Kent found that despite the party’s decline in membership, under 
Brockway’s stewardship the paper continued to enjoy a healthy circulation among non-
party members.55  
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Labour Party Foreign Policy 
The Labour Party’s foreign policy has been the subject of much attention. It has been 
argued that because Labour was founded in order to represent domestic working-class 
interests, foreign issues were always of secondary concern.56 One of the most important 
discussions relates to its precise ideological nature. Initial historiography on domestic 
developments argued that the interwar years saw socialism, albeit vaguely defined, shift 
from being a ‘factional position’ to a ‘firm party commitment’ for Labour.57 According to 
scholars like Henry Winkler and Michael Gordon, a commitment to socialism undoubtedly 
extended into Labour’s foreign policy.58 Others such as Lewis Minkin and Patrick Seyd 
concurred with this analysis, contrasting the ‘socialist’ foreign policy of the interwar 
period with the post-war majority government’s strategy which emphasised ‘practicality 
and the national interest’.59 To support the characterisation of foreign policy as ‘socialist’, 
Gordon cited assertions made by influential figures in the 1920s and 1930s such as 
Clement Attlee’s claim that there could be ‘no agreement between a Labour Opposition 
and a capitalist government’ and Arthur Henderson’s comments that the formulation of 
both domestic and foreign policy ‘spring from our faith that the future belongs to 
Socialism’.60 Furthermore, the adopted policy was deeply idealistic as it ultimately ‘rested 
on a powerful vision… of how relations among nations ought to be conducted’.61 
However, this socialism was ‘never reduced to a sharply defined, authoritative, totalistic 
doctrine’.62  
 
However, more recent works such as Paul Bridgen’s The Labour Party and the Politics of 
War and Peace take a different view, arguing that although Labour’s pre-war intentions 
were genuinely radical and based upon interaction with the international socialist 
movement, Labour’s actual interwar foreign policy in fact owed more to ‘Gladstonian 
internationalism’ than to socialism.63 Rather than defining the course pursued as cohesively 
 
56 Henry Winkler, British Labour Seeks a Foreign Policy (New York, 2005), p. 1.  
57 Lewis Minkin and Patrick Seyd, ‘The British Labour Party’ in William E. Patterson and Alistair Thomas 
(eds.), Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe (London, 1977), p. 109. 
58 Winkler, British Labour Seeks a Foreign Policy (New York, 2005); Michael Gordon, Conflict and 
Consensus in Labour’s Foreign Policy: 1914-1965 (London, 1969). 
59 Minkin and Seyd, ‘The British Labour Party’, p. 109. 
60 Gordon, Conflict and Consensus, p. 6. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 8. 
63 Paul Bridgen, The Labour Party and the Politics of War and Peace: 1900-1924 (London, 2009), p. 74 and 
p. 190. 
21 
 
‘socialist’, Bridgen stresses the complexity and diversity of influences on Labour’s 
international policy in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. Hence, he 
identified three distinctive currents. Firstly, those who wished to promote international 
harmony and collective security through the establishment of the League of Nations. 
Second, those who wished to address the role that the economic system played in creating 
conflict and finally, the anti-militarism of the ILP.64 However, we should note that Bridgen 
is by no means the first to emphasize the liberal influence on Labour’s foreign policy, as 
Kenneth E. Miller’s 1967 work Socialism and Foreign Policy also came to this 
conclusion.65 Likewise, Rhiannon Vickers’ study The Labour Party and the World argues 
that ‘as far as foreign policy was concerned, it is not clear that the Labour Party had any 
socialist ideology as such’. Instead, ‘by far the most important influence on Labour’s 
foreign policy were liberal views of international relations’.66  Therefore, for Vickers, the 
true significance of Labour’s interwar foreign policy was not in its socialism but the 
perceived successes which ‘demonstrated that Labour could be trusted to represent the 
nation and not just class interests, which was reassuring to the electorate’.67 Furthermore, 
Vickers concluded that the Labour Party, both in government and in opposition, ‘had some 
considerable impact upon British views of internationalism, collective security and the 
League of Nations’.68  
 
In an analysis of this question, political scientist Lucian Ashworth suggests that it may be a 
false dichotomy to label ideals as either ‘liberal’ or ‘socialist’, as ‘while values like peace 
and internationalism would have been shared by an earlier radical liberal tradition, this did 
not make it any less part of the socialist world’.69 Thus, although the League of Nations 
itself was not socialist, its existence ‘could be part of the development of a socialist world’ 
as only when the threat of war had been eradicated could ‘the work of building an 
international socialist society begin’.70 
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On the issue of Labour attitudes towards empire, scholars have emphasised the diversity of 
thought within the movement on this question. For example, Caroline Knowles has noted 
that with regard to India, some Labourites argued for complete and immediate 
independence while others believed it was better for India to be under ‘socialist’ rule than 
that of Indian nationalists.71 A number of historians have pointed out that key figures, 
although in agreement with Hobson’s critique of empire were not automatically ‘anti-
imperialists’. For example, Ramsay MacDonald, who served as both Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary, defined himself as a ‘constructive imperialist’.72 Moreover, most 
conclude that Labour governments pursued a policy of continuity as far as the empire was 
concerned.73 
 
The first comprehensive study of Labour and the empire was Partha Sarathi Gupta’s 
Imperialism and the British Labour Movement: 1914-64, which was published in 1975. In 
this text, Gupta argued that the existing literature produced by scholars such as John 
Naylor, Kenneth Miller and Michael Gordon was deficient in the sense that it ‘neglected 
the evolution of labours colonial and commonwealth policy and their influence in turn on 
foreign policy’.74 However, like these other authors, a central aim of Gupta’s study was to 
engage in the debate regarding the tension between ideology and pragmatism in the Labour 
Party’s external policy.75 As the title indicates, the study analysed the labour movement as 
a whole rather than purely evaluating the official policy. Therefore, Gupta explored how 
the various groupings within the labour movement competed with each other to influence 
policy-making.76 For instance, when some within the trade unionist section declared 
themselves against allowing ‘economic nationalism’ in India’s steel  and cotton industries, 
the ‘radical anti-imperialist tradition’ within the movement was strong enough to resist it.77 
Moreover, he attributes the influence of Fabian ideology as the ‘chief explanation for the 
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slowness of Labour to abandon the concept of imperial rule’.78 Gupta concluded that 
Labour did achieve some significant successes. For instance, while in opposition the party 
played a ‘pioneering role’ in the ‘reform of labour laws in the colonies in general’.79 
Moreover, his largely sympathetic analysis pointed out that Labour was not in power for a 
significant enough period of time to effect far-reaching change and often lacked the 
parliamentary majority required to embark upon a radically different colonial policy.80 
Furthermore, Gupta blamed the intransigence of the Indian nationalists for the lack of 
democratisation in India.81 
 
Stephen Howe was the first historian to examine in significant detail the link between anti-
colonialism and British labour with his book Anti-Colonialism in British Politics: The Left 
and the End of Empire:1918-1964. Given the nature of the study, Howe did not look at 
official Labour Party policy, but rather the activities of more radical elements such as the 
ILP and the Communist Party. Regarding the interwar years, Howe emphasised the deep 
divisions that existed within the Labour Party, as ‘the anticolonialist lobby’ on the left of 
the party might be ‘worlds apart’ from the party leadership, especially when in 
government.82 The study identified four ‘broad currents’. The first of these two mainstream 
perspectives was ‘constructivist imperialism’, which sought to gradually enable self-
government within empire. The second was the emphasis on ‘native rights’ and active 
preparation for self-government. The two more marginal outlooks were what Howe terms 
the ‘self-designated Empire Socialists’ who were wholly supportive of the imperialist 
status quo and finally, on the left, those who were outright anti-colonialists.83 Regarding 
the CPGB, Howe found that the British Communist propaganda focused more on colonial 
injustice and exploitation rather than on imperialism as a world system, an emphasis which 
was strongly criticised by Moscow.84 Howe also included a brief discussion of how the 
Union of Democratic Control (UDC), which had begun life in 1915 as a pressure group 
dedicated to anti-militarism and democratising the conduct of British foreign policy, 
engaged with anti-colonialism in the years after the First World War.85 
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A key historiographical issue concerns Labour’s attitudes towards empire. With Labour 
coming to power in 1924 the party found itself administering a vast empire, along with 
several League of Nations Mandates. This question is central to our study given that 
Palestine was a British Mandate throughout the interwar years. The traditional narrative 
has described the mandates system as a ‘euphemism for colonies’. Take for example, Niall 
Ferguson’s widely read work Empire, which approvingly quoted H. A. L. Fisher’s 
assessment of mandates as ‘the crudity of conquest draped in the veil of morality’.86 That 
said, it is worth noting that Fisher’s analysis was more nuanced, as he went on to add that 
‘annexing States as mandatories obliged at fixed intervals to give an account of their 
stewardship to a League Commission. That such a requirement was made and assented to 
was a clear advance in international morality’.87   
 
Historians specialising in the mandates system have challenged the traditional narrative. In 
2006, Michael D. Callahan contended that mandates had received ‘almost no systematic 
scholarly attention’ and therefore the claim that mandates differed only in name from other 
colonial possession was simply an unevidenced assertion.88 Callahan argued that imperial 
powers acknowledged that mandates were not simply colonies and furthermore, the 
mandates system served as a ‘permanent reminder’ of the ‘anti-imperialist and 
humanitarian condemnation’ of European colonialism.89 While conceding that the PMC 
was ‘not a fierce critic of colonialism and had no intention of demolishing Europe’s 
empires’, Callahan advanced the argument that the PMC ‘through informal connections’ 
and ‘the implied threat of international criticism’ did in fact impact upon ‘every level of 
European imperial rule’.90  
 
In recent years, systematic scholarship on the mandates system has been undertaken. Most 
notably, Susan Pedersen has produced several articles and a book-length study of the PMC, 
making extensive use of its archives in Geneva. Pedersen agreed that although the 
 
86 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London, 2007), p. 315. 
87 H.A.L Fisher, A History of Europe vol. III (London, 1938), pp. 1207-8. 
88 Ibid., p. 2.  
89 Michael D. Callahan, ‘‘Mandated Territories Are Not Colonies’’: Britain, France and Africa in the 1930s’ 
in R. M. Douglas, Michael D. Callahan and Elizabeth Bishop (eds.), Imperialism on Trial: International 
Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective (Oxford, 2006), p. 13. 
90 Ibid., p. 21. 
25 
 
mandates system ‘certainly aimed at legitimating and prolonging imperial rule’.91 It 
nevertheless proved ‘more disruptive than its framers intended’.92 Furthermore, the PMC’s 
published records and reports made it ‘a magnet’ for those wishing to challenge the rule of 
the mandatory power.93 Pedersen has argued that the real significance of mandates was 
what she termed the ‘internationalisation’ of imperial rule. Thus, mandates system 
displaced ‘some amount of conflict’ over non-consensual rule into ‘the international 
realm’.94  
 
There has not been a substantial amount of scholarship produced on the specific question 
of the Labour Party and mandates in the interwar years. John Callaghan included a brief 
discussion in his book, noting that Labour (along with the LSI) welcomed the 
establishment of the mandates system, but also expressed concerns about the manner in 
which mandates had been allocated.95 Significantly, Callaghan remarked that Labour had 
‘very little to say about the newly acquired empire in the Middle East’.96 R.M Douglas also 
noted that within labour circles in the 1920s and 1930s, there was much criticism of the 
inadequacies of the mandates system and the demand to extend the remit of the PMC to 
‘all non-self-governing territories’.97 In this study, Chapter Four will be dedicated to 
discussing socialist perspectives on the question of the mandates system, with particular 
focus on Palestine. 
 
The International Labour Movement 
The events of the First World War saw the idea of working-class internationalism gravely 
undermined, as the major European working-class parties fell in behind their respective 
nation-states and the Second International collapsed. However, Rhiannon Vickers points 
out that fragmentation was not absolute and the British Labour Party remained in contact 
with some European counterparts during the war, as they were united on three key issues, 
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namely, organised labour playing a key role in drawing up the post-war settlement, a new 
socialist body to replace the Second International and the creation of an international body 
to prevent war between states.98  
 
During the interwar years, the international scene was often characterised not by national 
divisions, but by fundamental divisions within the ranks of the working-class movement, 
particularly between the reformist and the revolutionary sections. One of the most 
important manifestations of this separation was the rivalry between the Communist 
International or ‘Comintern’ (established in 1919) and the Labour and Socialist 
International (LSI) which was founded in 1923. Geoff Eley has noted how the Comintern 
played a key role in splitting national labour movements as after drawing up its twenty one 
conditions for membership, it ‘cajoled the pro-Bolshevik left’ into breaking with the non-
revolutionary left by either expelling their opponents or forming a new party.99 The 
situation was briefly further complicated by the inauguration of the so-called ‘Second and 
a Half International’ or ‘Vienna International’ which unsuccessfully attempted to bridge 
the gap between the two perspectives before folding in 1923.100  
 
The Comintern has proved to be of particular interest to labour historians because, as 
Andrew Thorpe has written, ‘never before and never since has a world party been 
created’.101 Although, given that history is never written in an ideological vacuum, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that this can also be attributed to some extent to the prominent status 
of Marxist philosophy in labour history during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The first comprehensive history of the institutional international labour movement was 
produced by John Price in 1947.102 This book dealt almost exclusively with the LSI and 
concluded that whilst the LSI affiliates prioritised their respective national interests, the 
Comintern frequently ensured that international and national interests were subordinated to 
Soviet interests.103 Therefore, according to Price, far from being a democratic ‘world 
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party’, the Comintern was in fact Moscow-controlled. The view that national communist 
parties were Moscow-controlled continued to be advocated in the next three decades, by 
scholars on both the left and right wing of the political spectrum. Consequently, the 
mainstream outlook argued that Moscow’s dominance was a disastrous development, most 
significantly when the Comintern formulated its ‘class against class’ theory which deemed 
social democrats ‘social fascists’ and thus effectively destroyed any chance of the labour 
movement forming a successful ‘united front’ against genuine fascism.104 However, by the 
mid-1980s these assumptions began to be challenged and it was argued that whilst 
individual national parties were not entirely unaffected by Comintern policy, it was 
misguided to see the Comintern as the mechanism by which communists in all countries 
were in the words of Andrew Thorpe, ‘marionettes… manipulated by their Kremlin 
puppet-master’.105 Henceforth, historians such as Thorpe have pointed out that number of 
national communist parties did in fact enjoy a significant degree of autonomy. For 
instance, the Costa Rican Communist Party was deemed too unimportant for serious 
Comintern attention, whilst factors such as the necessity to make instant policy and 
inadequate communication networks allowed the Chinese Communist Party to exert a 
certain level of autonomy.106 On the ‘class against class’ issue, Peter Huber has argued that 
rather than being Moscow-imposed, the policy was pushed for by leading members of 
national parties, particularly the CPGB.107 Similarly, when the ‘class against class’ policy 
was abandoned, rather than ‘a slavish and monolithic adherence to Moscow’s wishes’, the 
move actually sparked division in the British party.108 Furthermore, the communist 
movement’s anti-fascist record has been re-evaluated, for instance Matthew Worley has 
pointed out that in Germany ‘there were moments of co-operation’, which included 
communists and SPD members fighting street battles against the Nazis.109 
 
Returning to the LSI, Christine Collette argues that the LSI should not be characterised 
exclusively by failure, as its inclusion of former allies and belligerents was in itself a 
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genuine achievement.110 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the organisation suffered a 
major blow in 1933 when, as a result of the rise of fascism, it lost strong affiliates such as 
the German, Austrian and Czech parties.111 Recent scholarship by Daniel Laqua has 
examined how the LSI argued for the democratisation of the international order.112 In 
addition, a recent study by Talbot Imlay has emphasised the Eurocentric composition of 
the LSI.113 Imlay has also analysed how the LSI engaged with the question of empire and 
with the anti-colonialist nationalist movements in the interwar period.114 
 
An organisation which worked in close liaison with the LSI was the International 
Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). This previously neglected social democratic 
institution was the subject of a recent study by Geert van Goethem.115 He questioned the 
assessment of some authors who had argued that given that the international labour 
movement failed in its primary aim to preserve world peace and given that it is largely the 
story of organised social democracy betraying the ideals of working-class internationalism, 
it is hardly worth studying.116 Van Goethem closely analysed the structure and strategy of 
the IFTU, arguing that one of the major flaws in its formation was the decision to compose 
the organisation from national federations rather than industrial ones as this proved to be 
the underlying reason for its failure to take international industrial action. Furthermore, the 
policy of admitting only one national federation from each county reinforced its ‘closed 
character’ and its refusal to work with other trade union internationals ensured division and 
conflict in the international working-class movement.117 Additional faults were its inability 
to reach out beyond Western Europe to movements in colonial countries and its failure to 
forge close ties with the US labour movement.118  
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An organisation particularly relevant to this study is the Comintern-initiated transnational 
anti-colonial network the League Against Imperialism (LAI), which was founded in 
February 1927. The LAI has been discussed in several different contexts. In the British 
context, it appeared briefly in Brockway’s memoirs as well as in some of the early 
biographies of Maxton.119 It was also referred to in G.D.H. Cole’s seminal A History of the 
Labour Party from 1914, first published in 1948, although the analysis of the ILP’s 
involvement in the LAI was brief and superficial.120 Brief mention was also made in some 
of the scholarly literature on the ILP leader James Maxton produced in the 1960s.121 The 
LAI has also proved to be of great interest to Marxist historians. John Saville discussed the 
LAI in an essay on internationalism in interwar Britain, as well as in his biographical work 
on Reginald Bridgeman, an ILPer who served as secretary of its British section.122 Jean 
Jones later produced an article for Socialist History (the successor to the Communist Party 
History Group) which chronicled the complex processes which led to the formation of the 
LAI and its activities for the entire duration of its existence, focusing primarily on the 
LAI’s British section.123 
 
The debate regarding the LAI has often revolved around the question of the extent and 
nature of communist involvement. For some historians, it was an example of one of many 
interwar communist fronts and its swift demise after a promising beginning was an 
instructive example of the damaging impact of the ‘class against class’ policy on left-wing 
unity.124 However, Margaret Cole argued that while fronts like the National Minority 
Movement (NMM) were ‘largely controlled by Communists or their fellow travellers’, the 
LAI was ‘nothing of the kind’.125 For Andrew Williams, it was an example of the futility of 
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the ILP’s attempts to simultaneously work with the communist and social democratic 
movements in an effort to unite the two.126  
 
Scholars of anti-colonialism have approached the LAI from a different perspective. Vijay 
Prashad criticised those authors ‘who mention the [Brussels] conference simply to reduce it 
to a communist front organisation without any sense of the value that it held for those who 
travelled to it from Africa’.127 Jonathan Derrick argued that far from this organisation 
being a Soviet creation, its organiser Willi Münzenberg had to push for its establishment 
‘against serious hesitations in Moscow’.128 Moreover, Derrick highlighted the genuinely 
international composition (though not necessarily influence) of the organization as its 
founding conference hosted representatives from Tunisia, the West Indies, Egypt, India, 
Guadeloupe, South Africa and China.129 For Stephen Howe, the LAI was not merely 
another communist front but the ‘most significant attempt to establish an international 
anticolonial body between the wars’.130 
 
In recent years, Fredrik Petersson has written extensively about the LAI, producing several 
articles and the first book-length study of the organisation. Petersson’s studies have made 
extensive use of a variety of archival material, most notably the Comintern archive in 
Moscow and the LAI records held at the IISH. He too emphasised that analyses which 
presented the LAI as a ‘mere mouthpiece for Soviet foreign policy’, ignore the fact that the 
LAI ‘did function as a source of experience and inspiration for both anti-colonial activists 
and the anti-colonial movement’.131 He was also critical of some of the existing scholarship 
which he claimed had contributed to misunderstandings about the nature of the LAI. 
Petersson argued that the LAI is better understood as a communist ‘sympathising’ 
organisation rather than a front.132 Talbot Imlay’s recent study of the practice of socialist 
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internationalism has also discussed the impact of the LAI.133 This study will not offer an 
authoritative account of the LAI’s history. Rather, it seeks to examine the motives for ILP 
interaction with the emerging anti-colonial nationalist movements through its leadership’s 
involvement in the LAI and what that reveals about its conception of internationalism. 
 
Zionism 
Historians have placed Zionism in various frameworks and, as we shall see, have even 
perceived this ideology in diametrically opposing ways. The picture is further complicated 
by the fact that Zionism was not a homogenous ideology, as Political Zionism, Labour 
Zionism and Cultural Zionism all emerged with distinct influences and ambitions.134  
 
First published in the late 1960s, Maxime Rodinson’s Israel: A Settler Colonial State was 
the earliest academic text to argue that Zionism was an unambiguously colonial movement, 
directly comparable to the French in Algeria.135 Others followed, claiming that from the 
outset the movement was a self-professed colonial endeavour, as the Zionist organisations 
established in the late nineteenth century were called ‘The Jewish Colonial Trust’ and the 
‘Colonization Commission’.136 This was a direct challenge to scholars who had argued that 
it was in fact an anti-imperialist movement, which had won its freedom through struggle 
against the British Empire.137  
 
However, it was not until the late 1980s that the most significant intellectual shift 
developed, when with the opening up of the archives, a group of ‘revisionist’ Israeli 
historians emerged. Scholars such as Benny Morris, Tom Segev, Ilan Pappé and Avi 
Shlaim became known as the ‘New Historians’ or ‘Post-Zionists’, challenging mainstream 
Israeli historians who in the words of Morris ‘were not real historians and did not produce 
real history’.138 Instead, according to Segev, these ‘Old Historians’ had simply produced ‘a 
national mythology’.139  
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Although much of the work of the post-Zionist historians centred on 1948 and the creation 
of the State of Israel, many of their insights regarding Zionism were concerned with the 
key issues of the interwar period. For example, on the issue of population transfer Nur 
Masalha concluded that the Yishuv leadership pursued transfer schemes from the mid-
1930s onwards and that Ben-Gurion and other leading Labour Zionists  advocated ‘forced’ 
or ‘compulsory’ population transfer.140 Morris argued that the transfer of Palestinian Arabs 
was ‘inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism’.141 These findings challenged the existing 
consensus that the idea of transfer only emerged as a discussion within Zionism in 
response to the recommendations drawn up by the Peel Commission in 1937, but never had 
any basis in mainstream Zionist thinking.142  
 
Previously, historians had sought to emphasise that given the labour movement’s central 
role in the nation-building process, the Zionist colonisation of Palestine could not be 
compared to ‘classic’ imperialism. Even Rodinson agreed with this assessment, writing 
that ‘the socialist outlook that inspired a large part of the Yishuv… cannot be denied’.143 
Indeed, one of the main reasons offered by Yosef Gorni for British Labour’s support of the 
Zionist project was the socialist nature of the Yishuv society.144 Yet, according to post-
Zionist scholar Zeev Sternhell, the Zionist labour movement were enthusiastic supporters 
of free-market capitalism in Mandatory Palestine because ‘no social consideration was 
allowed to stand in the way of national interests’.145 Therefore, the Yishuv became a 
‘typical bourgeois society with significant social and economic discrepancies’ and despite 
the rhetoric of its leaders ‘the national ideology of the Jewish Labour movement was to 
conquer as much land as possible’.146 
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Furthermore, the kibbutz system, held up as the embodiment of the socialist society, far 
from stemming from socialist ideology was in fact a means of creating an ethnically 
exclusive community.147 As Paul Kelemen has elucidated, ‘socialist principles would have 
demanded class solidarity across the ethnic division in Palestine not the formation of 
enclaves for the exclusive employment of Jewish workers’.148 Baruch Kimmerling, a 
sociologist by training, also questioned the socialist nature of the kibbutz system, arguing 
instead that it was largely developed as a means of ensuring security during flashpoints of 
Palestinian Arab nationalism.149  
 
Both Gershon Shafir and Kimmerling independently concluded that Zionism was more 
closely related to the classic colonial settler model ‘than previous histories had allowed’.150 
As Ilan Pappé has commented, the recent works by both western and ‘revisionist’ Israeli 
historians have concluded that interwar Zionist land and labour policy was ‘determined 
solely by a narrow-minded nationalism’ with ‘little or no trace of any socialist, Marxist or 
altruistic attitude of any kind towards the Palestinian worker or peasant’.151 Indeed, Pappé 
deemed the Zionist labour movement responsible for instituting and implementing ‘the 
ethnic cleansing of the local population’.152 Such findings were in sharp contrast to the pre-
existing historiography which characterised the mandatory period as one of ‘Zionist 
goodwill foolishly rejected by Palestinian intransigence’.153 Thus, as S. Illan Troen has 
written, ‘in Israeli historiography, Zionist settlement is increasingly viewed as a form of 
European imperialism’.154  
 
However, the revisionist challenge was inevitably met with severe criticism. In 
Fabricating Israeli History: The New Historians, Efraim Karsh accused these scholars of 
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‘deliberate... historical distortion’ and engaging in ‘partisan re-writing of history’.155 A 
recent work by Jonathan Adelman criticised the approach of the post-Zionists and 
reiterated the idea of ‘the socialist Zionist revolution’, arguing that Zionism was ‘both a 
national liberation movement and a social revolution’.156 Therefore, the historiography 
falls into two broad perspectives; those who write from a post-Zionist viewpoint and those 
who reject this outlook.  As we have seen, the exchanges between these two positions are 
often of a polemical nature. 
 
In more recent scholarship, the phenomenon of anti-Zionism has begun to acquire a more 
prominent status as a category of analysis. In his study Divided Against Zion: Anti-Zionist 
Opposition in Britain to a Jewish State in Palestine, which examined British anti-Zionism 
in the period immediately after the Second World War, Rory Miller sought to address the 
fact that ‘anti-Zionism as an issue in and of itself, has been viewed as a minor adjunct in 
the history of the Palestine question and the Zionist movement’.157 As a result of this, in 
Miller’s view ‘there has been little written on either the subject of anti-Zionism in general 
or the anti-Zionist effort in Britain in particular’.158 Kelemen concurred with this analysis, 
noting that ‘The pre-1948 advocates of the Zionist position in Britain have been discussed 
extensively if often uncritically… but the coverage of their opponents particularly in 
relation to the impact of Zionism on the Arab world has been much more patchy’.159 
However, Miller argued that this oversight is ‘somewhat understandable’ and primarily 
attributes this development to the fact that anti-Zionism from Herzl to the founding of the 
State of Israel was ‘to a large extent a reaction and response to Zionism’ with ‘no 
programme of its own’ and ‘no clear goals’.160 Nevertheless, in this study, due attention 
will be given to the anti-Zionist perspective within the interwar ILP. 
 
Scholar of anti-colonialism Stephen Howe took a fresh approach to the development of 
Israeli historiography by comparing it to the trajectory of the writing of Irish history. Here, 
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Howe was able to identify several definite similarities. Both were originally nationalist 
historiographies, which had ‘accompanied and in some sense become the official narratives 
of successful state-building projects’.161 Furthermore, in both the Republic of Ireland and 
Israel ‘a generation or two after the establishment of their states, their official self-
presentation came under challenge from some historians’.162 Moreover, as we have already 
discussed in the case of Israel, these scholars brought a new sense of professional and 
critical analysis which questioned the nationalist narrative and also challenged notions that 
historical developments in that locality were without parallel elsewhere. Additionally, 
these revisionists often gave what Howe terms ‘unfamiliarly empathetic attention’ to the 
histories of ‘the other side’.163 
 
British Labour and Zionism 
Much of the early literature relating to British Labour and Zionism in the interwar period 
examined the policies of the Labour governments in administering mandatory Palestine in 
1924 and 1929-31, rather than assessing the discourse of the movement as a whole; for 
instance evaluating Passfield’s White Paper, which it has been argued, signalled a policy 
shift away from the Balfour Declaration.164 A notable exception to this was The British 
Labour Movement and Zionism by Yosef Gorni which discussed in detail the attitudes of 
the Labour movement from the Balfour declaration to the creation of the State of Israel. 
Gorni not only analysed Labour’s foreign policy in Palestine, but also the attitudes of the 
Labour press, Labour intellectuals and politicians. This included a discussion of the views 
of leading ILPers in the 1930s.165 At the outset of this study he argued that the Labour 
movement was ideologically inclined to support Zionism and therefore the most pertinent 
question to ask is why the Zionist movement was ‘dealt one of its most bitter blows’ by 
Labour in the form of Passfield’s White Paper.166  
 
However, Paul Kelemen, a prolific scholar on the subject of the labour movement and 
Zionism, has challenged this interpretation, arguing that on a purely philosophical basis 
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Labour could have pursued an anti-Zionist policy.167 Therefore, in one of his own studies, 
Kelemen explored the empirical reasons why a pro-Zionist stance prevailed, examining 
factors such as (but not limited to) the influence of Poale Zion (which affiliated to Labour 
in 1920) and the belief in some quarters of the party that support for Zionism would help 
secure the support of the Jewish electorate in Britain.168 Kelemen was not alone in 
criticising Gorni’s study. Reviewing The British Labour Movement and Zionism, Zachary 
Lockman concluded that Gorni’s ‘uncritical acceptance of the morality and justice of the 
Zionist cause prevent him from getting to the heart of the matter’ because ‘he cannot 
understand and hence cannot seriously explain’ Labour’s ‘very real dilemma’ over 
Palestine.169 Stephen Howe has also questioned Gorni’s objectivity, noting that his work is 
written from a ‘strongly pro-Zionist standpoint’.170  
 
Kelemen has noted that the perceived socialism of the Zionist communities in Palestine 
was not the only factor in attracting support from elements of the labour movement, 
concluding that some senior Labourites backed Zionism precisely because it was 
reminiscent of British colonialism.171 European factors played a role in determining 
Labour’s policy on Palestine. For example, with the rise of European fascism, key 
Labourites such as Herbert Morrison saw Arab nationalism not as a form of anti-colonial 
self-determination, but as a movement engineered by the agents of Hitler and Mussolini.172 
Furthermore, the Nazi persecution of Jews in the 1930s convinced many in Labour of the 
urgent necessity of creating a Jewish homeland.173 
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Another highly relevant study is an unpublished PhD thesis by Andrew Sargent, completed 
at the University of Nottingham in 1980. This piece of work has been largely overlooked in 
the published literature dealing with British labour and Zionism. Therefore, we will outline 
in some detail the findings of Sargent’s study. In it, he contends that the history of the 
Labour Party and Palestine before 1945 ‘is a history of growing attachment to the cause of 
Zionism’.174 This process was achieved chiefly through the arguments of Labour Zionism. 
However, emotional and personal factors also came into play, such as the memories of the 
plight of Jewish refugees who arrived in the UK and the ‘potent references’ to the building 
of a ‘New Jerusalem’ which struck a chord with religious-minded Labourites.175 The 
friendships between key British Labourites and leading Labour Zionists and the glowing 
reports produced by labour politicians after visiting Palestine were also decisive in 
ensuring continued Labour support for Zionism.176  
 
As well as the intellectual arguments, Zionism was successful institutionally. Sargent 
points out that Poale Zion was, ‘the only affiliated group seeking to influence a specific 
issue of foreign policy’.177 Crucially, as an affiliated group, it could submit resolutions to 
Labour’s annual conference and to gain the attention of the NEC. In addition, the main 
Labour Zionist party in Palestine Mapai and the trade union organisation Histadrut both 
forged close ties with the British Labour Party. Therefore, after Passfield’s White Paper of 
1930, ‘there was scarcely a resolution or statement of policy which was not initiated or 
shaped by Labour Zionists’.178 In fact, Sargent concludes that Labour Zionists held more 
sway over the NEC than did the Imperial Advisory Committee.179 The Palestinian Arabs 
by contrast, had no comparable links or influence.180  
 
Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) had its roots in Eastern Europe during the late nineteenth 
century, with the first group established in 1897.181 By 1905, Poale Zion groups had been 
set up by members of the Jewish community in several British cities before an inaugural 
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conference was held in Manchester in 1906.182 After its affiliation to the Labour Party in 
1920, it focused its energies on lobbying Labour politicians and found ‘significant support 
in the Labour Party’.183  
 
Links were forged beyond Labour Zionism. For example, The English Zionist Federation 
(EZF), founded in 1899, was a prominent organisation which, as we will see, some Labour 
politicians engaged with during the interwar period. The EZF grew considerably in the 
years following the Balfour Declaration, and by 1921 had 30,000 members, with Chaim 
Weizmann serving as its leader from 1917 to 1924.184 
 
But not all Jewish political organizations were Zionist. Significantly, the Polish Bund, 
which had emerged out of the Bundist movement in Tsarist Russia, was a socialist Jewish 
organisation that was stridently anti-Zionist.185 Although the Bund did not formally 
affiliate to either international until 1930, it engaged with developments within the LSI 
throughout the 1920s and was deeply critical of the pro-Zionist pronouncements of leading 
figures such as Vandervelde and Blum.186 Furthermore, Russian Bundist Raphael 
Abramovich served on the executive of the LSI as a representative of the exiled 
Mensheviks.187 
 
The link between Jewish political activism and the British labour movement has generated 
considerable scholarly interest. This can be seen by the publication of an edited volume 
published in 2000 entitled Jews, Labour and the Left 1918-48. Of particular relevance is a 
chapter by Christine Collette, ‘The Utopian Visions of Labour Zionism, British Labour and 
the Labour and Socialist International in the 1930s’. According to Collette, Labour’s 
commitment to Zionism was so strong that ‘the Labour Party files rarely record so 
consistent a pursuit of policy’.188 Support for Zionism was seen by British Labour as ‘an 
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expression of internationalism’ thus, ‘illustrating the complexity and the interrelationship 
of ideas of nationalism and internationalism’.189 Collette introduced two new themes into 
the scholarly discourse on Zionism and Labour, namely ‘utopia’ and ‘gender’.190 The 
support of both British Labour and the LSI was ‘utopian’ in character, in the sense of Lucy 
Sargisson’s definition of Utopia as ‘an imaginary space that our thoughts inhabit, allowing 
us to critique our present time and place’.191 Collette found that a common theme to 
British, International and Zionist Labour was that these movements all failed to properly 
include women and ensure their equal treatment.192 Collette however, neglects to explore 
the phenomenon of anti-Zionism. This study will examine how both support for and 
opposition to Zionism could be expressions of internationalism.  
 
Unlike many other areas of historical inquiry, this question has drawn the attention of 
academics from outside the discipline of history. Most notably Kelemen, who has written a 
book and seven articles on various aspects of labour and Zionism, is a sociologist, as is 
Philip Mendes, whose work on the Australian labour movement and Zionism also 
examines the responses of British labour.193 Political scientists interested in the discipline 
of international relations such as John Chiddick have also explored these questions, which 
is perhaps understandable given that Israel-Palestine conflict remains one of the most 
prominent contemporary political issues. In the opinion of Chiddick, British Labour’s 
commitment to Zionism was ‘not the product of strong engagement or with extensive 
knowledge of the region’.194 Placing responses in the context of anti-colonialism and thus 
contrasting responses to nationalism in India and Africa, Chiddick noted that Labour’s 
relationship with Arab nationalism was ‘marked by a greater ambivalence, especially with 
regard to Palestine’.195  
 
Although certainly the most important electoral expression of the Labour movement, the 
Labour Party was not the movement’s sum total, as the Communist Party emerged as a 
political force during the interwar years. According to Raphael Samuel, despite its 
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relatively small size, ‘the CPGB exercised a gravitational pull on the British left, a force 
field whose influence it was impossible to escape’.196 There was a fundamental division 
between Labour and the CPGB over the issue of Zionism. As June Edmunds has written, in 
the years following the First World War reformist socialists ‘began increasingly to 
acknowledge Jewish national self-determination’ and believed Zionism to be ‘compatible 
with democracy and progress’.197 The communist left on the other hand were hostile to 
Zionism because as a form of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ it was in opposition to its 
‘commitment to internationalism’.198 Furthermore, Walid Sharif points out that both Lenin 
and Stalin had almost always regarded the Zionist movement as ‘spearheading British 
imperialism in the Middle East’.199 Kelemen makes the insightful point that the 
communists’ position is worthy of study as its characterisation of Zionism as a colonial 
movement continues to resonate in contemporary academic discourse.200 Indeed, this 
cannot be attributed to the prominence of Marxists in Israeli academia given that, as 
Stephen Howe has pointed out, with the exception of Ilan Pappé, none of the key post-
Zionist historians had any Marxist leanings.201  
 
The link between British communism and Jewish political activism was also explored in 
Stephen Bird’s and Christine Collette’s edited volume. For instance, Deborah Osmond 
argued that many British Jews saw the new Soviet republic and not Palestine as ‘the safest 
haven against political anti-Semitism’.202 Jason Heppel noted that the CPGB had numerous 
Jewish activists in key organisational positions and by 1936 the party had established a 
Jewish Bureau.203 Approximately 7% of the CPGB’s full time employees that staffed ‘the 
party hierarchy and positions of leadership’ were Jewish, at a time when Jews constituted 
less than 1% of the British population.204 Elsewhere, Kelemen has highlighted how the 
Communist Party viewed developments in Palestine as ‘proof’ of their ‘social fascism’ 
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theory.205 However, the communist and social democratic analyses did have some overlap, 
as like Labour, the CPGB were deeply critical of the Palestinian Arab leaders, who were 
believed to be ‘treacherous feudal-bourgeois leaders’ who were ‘deceiving their 
followers’.206  
 
International Labour and Zionism 
While much attention has been accorded to British Labour and Zionism, less has been 
given to the link between it and the international socialist democratic movement. Only 
Kelemen, Collette and Sargent have engaged with this issue in any substantial detail. 
Consequently, it is the work of these scholars that will be considered in this section. 
Kelemen has noted that the debate on Zionism in the LSI shifted profoundly after the First 
World War. Prior to the conflict, the discussions had focused on Europe and arguments for 
and against Jewish assimilation into the working class. However, after the war the debate 
focused on the society that the Zionist movement proposed to build in Palestine.207 He 
concluded that there was barely any opposition to Zionism from the European socialist 
movement during the interwar years. This was not because of the intervention of Poale 
Zion in terms of its propaganda and lobbying efforts, but was in fact due to social 
democracy’s receptiveness to the ideology of Labour Zionism.208 One reason for this 
openness lay in the fact that it was ‘in essential respects the antithesis of Bolshevik 
socialism’ as it rejected the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat and believed in the 
reconciliation of nationalism and socialism.209 A more important reason however was that 
the ‘right-wing’ of the Second International came to dominate the post-war era. Therefore, 
in terms of its colonial policy, Labour Zionism was seen as a form of ‘positive’ or ‘benign’ 
colonialism.210 Thus, because of the perceived benign ‘universalism’ of Labour Zionism, 
Palestinian Arab hostility to Zionism was seen as reactionary, motivated only by feudal, 
narrow, religious interests.211 In fact, as Collette noted, the LSI viewed Arab nationalism to 
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be ‘poisoned by German and Italian fascism’.212 Again, as with the British Labour Party, 
expedience played an important part in influencing policy. European social democrats 
feared that mass resettlement of Jewish refugees in Europe would strengthen popular anti-
Semitism, which in turn, would enable the fascists to capture social democracy’s working-
class electoral base. Therefore, Palestine presented itself as a preferable solution.213 Hence, 
it appears fair to conclude that for Kelemen, the attitudes of European labour essentially 
mirrored those of British labour. 
 
Sargent noted that the split in the international movement impacted upon the Zionist labour 
movement, as Poale Zion was deeply divided over which international to join. This led to 
the formation of the Jewish Communist Union Poale Zion, which affiliated to the 
Comintern. However, the Comintern soon demanded that these members joined their 
respective national Communist parties.214 The ‘right wing’ of the party then participated in 
the ‘second and a half international’ in 1921 before finally being admitted into the LSI in 
1924. This was a major gain for the Zionists as Poale Zion had been rejected by the pre-
war Socialist International. In addition, the Histadrut affiliated to the IFTU.215 Therefore, 
Sargent concluded that the Zionists’ success within the British Labour Party ‘was mirrored 
and re-enforced by their success within the wider International Socialist movement’.216 As 
with the British labour movement, the Palestinian Arabs had no influence comparable to 
that of the Zionists. To support this claim, Sargent quoted from a contemporary Zionist 
activist who wrote ‘we have been able to entrench ourselves in the international councils, 
from the Geneva League to the Socialist International before the Arabs ever entered the 
scene’.217 Therefore, in contrast to Kelemen, Sargent has stressed the importance of the 
lobbying activity of Poale Zion rather than the attractiveness of Labour Zionism as an 
ideology. 
 
Regarding the Comintern, as Joel Benin has pointed out, ‘throughout the era of the British 
mandate in Palestine the international communist movement regarded Zionism as a settler-
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colonial movement expropriating the rights of the indigenous population in alliance with 
British imperialism’.218 On the issue of Zionism, the CPGB did not deviate from the 
Moscow line. 
 
Labour and Anti-Semitism 
The issue of anti-Semitism and the British Labour movement has been explored in the 
existing historiography. The main focus of this has been the anti-Semitic rhetoric espoused 
by some Labourites in the context of the Boer War and Jewish immigration into Britain in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Historians have been divided over the 
prevalence. For example, Colin Holmes has argued that its extent has been overstated by 
some scholars.219 As we have seen, there has been some attention paid to anti-Semitism in 
relation to Zionism, mainly in terms of explaining hostility to Zionism. But some 
subsequent literature has also explored the relationship between pro-Zionist thought and 
anti-Semitism. As previously noted, Kelemen has examined how advocacy of Zionism by 
the mainstream labour movement in the 1930s was motivated in part by a desire to avoid 
large-scale Jewish immigration into Britain. David Cesarani has also addressed the 
question, demonstrating how support for Labour Zionism could coexist with a certain form 
of anti-Semitism.220  
 
Chapter five of this study aims to explore the relationship between anti-Semitism and pro 
and anti-Zionist perspectives. For example, it will examine in detail the impact of violent 
anti-Semitic persecution in Eastern Europe after the First World War and the rise of 
fascism in Europe in the 1930s on the discourse regarding Palestine. It is necessary to 
engage with several historiographies in order to properly explore the question of the ILP’s 
perspectives on Mandatory Palestine and this study will continue to draw on and critically 
analyse the secondary literature throughout the course of the various chapters. 
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Chapter 1: The Internationalisms of the ILP in the Interwar Years 
 
The self-identification with and pursuit of ‘internationalism’, although interpreted in 
various ways, was a defining feature of the labour movement and its most important 
electoral expression, the Labour Party, reflected this. Conversely, despite Britain’s 
participation in the League of Nations, its treaties with other nations and the maintenance 
of the British Empire, leading figures in the Conservative Party displayed a definite 
aversion to any kind of overtly internationalist agenda. As the party’s most important 
figure in the interwar period, Stanley Baldwin, commented, ‘I do not myself know what 
the word ‘internationalism’ means. All I know is that when I hear it employed it is a bad 
thing for this country’.1 As Norman Angell observed, Labour was ‘by doctrine 
internationalist’ and ‘seemed to mean business about its internationalism in a way which 
the Conservatives did not’.2 Instead, the Tory party positioned itself as ‘patriotic’ and by 
portraying Labour as the opposite, was able to inflict serious damage upon Labour’s 
electoral performances, most notably in 1918 and 1924.3  
 
Nevertheless, Labour persisted with its policy which in official terms centred on the 
necessity of international cooperation and securing peace.4 However, the picture is a 
complicated one, as the Labour Party was far from a monolithic entity. Rhiannon Vickers 
has identified five ‘streams’ of influence, namely the ILP; the trade union movement; the 
Social Democratic Federation and other Marxist groups; the Fabians and the radical 
Liberals, epitomised by the Union of Democratic Control. These contributed to the 
creation of two central ‘internationalisms’: liberal internationalism and socialist 
internationalism.5 This chapter focuses on one of these sections, the ILP, which has been 
described as Labour’s most ‘fervently’ internationalist element.6 It was certainly true that 
influential ILPers saw the resolution of international problems to be just as crucial as 
solving domestic questions. As E. D. Morel wrote in 1922: 
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… the Labour Party has two supreme aims: the raising of the standards of life… and, 
which has become essential to the very existence of the state, the exercise of the full 
national influence in the councils of the world on behalf of international reconstruction, 
reconciliation and enduring peace, based upon a realisation of the economic 
interdependence of nations, and upon the common needs and aspirations of mankind.7  
 
This chapter will explore in detail the nature of the ILP’s internationalism, identifying 
change and continuity over time and examining its relations both nationally and 
internationally, with the rest of labour movement. An understanding of the ILP’s 
perspectives on internationalism is crucial to understanding its engagement with Zionism 
because, as later chapters will show, arguments regarding the status and future of 
Palestine were framed largely in relation to internationalist principles. There will be a 
particular focus on the issue of empire as this is especially pertinent given Palestine’s 
status in the interwar period. 
 
Internationalism Before the First World War, 1892-1914 
The ILP was founded in 1893 with the immediate goal of representing domestic working-
class concerns at municipal and parliamentary level. The national organisation was 
formed from ‘the bottom up’ after the coming together of local parties which had stressed 
their political independence and rejected the idea that working class interests could be 
secured through the ‘Lib-Lab’ representatives of the Liberal Party or via working-class 
Toryism.8 Keir Hardie’s election to parliament in 1892 then galvanised the movement as 
44 new ILP branches were established within eight months of Hardie’s victory.9 
 
Despite prioritising domestic issues, the party’s early literature and propaganda 
nevertheless expressed explicit, if rather broad, internationalist sentiments.10 A pamphlet 
written by ILP secretary Tom Mann in 1897 concluded with the declaration that:  
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The Independent Labour Party ever upholds the solidarity of all workers, regardless of 
race and nationality…. It looks forward with confident hope to the International 
organisation of Labour, and echoes the cry, whose realisation means the complete 
downfall of capitalism, and the final triumph of Democracy – WORKERS, OF ALL 
COUNTRIES, UNITE.11 
 
Moreover, this commitment was not simply confined to rhetoric but operated on a variety 
of practical levels. In 1896, Mann was instrumental in the formation of the International 
Federation of Ship, Dock and River Workers, which later became the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, and served as its first president.12 So committed was 
Mann to this international project that he offered his resignation as ILP secretary in order 
to make it his primary focus.13 Links were forged with the international labour movement 
as prominent ILP figures such as Hardie, Ramsay MacDonald and Glasier represented 
Britain at conferences of the International Socialist Bureau, as well as at conferences of 
the Second International in the years prior to the war.14 There was also a colonial 
dimension. In 1907, ILP leader Hardie embarked upon a speaking tour of the US, Canada, 
South Africa and Australia, as well as visiting India and publishing a book about his 
experiences there.15 In addition to his connections with Labourites based in European 
countries, Hardie also made links with nationalist movements within the British empire. 
For instance, he befriended leading Indian nationalist Bipin Chandra Pal, who was invited 
to speak at the ILP’s annual conference.16  
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Internationalism manifested itself in other ways as the party actively campaigned against 
the Boer War.17 The rationale for this was summed up by Glasier who stated, ‘our party, 
being a socialist, and therefore a democratic party, maintains the principle that no nation 
can govern another’.18 The significance of this particular underlying principle is that it 
reflected the influence of the liberal tradition upon the ILP’s early internationalism. 
Consequently, this standard was extended to other international questions. As Hardie 
explicitly stated, while in India he became convinced of John Stuart Mill’s dictum that 
‘such a thing as a government of one people by another does not and cannot exist’.19   
 
Another expression came in the form of anti-racism. The ILP rejected an affiliation 
attempt by its South African counterpart on the basis that the latter’s racist advocacy of an 
exclusively white suffrage was at odds with the British party’s notion of ‘universal 
brotherhood’.20 Meanwhile, in parliament, efforts were made to secure political rights for 
non-white people in South Africa.21 Hardie’s visit there provoked a violent response 
when he spoke out against racial discrimination within the trade union movement. His 
writings on India denounced ‘the colour bar’ and angrily documented incidents of white 
racism against Indians.22 
 
At this time, in the absence of a particularly detailed party policy, leading individual 
figures such as Hardie were responsible for setting the tone of the ILP’s internationalism 
and establishing its internationalist reputation. Ramsay MacDonald travelled to South 
Africa and India and subsequently produced accounts of his experiences.23 Indeed, for 
MacDonald, who would later serve as Labour’s first ever Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary, international issues were never peripheral concerns. This was illustrated when 
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in 1900; he resigned from the Fabian Society after its refusal to condemn the Boer War.24 
MacDonald was not alone in this; H.N. Brailsford joined the ILP in 1907 after concluding 
that the Fabians were not sufficiently critical of British imperialism.25  
 
However, these activities could mask a more complex, often contradictory reality. As 
Paul Ward has shown, the ILP leadership often emphasised the British character of its 
socialism.26 Furthermore, Ward has noted that the establishment of branches of trade 
unions such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in Canada, Australian and South 
Africa were ‘less an expression of internationalism than of skilled workers’ emigration to 
the dominions’.27 Moreover, the labour movement was not immune to racist or 
xenophobic ideas. ILP parliamentary candidate Ben Tillett, who was centrally involved in 
the International Federation of Ship, Dock and River Workers and enthused about the 
prospect of taking worldwide industrial action, revealed just how superficial his 
commitment to the idea of ‘universal brotherhood’ was in practice. Commenting upon 
immigration into Britain he remarked, ‘Yes, you are our brothers and we will do our duty 
by you, but we wish you had not come to this country’.28 Indeed for Tillett, his perception 
of ‘universalism’ was severely limited as he believed there could be ‘no comradeship’ 
between black and white workers.29 Therefore, rhetoric about ‘worldwide’ or universal 
equality was in reality, an expression of white solidarity.30 Although such overt racism 
was not representative of the prevailing attitude within the ILP, Tillett’s view on 
immigration was by no means marginal. Glasier argued that ‘neither the principle of the 
brotherhood of man nor the principle of social equality implies that brother nations or 
brother men may crowd upon us in such numbers as to abuse our hospitality, overturn our 
institutions or violate our customs’.31  
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In the years prior to the war, several Liberals launched a vociferous attack on the conduct 
of imperial policy. Particularly significant was J. A. Hobson’s 1902 work Imperialism: A 
Study, which was, in the words of one historian, ‘the most widely read attack on the 
colonial movement’.32 Published soon after the conclusion of the second Boer War, it 
denounced ‘jingoism’ and heavily influenced Lenin’s 1917 study Imperialism: The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism. Yet unlike Lenin, critics such as Hobson were not anti-
colonialists. As Mark Mazower has noted, ‘what is striking is the degree to which even 
the most radical of British internationalists accepted the imperial framework of world 
politics’.33 Here we might add that the mainstream nationalist movements in countries 
such as Ireland and India also accepted the imperialist system and did not advocate 
complete independence from the British Empire, but rather demanded dominion status 
within it. These Liberal critics had made their peace with the reality of empire, preferring 
instead to constructively critique the nature of colonial administration and offer a vision 
of what has variously been termed ‘sane’, ‘constructivist’ ‘ethical’ or ‘benevolent’ 
imperialism. According to Hobson, ‘sane Imperialism’ was ‘devoted to the protection, 
development and education of a ‘‘lower race’’ whereas ‘insane Imperialism’ handed over 
‘these races to the economic exploitation of white colonists who will use them as ‘‘live 
tools’’ and their lands as repositories of mining or other profitable treasure’.34  
 
The acceptance of empire also proved to be true for a significant section of the labour 
movement. For instance, Ramsay MacDonald’s 1907 tract Labour and the Empire, 
despite criticising ‘bombastic Imperialism’ for being exploitative and ‘incompatible with 
democracy’, argued for the reform of empire rather than its dissolution.35 MacDonald felt 
that the labour movement must adopt a realist attitude: 
 
Being historical it [Labour] does not quarrel with historical facts… it does not seek to go 
back on them when once they have passed beyond the stage of contemporary change. The 
Labour Party therefore no more thinks of discussing whether the Stuarts should be 
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restored to the throne than it does of debating whether we should break the Empire into 
pieces.36  
 
He called for the implementation of an ‘Imperial standard’ based on ‘certain axioms 
regarding human liberty and the administration of justice’.37 MacDonald envisioned 
Labour’s form of imperialism as one which ‘to its subject races… desires to occupy the 
position of friend… (and)… to its self-governing Imperial states… seeks to be an 
equal’.38 Here MacDonald made an important distinction between those deemed capable 
of self-government and those considered to be incapable. Moreover, the criterion for self-
rule was evidently based on race. However, it is important to note that MacDonald 
himself conceded that he was ‘perhaps too bold in associating the Labour Party with this 
book. The Labour Party has as yet sanctioned no Imperial policy’.39 
 
As MacDonald acknowledged, there was by no means a consensus on the issue. Some 
socialists wanted its immediate and total dissolution, some believed that imperial 
expansion was historically necessary if the capitalist epoch was to pass into socialism, 
while others contended that Europe required colonial possessions if its workers were to 
have economic prosperity. When the Second International met in Stuttgart in August 
1907 the majority report of its colonial commission initially recommended that while the 
‘general usefulness or necessity of the colonies – particularly for the working class’ was 
‘highly exaggerated’, the congress did not ‘in principle reject all colonial policy for all 
time, as it could have a civilising effect under a socialist regime’.40 This was then revised 
to read: ‘In view of the fact that socialism wants to develop the productive energies of the 
entire globe and to raise all peoples to the highest levels of culture the congress does not 
in principle reject every colonial policy, since such a policy can have a civilising effect 
under a socialist regime’.41 
 
Despite these amendments, the motion was rejected by 127 votes to 108, with 10 
abstentions. Tellingly however, the majority of the British delegation, which was 
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comprised of 10 members of the Labour Party, 4 from the Social Democratic Federation, 
4 from the ILP and 2 from the Fabian Society voted 14 to 6 in favour.42 Yet, as Partha 
Sarthi Gupta has noted, in this vote, the ILP contingent ‘joined the German leader 
Kautsky in opposing imperialism under any guise’.43  
 
Therefore, as we have seen, the ILP’s internationalism was wide-ranging, incorporating 
several distinct aspects. The first key feature was the internationalisation of socialist and 
trade union organisation. The second characteristic was opposition to imperialist and 
capitalist wars. A third facet involved engaging with national movements seeking 
independence from British rule and fourth was a dialogue on the future of the British 
Empire. However, internationalism, regardless of whether it came in its liberal or socialist 
guises was never inherently anti-colonialist in the sense that it demanded the immediate 
ending of empire. 
 
The Challenges of World War, 1914-1918 
After the formation of the Labour Party in 1906, the ILP initiated the majority of the 
discussion concerning foreign affairs, and the Labour Party as a whole proved very 
receptive to ILP-inspired resolutions on issues such as anti-militarism and the need to 
replace war with arbitration.44 Yet, at the outbreak of war in 1914, the ILP distinguished 
itself as the only significant section of the British labour movement to actively oppose the 
conflict in Europe. The Fabians for instance, backed the war as a ‘crusade for 
democracy’.45 Indeed, as Julius Braunthal has highlighted, the ILP was the only mass 
workers’ party in Europe to oppose the war.46 In doing so, the ILP had, according to its 
London City branch, ‘remained loyal to the principles of internationalism’.47 The party 
remained hopeful that its vision of internationalism could be revived, as its National 
Administrative Council proclaimed:   
We are told that International Socialism is dead, that all our hopes and ideals are wrecked 
by the fire and pestilence and European war. It is not true. Out of the darkness and the 
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depth we hail our working-class comrades of every land… Long live International 
Socialism! 48 
ILP members Fenner Brockway and Clifford Allen took the initiative to set up the ‘No 
Conscription Fellowship’ and thousands of its members were imprisoned for their 
opposition to the war, including high-profile cases like that of Alice Wheeldon.49 Overall, 
of the 1,191 people tried as conscientious objectors, 805 were members of the ILP.50 
However, although an anti-war stance prevailed within the party, opinion was neither 
uniform nor static. Two of its seven MPs – James Parker and J.R. Clynes, its chairman 
Fred Jowett and eleven of its branches openly supported the war effort.51 Joseph Burgess, 
one of the party’s founders, former organising secretary, local councillor and NAC 
member had succeeded in securing anti-war and anti-imperialist resolutions at the first 
annual conference of the Labour Representative Committee in 1901. However, in 1915 he 
resigned over the issue of the war and joined Hyndman’s pro-war National Socialist 
Party.52 Others chose to remain and portray the party as a supporter of the war effort. In 
1916, at a meeting in Newcastle upon Tyne, ILP activist Thomas Richardson claimed that 
the ILP were ‘second to none in their admiration of their brave countrymen who had 
joined the colours in defence of civil and political liberty’, asserting that ‘tyrannical 
Kaiserism’ was ‘a menace not only to Europe but to the world’.53 At the annual 
conference in 1917, a motion calling on ILP MPs to vote against any war credits in future 
was voted down by 198 votes to 61.54 Furthermore, as the conflict progressed, Hardie and 
MacDonald became convinced that the war had to be fought until Germany was 
defeated.55 The emergence of the ILP leaders’ more pessimistic attitude and the existence 
of a pro-war contingent at a grassroots level were overlooked in Braunthal’s analysis.  
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A major war-time development which was to have considerable implications for 
immediate post-war policy was the establishment in 1914 of the anti-militarist pressure 
group the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), which had attracted over 300,000 
members by the autumn of 1915.56 The organisation’s manifesto advocated five main 
tenets, the first of which set out a commitment to self-determination, stating that ‘No 
Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the consent by 
plebiscite or otherwise of the population of such Province’.57 The second called for an 
end to ‘secret diplomacy’, stipulating that: ‘No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall 
be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. 
Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created’.58 
 
In addition, it argued that states should no longer form alliances but co-operate in an 
‘International Council’. Furthermore, states should aim to drastically reduce and control 
armaments and enter into an ‘Open Door’ trade agreement to ensure an end to ‘economic 
war’.59 The UDC featured senior ILP members such as MacDonald, Phillip Snowden, 
Jowett and H.N. Brailsford along with politicians and activists who, at that point, were 
close to the Liberal Party, including E.D. Morel, J. A. Hobson, Charles Trevelyan. It was 
very much a cross-class initiative as this Liberal contingent was described by Fenner 
Brockway as ‘bourgeois to their fingertips’.60 As indicated by Jowett’s involvement, the 
organisation was not explicitly ‘pacifist’ (although described as such by the government), 
rather it was a vociferous critic of Britain’s war time policies at home and abroad.61 
Indeed, as Rhiannon Vickers has pointed out, the UDC’s first pamphlet stated clearly that 
‘it is imperative that the war, once begun, should be prosecuted to a victory for our 
country’.62 As a result, Arthur Henderson saw ‘no inconsistency’ in supporting Britain’s 
war effort and being on the General Council of the UDC.63 As Martin Ceadel has 
highlighted, there is an important difference between ‘pacifism’, that is to say, ‘the belief 
that war is always wrong and should not be resorted to, whatever the consequences’ and 
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‘pacificism’ i.e. ‘the assumption that war although sometimes necessary is always an 
irrational and inhumane way to solve disputes, and that its prevention should always be 
an overriding political priority’.64  Reactions to the UDC demonstrated the scope of 
opinion within the labour movement regarding the war. Thus, for Ellen Wilkinson, the 
timidity of the UDC was a ‘tragedy’ and called for the ILP to advocate a ‘bold policy’.65 
While in Stirling, the miners’ union withdrew from the town’s trades council between 
1915 and 1918 in order to protest against the decision to invite a member of the UDC to 
address the council.66 Ultimately, the UDC directly influenced ILP policy and at its 1915 
conference, the ILP passed a resolution which ‘followed closely’ the main aims of the 
UDC programme.67  
 
Reconstructing and Constructing Internationalism in the Post-War World, 1918-
1926 
It was during the later stages of the war that the Labour Party began to formulate a more 
specific foreign policy, culminating in its ‘war aims’ statement of 1917, which was then 
accepted with only minor modifications by the conference of Inter-Allied Labour and 
Socialist parties in February 1918.68 These aims included detailed proposals for the 
establishment of the League of Nations, the nature of future economic relations between 
states and opined on disputed territories such as the Balkans, Alsace and Lorraine, and 
Palestine.  
 
It was the more pragmatic line on empire that was articulated in the war aims. On ‘the 
colonial policy of capitalist governments’ it declared that ‘without ceasing to condemn it, 
the Inter-Allied Conference nevertheless recognises the existence of a state of things 
which it is obliged to take into account’.69 Therefore, rather than dismantling empire, 
European labour called for the League of Nations to safeguard ‘natives’ against ‘the 
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excesses of capitalist colonialism’.70 It was at the insistence of the ILP that the additional 
clause was added which called for League of Nations involvement in this process and 
took into account the aspirations of the population within a particular territory, and read 
thus: 
 
With respect to these colonies the Conference declares in favour of a system of control, 
established by international agreement, under the League of Nations and maintained by 
its guarantee, which, whilst respecting national sovereignty, would be alike inspired by 
broad conceptions of economic freedom and concerned to safeguard the rights of the 
natives under the best conditions possible for them, and in particular: 
(1) It would take account in each locality of the wishes of the people, expressed in the 
form which is possible for them. 
(2) The interests of the native tribes as regards the ownership of the soil would be 
maintained. 
(3) The whole of the revenues would be devoted to the well-being and development of the 
colonies themselves.71 
 
Therefore, while the document spoke of Labour’s commitment to ‘the frank abandonment 
of every form of imperialism’, this did not mean decolonisation but rather the 
internationalisation of the imperial system. 
 
German social democrats criticised the war aims policy as ‘a masterpiece of English 
cant’, which would ‘further the aims of Entente Imperialism’ and approvingly quoted 
Joseph Havelock Wilson’s assessment that it was ‘the most contradictory document that 
was ever laid before a Labour Congress’.72 The German socialists pointed out that despite 
the supposed commitment to self-determination, Ireland had not been deemed worthy of 
independence.73 The ILP too were deeply critical of aspects of the memorandum. They 
urged the congress to remove the section which assigned ‘responsibility for the origins of 
the war’ to Germany describing it as ‘eminently undesirable’ as the assembly could ‘in no 
sense be regarded as a judicial or impartial body’.74 
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One of the most significant outcomes of the war was the demise of the Second 
International. The affiliated parties had resolved to actively oppose war, but when Britain 
declared war on Germany in August 1914, such action failed to materialise and the anti-
war contingent of the working-class movement was increasingly isolated.75 A month prior 
to the end of hostilities, the ILP expressed their belief in ‘the need for the reconstitution 
of the Socialist International’ urging the French Socialist Party to call the International.76 
However, from 1918 to 1921 it chose to ‘stand aloof’ from the two major Internationals – 
the Comintern having being established in 1920.77 Yet, this was not due to a lack of 
enthusiasm for an international socialist organisation, but was because the ILP believed 
that remaining ‘independent’ would place the party in a position to unify the socialist 
movement. Indeed, the sense of priority was indicated in an ILP policy document from 
1920 discussing strategy with regards to the Internationals which stated, ‘No more 
momentous decision has ever been asked for from the ILP’.78 In 1921 the party 
unilaterally involved itself in the Vienna or ‘Second and a Half’ International which 
unsuccessfully attempted to bridge the divide between revolutionary and reformist 
socialists, before eventually affiliating to the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) in 
1924.79 
 
A definitive episode of this period was Labour’s response to the Russian revolution of 
1917. Even though Labour, including the ILP, had ‘little sympathy’ for the Bolshevik 
government, actually inviting Kerensky to their 1918 annual conference, it was 
unequivocal in its defence of the Soviet Union.80 In fact, by 1920, the Labour Party, along 
with the TUC was ‘unanimously determined’ to call a general strike to prevent Britain 
declaring war on Russia. A.J.P. Taylor has argued that opposition to intervention was 
motivated ‘more from dislike of further war than from any love of the Bolsheviks’.81 
However, it is important to take into account that many figures from across the spectrum 
of the labour movement explicitly justified actions in terms of international socialism 
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rather than anti-militarism. Herbert Morrison maintained that ‘a war against Russia was 
not alone a war against Bolshevism or Lenin, but against the whole international 
organisation of socialism’.82 Similarly, the ILP’s John Paton commented, ‘For me as for 
most socialists, the fate of world socialism was bound up with the success or failure of the 
Russian Revolution’.83 For George Orwell, who was of the opinion that in Britain 
patriotism was ‘usually stronger than class-hatred and always stronger than any kind of 
internationalism’, the ‘Hands Off Russia’ campaign represented the only instance in 
which the British working class had ever ‘thought or acted internationally’.84 
 
After the war, the Union of Democratic Control greatly impacted upon the composition of 
the ILP. Leading members of the UDC such as Morel, Trevelyan and Angell all joined 
the ILP within a few years of the war ending. They were joined in the ILP by ex-Liberal 
MPs who had not been involved with the UDC such as Josiah Wedgwood and Noel 
Buxton. The decision to join the ILP is even more significant given that in 1918, it was 
for the first time possible to attain individual membership of the Labour Party without 
being a member of an affiliated trade union or socialist group. By the 1920s, the 
leadership of the UDC consisted entirely of ILPers.85 It is hardly surprising therefore, 
given the influx of ex-Liberals joining existing members like MacDonald who as we saw, 
advanced broadly similar conceptions to Hobson regarding empire, that this doctrine of 
‘sane imperialism’ became prominent within the interwar ILP.86  
 
In the immediate post-war period, MacDonald reiterated his arguments in relation to the 
empire. He maintained that socialists should strive to create an empire comprised of self-
governing states and could not ‘refuse responsibility for the… native races’.87 Speaking in 
1921, John Scurr articulated the tension between ideology and practice, arguing that if 
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Labour were to come into government: ‘We might be opposed to Imperialism, but we 
must admit the Empire was a concrete fact, whose existence carried with it duties and 
responsibilities that Labour would be cowardly to ignore’.88  
 
There were, however, dissenting voices. Maintaining that ‘Indian freedom can only be 
won by Indian people themselves’, in 1921 Fenner Brockway questioned the notion that 
British labourites could automatically assume the role of educators in the colonies, 
arguing: ‘the first duty of an Englishman in regard to India is to educate, not the Indian 
people, but his own countrymen to a knowledge of the tyranny of British Rule… until we 
do that we should be ashamed to go to India as guides or teachers’.89 Nonetheless, 
paternalistic attitudes were deeply ingrained. Even Norman Leys, who was a vocal 
opponent of imperialism, still only had qualified support for Indian self-rule. As Nicholas 
Owen has pointed out, Leys feared that the Indians might not be able to formulate a 
constitution and argued that the ILP should be given the task of devising it, given their 
experience in this area.90 
 
Despite the significant migration of Liberals into the party, ILPers did not accept that 
Labour had simply adopted the foreign policy of the Liberals. Responding to a claim in 
the New Statesman that ‘on all questions of foreign affairs’ there was ‘no serious division 
of opinion between the Liberal and the Labour Parties’, Brailsford pointed out that 
Labour was opposed to Lord Grey’s advocacy of a military alliance with France and 
attacked Lloyd George for conspiring with Clemenceau to create ‘a peace of violence and 
dictation’ which had rendered the League of Nations ‘nothing but a pathetic monument to 
the war-time illusions of Liberalism’.91 In the post-war period, the ILP continued to 
devote a great deal of attention to international developments. The party’s paper The New 
Leader, under the editorship of Brailsford, extensively featured foreign policy in its 
pages, much of it penned by Brailsford himself. A key element of Brailsford’s political 
thought related to the economic benefit of international co-operation. He argued that 
because the world market was one entity, it followed that poverty elsewhere in the world 
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adversely affected employment for British workers by creating the ‘universal evil’ of 
under-consumption.92 Therefore, it was ‘the duty of International Socialists’ from Britain 
and the ‘Western International’ to provide help ‘as educators and organisers’ to workers 
‘in the Empire and far beyond it’ in their ‘industrial and political struggle for the better 
distribution of income’.93 One means of achieving this was to ‘capture’ the League of 
International Labour Office, and turn it into a power that would ‘raise the conditions of 
exploited populations’.94 It was also imperative if under-consumption was to be tackled to 
‘advance to a working League of Nations’ which would ‘internationalise’ resources such 
as raw materials by rationing them.95  
 
Much of the ILP’s criticism was levelled at the League of Nations’, despite, (or perhaps 
because of) its relentless advocacy of such an organisation. The suitability of the League 
to secure lasting world peace was called into question. Robert Smillie told an ILP meeting 
in Newcastle that ‘it was not to the League of Nations… but to movements like the 
I.L.P… that we must look to end war’.96 However, the prevailing policy within the ILP 
still held that the League of Nations, including its mandates system was sound in 
principle and needed reform of the kind outlined by Brailsford.   
 
Anti-Colonialism and the League Against Imperialism: 1927-1932 
The turning point arrived in 1926 when James Maxton replaced MacDonald’s ally 
Clifford Allen as ILP chairman, a development which signalled the ascendancy of the left 
wing into the party’s leadership and had profound implications for the direction of its 
internationalism. At the time of Maxton’s election, the ILP was undoubtedly ideologically 
anti-imperialist. Take, for example, the ILP pamphlet The Crime of Empire by C.A Smith 
which considered the nature of imperial rule in non-self-governing parts of the empire: 
‘Empire is not glorious – it is essentially robbery with violence motivated by greed and 
maintained by murder’.97 
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Nevertheless, as Stephen Howe has pointed out, the ILP’s official colonial policy still was 
one of ‘overt paternalism’.98 The document Socialism and the Empire, which Smith saw 
as ‘the constructive policy of the ILP’, had been drawn up by the ILP Empire Policy 
Committee in March 1926.99 Quoting from the ILP’s constitution, the report emphasised 
that socialists must recognise that ‘the interests of the workers throughout the world 
whatever race, colour or creed are one, and that war and imperialism are mainly caused 
by the greed of competing capitalist groups’.100 Therefore ‘the policy which Socialism 
would adopt in relation to Empire problems’ involved ‘a complete break with many past 
traditions’.101 However, one tradition it did not break from was an acceptance of the 
mainstream race-based distinction between those parts of the empire that were capable of 
self-government and those that were incapable: ‘it must be recognised that, for many 
races self-government is an ideal which could not be realised for some years’.102 In the 
meantime, these would be governed as mandates, as although the system ‘was open to 
criticism in some respects’ it was, ‘in the main… based on the right principles’.103 
Furthermore, the report completely rejected any process of decolonisation, even for those 
deemed capable of self-rule. Instead, it declared that ‘… the Socialist aim should not be a 
destructive one of breaking up the Empire, but a constructive one seeking to develop it 
into a real Commonwealth of Nations’.104 Therefore, in fundamental respects, the official 
policy still contained within it many of Hobson’s central ideas and in fact, Hobson was 
approvingly quoted in C. A. Smith’s work.105  
 
However, in February 1927, leading figures in the ILP became key founder members of a 
transnational anti-colonial organisation, the League Against Imperialism (LAI), which 
had been initiated by Communist Party organiser and KPD member of the Reichstag, 
Willi Münzenberg.106 The aim was to bring together intellectuals, communist and social 
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democratic working-class parties and anti-colonial nationalist movements to work for the 
defeat of imperialism. In December of 1926, the ‘Provisional Committee of International 
Congress Against Imperialism and Oppression’, which included figures like Münzenberg, 
Lansbury and Nehru, had issued an invitation to create ‘a permanent organisation to link 
up all forces combating international imperialism and in order to ensure their effective 
support for the fight for emancipation’.107 This resulted in the Brussels conference which, 
in the words of one scholar, ‘hosted a stunning array of delegates’, including Albert 
Einstein, Henri Barbusse, Upton Sinclair and Nehru.108 
 
The decision to accept the invitation to participate in the LAI represented a significant 
departure from previous policy. In this respect, the League’s full title was ideologically 
revealing, namely, ‘The League Against Imperialism and For National Independence’. As 
we have seen with the case of the ILP’s Socialism and the Empire, many socialists who 
were resolutely against imperialism were not necessarily in favour of national 
independence, particularly for those ‘races’ considered as yet unfit for self-rule. After the 
founding conference, the Communist Party’s Harry Pollitt made reference to this section 
of the labour movement, remarking that the LAI was ‘the answer to the armchair theorists 
who dilate upon imperialism and the empire as something that only needs the 
humanitarian touch in order that it can be put right’.109 Pollitt approvingly quoted Georg 
Ledebour had who told the congress, ‘‘There can be no socialist colonial policy’’ as ‘the 
very term connotes exploitation on an unparalleled scale’.110 Twenty years earlier, 
Ledebour, along with Kautsky had led the opposition to the idea of a ‘socialist’ colonial 
policy at the Second International congress in 1907.111  
 
The LAI’s founding conference had a profound impact upon many of those involved. 
Lansbury, who was unanimously elected chairman, compared the gathering to the signing 
of the American Declaration of Independence and ‘visualised the days a hundred years 
hence when men will look back to the great gathering… at Brussels… and they will tell 
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once again that men and women gathered together, once more to declare that all men and 
women are born equal’.112 Lansbury explained the rationale behind supporting nationalist 
movements in the following terms: ‘the more we can get the spirit of Nationalism 
developed and expressed in the grander and wider ideal of International Socialism, the 
sooner will the world be freed from the curse of militarism and its accompaniments of 
piracy, plunder and murder’.113 In essence, freedom from imperialism was a prerequisite 
for genuine internationalism. Therefore, all the various groups at the congress expressing 
‘one point of view’, namely that ‘the peoples of the world must be free from the thraldom 
of Capitalist Imperialism in order that they may by their own action become partners 
together in the great task of building… the International Commonwealth of All 
Peoples’.114 Lansbury directly challenged the prevailing attitude within the labour 
movement, noting that: ‘even among Socialists… we hear various statements intended to 
prove that white men organise and control coloured people for the good of those 
controlled’. By contrast, those gathered at the conference ‘without reservation’ rejected 
‘that whole doctrine’ and would endeavour to ‘convert’ the ‘citizens of Imperialist 
countries’ to this viewpoint.115 He also rejected as ‘absolutely untrue’ the idea that the 
movement was directed from Moscow. 
 
In similarly enthusiastic tones, Ellen Wilkinson described it as ‘the most dramatic 
conference I was ever at’, noting that ‘there isn’t space to describe all the interesting 
people who were present’.116 Again, she dismissed claims of control by Moscow, stating 
that ‘the said League is not some Machiavellian plot of the wicked Red Russians against 
the British Empire’. She denied that the Soviet Union was financing and controlling the 
LAI and pointed to the fact that there were no Russian delegates present. Wilkinson 
believed that there was a common interest in ending imperialism, as while ‘white workers 
had been content to see brown and yellow and black men butchered and enslaved’ they 
now were suffering economically from the  results of ‘competition of the ill-paid labour 
of the East’.117  
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Brockway described the conference as ‘without exception the most remarkable and 
significant international gathering’ he had ever attended.118 It was ‘something 
approaching a Parliament of Mankind’ which ‘may easily prove to be one of the most 
significant movements for equality and freedom in world history’.119 During his speech to 
the congress, Brockway evoked Keir Hardie, saying of the ILP that ‘the spirit of Keir 
Hardie is our spirit’.120 He criticised the last Labour government’s policy towards India, 
and assured the audience that the ILP ‘then opposed and still opposes that policy’. 
Furthermore, he pledged that ‘if hostilities ensue between England and China, our 
sympathies will be with the latter’.121 In a dramatic scene, Brockway then shook hands 
with a Chinese delegate and ‘the whole audience… rose and roared its applause’.122  
 
Rhetoric aside, for Brockway, there were important political reasons why the ILP should 
involve itself in the LAI. Firstly, the LAI had the potential to help fulfil a central ILP 
ambition, namely to aid in the process of unifying the international labour movement.123 
Brockway was very explicit about this point, ‘The I.L.P. is seeking to reunite the 
International Socialist Movement, The League Against Imperialism may be an important 
bridge across the existing gulf’.124 Secondly, although he denied it was Moscow-
controlled, Brockway argued it would be ‘suicidal’ for socialists not to involve itself in 
the LAI, even if it had been initiated by communists, because it had ‘done what the 
Socialist International has failed to do – seriously begun the task of uniting the proletarian 
movements among the coloured races’.125 Thus Brockway argued that the ‘great 
significance’ of the LAI lay in ‘bringing the Socialists of Europe in contact with the 
nationalist movements and influencing them towards socialism and internationalism’.126 
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At this point, however, it is not clear that Brockway subscribed to an absolutist anti-
colonial perspective. The ILP’s resolution to the LSI conference of 1928, while 
demanding self-determination for Egypt and India, also noted that the League of Nations 
should have a role where it was ‘not immediately practicable to extend full self-
government to a subject race’.127  
 
The decision to throw its energies into the LAI was met with severe criticism from both 
the LSI and the Labour Party, which were convinced that the LAI was a communist 
front.128 The mainstream social democratic movement believed that the true objectives of 
the LAI were to undermine the LSI and spread communist propaganda in the colonies.129 
Undeterred, the ILP continued with its LAI activities and Lansbury chaired the first 
meeting of the International Executive Committee in late March.130 In Britain, in April 
1927, a meeting was held at the House of Commons which provisionally established a 
British section of the LAI. Brockway took the chair, with Lansbury as treasurer and ILPer 
Reginald Bridgeman as secretary.131 The meeting agreed to draft a reply to the LSI in 
which Brockway reiterated the reasons why the ILP had become involved and enquired 
whether under the LSI’s constitution, the ILP could affiliate.132  
 
It is not surprising that Labour attempted to distance itself from the LAI, given the 
political capital it afforded to their opponents. The Tories immediately seized on the 
Labour left’s involvement in the LAI, as in March 1927, during a parliamentary debate on 
the deployment of British troops to China, Conservative MP Major Kindersley drew 
attention to the LAI’s policy on China. After noting the involvement of MPs such as 
Maxton, Lansbury and Wilkinson he quoted extensively from the League’s position on 
China, recently adopted at the Brussels congress, before concluding: 
 
The general tone of the Conference is this: It is an organisation which exists apparently to 
stir up the native races against existing forms of government, and I can imagine no more 
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shameful or diabolical work than that which is apparently undertaken by this 
organisation. I wish to ask how Members of this House reconcile their membership of 
such an organisation with the oath that they take at the Table of this House.133 
 
Moreover, it left Labour open to the accusation that its foreign policy was being 
manipulated by Communists and worse; that some Labour members were actively and 
knowingly engaging in a Communist ‘conspiracy’ – a charge which had apparently 
proved damaging at the general election of 1924. While Kindersley had questioned the 
ILP’s loyalties by enquiring how membership of the LAI and the British parliament were 
compatible with each other, Anthony Eden was more explicit, declaring in the same 
debate that Labour’s new slogan should read ‘Support Socialism and betray 
Englishmen’.134 
 
In the face of increasing pressure from Labour and the LSI, and fearing that it might 
affect his chances of becoming Labour Party chair, Lansbury resigned as chairman of the 
LAI in June 1927.135 Commenting on Lansbury’s departure, LAI literature declared ‘Had 
the Labour Party been truly socialist, this incompatibility would not have existed’.136 
Lansbury was replaced by Brockway, who chaired the second meeting of the international 
Executive Committee in August, but the situation became more problematic for the ILP 
when in early September 1927, the Executive Committee of the LSI passed a resolution 
which stipulated that neither the LSI nor any of its affiliated parties should associate with 
the LAI.137 Consequently, Labour banned party members from LAI activities and in 
government, even went so far as to ban the LAI from meeting in London.138 In these 
circumstances, LAI literature praised Maxton and Brockway for having ‘stood by the 
League personally’.139 
 
Furthermore, it was not only Labour and the LSI which objected to the LAI. The decision 
to participate in the LAI caused serious divisions within the ILP. When its NAC met in 
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October 1927, there was an ‘animated discussion’ during which Shinwell, Kirkwood and 
others expressed serious misgivings about the LAI. According to the New Leader, during 
the course of the debate, Kirkwood ‘thundered’ at Maxton that ‘the chairman of the I.L.P. 
would have to do what he was told’.140 On the other side, Frank Wise, Oswald Mosley, 
and Dorothy Jewson held a positive view of the organisation.141 Nevertheless, a general 
consensus was reached which decided against affiliation. Brockway presented a report in 
which he declared that after investigating the LSI’s claims, he had concluded that the LAI 
was not communist-controlled. However, he believed that given the LSI’s recent ruling, 
ILP affiliation would be ‘unwise’ and offered his resignation as chairman of the LAI so 
that he could retain his position on the LSI executive, which was accepted. A further 
debate ensued during which, it was decided by a majority of 7-3 that individuals were 
permitted to maintain contact in an individual capacity.142  
 
After Brockway’s resignation, Maxton assumed the chairmanship of both the British 
section and the presidency of the international LAI. Maxton had been a critic of the first 
Labour government’s colonial policy; however, his solution was the conventional 
‘Empire Socialism’ view.143 Nonetheless, he backed the LAI from its inception.144 By the 
time he accepted the chairmanship of the LAI, Maxton had adopted an anti-colonialist 
position which was underpinned by a number of concerns. First, he emphasised that as 
appalling as life was for workers in developed capitalist countries it was ‘infinitely worse’ 
for the subject peoples, ‘particularly the coloured races’, who were exposed to the ‘double 
tyranny of ‘foreign government and foreign capitalism’.145 He dismissed the idea that 
imperial rule could benefit native populations, citing the high mortality rates and low 
wages in India as proof of this. However, workers in imperialist countries also had a 
material interest in dismantling imperialism. First of all, he argued that the imperial 
system not only exploited workers in native countries, but simultaneously used this ‘as an 
agency in beating down the standards of life of workers in the ruling country’. Secondly, 
Maxton highlighted the vast public expenditure that was spent upon maintaining an 
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empire. He claimed that the cost of the British military totalled ‘over one hundred million 
pounds’ and ‘a large proportion’ of this was spent ‘policing various parts of the British 
Empire’. Consequently, while India had proved a ‘rich field of exploitation’ for British 
capitalists, it had been ‘merely a burden to the British people’. Therefore, it followed that 
the ‘economic destinies’ of workers in imperialist and subject countries were ‘completely 
bound up’ with one another.146 
 
At his first meeting of the international executive, Maxton explained that he ‘believed in 
the League’ as it carried out ‘a bit of work that the Labour organisations do not’. He 
described the LAI as ‘a very hopeful movement’ and commented that ‘the fact that it is 
called Communist does not disturb me’.147 Clearly aware of Labour’s opposition to ILP 
involvement in the organisation, Maxton was nonetheless confident that he would not 
face exclusion, remarking that, ‘my position makes me a difficult man for the Labour 
Party’. Nevertheless, it was a decision which demonstrated a definite commitment to the 
LAI. For Maxton, it was ‘a matter of personal freedom and conscience.’148 Therefore, he 
was in his own words, ‘prepared to stand against the Labour Party’ provided that the 
League did not ‘act against the principles of the Labour movement’.149  
 
As it transpired, the ILP’s LAI activities did indeed prove to be a source of conflict. In 
November 1928, the Labour Party NEC wrote to the ILP’s NAC claiming that at a 
meeting in Limehouse ‘under the auspices of the League Against Imperialism’ Maxton 
had launched a verbal attack on Clement Attlee who, the previous year, had been 
appointed as one of the seven members of the cross-party Simon Commission, established 
to examine the prospects of constitutional reform in India.150 Maxton completely rejected 
the NEC’s accusations. He insisted that neither he nor any of the other speakers had 
criticised Attlee and that his speech at the meeting was ‘a plea for support to secure a 
Labour Government, but to see to it that such a Government should grant self-government 
to India, despite any contrary recommendations of the Simon Commission’.151 However, 
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he assured the ILP’s NAC that he would ‘exercise extreme care to avoid finding himself 
in a similar position in future’.152  
 
Another leading member of the LAI’s British section was miners’ leader A. J. Cook. 
Cook’s political sympathies were complex. He joined the ILP in 1906 but left the Labour 
Party in 1913. He was then a founder member of the CPGB in 1920 before leaving in 
1921.153 Cook was however closely aligned politically the ILP left, and Maxton in 
particular. Cook entertained great ambitions for the LAI as he believed that ‘international 
cooperation of all workers’ could be achieved by the LAI.154 In order for this to happen 
he argued that ‘the revolutionary workers must conquer the Trade Unions’ and set up a 
‘Universal Trade Union International’ which would be allied to the LAI.155 Therefore, at 
least for Cook, the LAI would not only rival the League of Nations but also be part of a 
process which would challenge the hegemony of the established institutions of the 
reformist international trade union movement, namely the International Federation of 
Trade Unions (IFTU). Others however, such as Gossip were sceptical about the feasibility 
of this proposal.156 
 
Under Maxton’s leadership, the British section resolved to ‘proceed to secure the 
recruitment of thousands of workers as members’ and staged a ‘general conference’ 
which met in London on 7 July 1928. It attracted 343 delegates who claimed to represent 
‘some 100,000 workers in the London area alone’.157 In contrast to the ‘sane imperialist’ 
doctrines of MacDonald and Brailsford, with their appeals to the League of Nations, what 
was articulated here, as in Brussels, was unambiguously anti-imperialist and anti-
colonialist. It resolved to struggle against ‘world imperialism’ in order to secure world 
peace and a resolution was passed which pledged to support the struggles of ‘all colonial 
people fighting our common enemy, the British capitalist class, even when such struggles 
aim for complete independence from the British Empire’.158 The LAI did not demand that 
these anti-colonial movements had to subscribe to socialist or communist doctrines before 
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pledging its support. For example, strong links were forged with the Indian National 
Congress and the LAI called for ‘complete national independence and for the election of a 
representative constituent assembly to decide the future of India’.159 
 
In the summer of 1928, Maxton and Cook co-authored a document which soon became 
known as the ‘Maxton-Cook manifesto’, accompanied by a more detailed pamphlet titled 
Our Case For A Socialist Revival which outlined their aspirations for the labour 
movement.160 A key part of this renewal involved a radical break, not only from 
mainstream Labour’s imperial policy, but also from the ILP’s Socialism and the Empire. 
 
Socialism to our mind involves the end of class and racial domination. While it envisages 
the world co-operation of nationalities on a free basis, and possibly even the merging 
together of existing nationalities into larger units, it cannot regard the development of 
large empires based on national suppression and exploitation as a step towards socialism. 
Indeed the dissolution of these empires is a necessary step to rational world co-
operation.161 
 
The tract directly challenged the claim made by MacDonald and others that Labour must 
adopt a ‘realistic’ attitude: ‘We are frequently told in the Labour Movement that the 
empire is a fact. The revolt of colonial peoples against Imperialist domination is equally a 
fact’.162 
 
Therefore, given this fact, the duty of the British labour movement was to support ‘the 
complete right of self-determination for all colonial peoples, including the right to choose 
independence’.163 Yet, the class dimension had not been discarded as crucially, the 
rationale for pursuing this policy was that colonial revolts were ‘directed against the same 
ruling class as the workers are fighting here at home’.164 Furthermore, it was also the task 
of organised British labour to establish ‘special relations’ with the fledgling labour 
movements in the colonies so that the latter could ‘develop that movement from one of 
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national emancipation to one of social emancipation’.165 Thus, while the previous 
‘paternalistic’ policy sought to aide workers’ movements within the empire, this strategy 
envisioned the end of empire as an essential prerequisite to the success of the colonial 
workers’ movements. Socialism could not be brought from the outside, either by a Labour 
government or the ILO, but instead had to be won by the colonial labour movements 
themselves. Brockway certainly saw the LAI to be the ‘counterpart in foreign affairs’ to 
the Maxton-Cook campaign.166 However, despite its advocacy of anti-colonialism, 
Münzenberg perceived the campaign to be a distraction from Maxton’s role in the LAI.167 
There was some truth to this, given that Maxton was unable to attend the first conference 
of the British LAI in London owing to the fact that he was in Glasgow addressing a 
special meeting of the Scottish ILP in order to deal with criticisms of the Maxton-Cook 
campaign.168 
 
The manifesto also revealed that another key factor in joining the LAI was an increasing 
disillusionment with the League of Nations. Unlike Brailsford, who maintained that the 
League might still be reformed, Maxton and Cook argued that the League could no longer 
ensure peace and feared that working-class ‘co-operation with the capitalist class during 
times of peace’ through the League, ‘will be a prelude to co-operation with the capitalist 
class in time of war’.169 This left the ‘international solidarity of the working class in its 
struggle against Capitalism’ with workers ‘standing on an independent basis’ as the ‘only 
potent instrument for preventing capitalist war’.170 The LAI therefore offered an 
alternative organisation through which this new strategy could be pursued. However, the 
ILP did not immediately cease with all of its League of Nations related activity. For 
instance, in November 1928, it accepted an invitation to have ILP representation at a 
League of Nations Union conference on armaments and the Pact of Paris, sending their 
leading figures Maxton, Brockway and Brailsford.171 Furthermore, despite endorsing the 
Maxton-Cook manifesto, Brockway did not appear to share this analysis, given that the 
 
165 Ibid. 
166 ‘The League Against Imperialism’, The Times, 9 July 1928. 
167 Middlemas, Clydesiders, p. 228. 
168 ‘League Against Imperialism: First British Conference’, New Leader, 13 July 1928. 
169 A. J. Cook and James Maxton, Our Case For a Socialist Revival (London, 1928), p. 21. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Minutes of the Meeting of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party, 
November 1928, p. 10.  
71 
 
ILP’s resolution to the LSI conference in 1928 accepted the idea that the League should 
have a role in preventing colonial exploitation.172  
 
Maxton continued to try to influence Labour Party policy. In his capacity as chairman of 
the LAI, he issued an open letter to the Labour Party conference of 1928 which called on 
delegates to reconsider those sections of the NEC’s report and party programme which 
pledged Labour to ‘maintain the imperialist system and actually made it easier, by 
changes proposed, for capitalism to continue the exploitation of Colonial countries’.173 
MacDonald criticised his ILP colleagues, declaring of the LAI: ‘Monkeying with 
revolution at a safe distance is not the sort of thing in which we should indulge’.174 
Instead, he assured the electorate that ‘the Labour policy is altogether different’.175 In 
Forward Bridgeman responded by stating ‘MacDonald seems to regard Nationalism as a 
greater evil than Imperialism’.176 However, it appears that MacDonald overstated the 
extent to which this stance was electorally damaging. Despite the National Union of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations distributing literature in Bridgeton and Uxbridge 
which highlighted their involvement in the LAI and asked, ‘Do you want to support 
Revolution and Smash up the Empire?’, Maxton was returned with an increased majority 
while Bridgeman significantly increased the Labour vote.177 
 
After the election, Bridgeman and MacDonald continued to clash when a public debate 
was held on the subject of imperialism, an encounter which plainly illustrated the 
opposing stances on empire. Opening the debate, Bridgeman accused Labour of 
denouncing the LAI as communist without ‘any proof’.178 Significantly, MacDonald 
argued that the difference between the LAI and Labour was not opinion but tactics. 
MacDonald stressed that ‘legislative machinery’ could be used to attain its ideals, 
whereas the LAI believed only in ‘the armed uprising of the proletariat’. For MacDonald, 
Labour, as a socialist party was axiomatically against imperialism and therefore the 
creation of the LAI was unnecessary. However, MacDonald suggested that anti-colonial 
views could be tolerated within the Labour Party, claiming that he would ‘welcome Mr 
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Bridgeman back into the Labour Party tomorrow’ if he severed his connections with the 
LAI.179 
 
The LAI claimed that it involved genuine unity and mutual collaboration across a 
relatively wide political and social spectrum. Münzenberg contended that the LAI was 
based on: 
 
(The) co-operation of the representatives of the oppressed peoples, national revolutionary 
organisations and left wing intellectuals with socialists, communists and other Labour 
Organisations… Every Communist or Syndicalist who joins the League to-day must be 
prepared to co-operate with the Socialists of the British Independent Labour Party. But 
every Socialist or bourgeois intellectual who enters the League must remember that he 
can only do so if he is seriously prepared to work together with Communists.180 
 
Münzenberg wrote that ‘from this principle, the League cannot deviate by a hair’s 
breadth’.181 However, this co-operation was short-lived, and the developments appear to 
confirm the communists’ grip on the organisation. With the adoption of the ‘class against 
class’ formulation, after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in August 1928, the 
Communist Party began to criticise social democrats in increasingly strong terms. 
Accordingly, at the second world congress of the LAI, held at Frankfurt in July 1929, the 
atmosphere had profoundly changed from the one of unity professed at Brussels. 
Although Maxton presided over the conference, the ILP came under serious criticism 
from many delegates.182 Maxton responded to these claims by promising to fulfil his 
‘duty’ to forcefully oppose Labour’s imperialist policies. He assured the conference that: 
 
I pledge myself, and those associated with me, to the League to carry out this duty openly 
and fearlessly, recognising that the pursuance of an imperialist policy by the Labour 
Government constitutes the most deadly menace to the interests of the oppressed masses 
of the colonies. 183 
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These criticisms from the LAI highlighted the relative marginalism of the ILP within the 
Labour Party. The ILP’s apparent numeric strength ultimately operated on a very 
superficial level, as it did not translate into anything like substantial influence over the 
direction of the Labour government’s policy. Although many Labour MPs elected in 1929 
were ILPers, only 37 were ILP-sponsored candidates and only around 20 of these were 
actually supportive of Maxton’s more radical socialist programme.184 As Maxton 
admitted to the Frankfurt conference, ‘There are many elements within the ILP who do 
not support my anti-imperialist policy and tactics and my association with the League. 
They may even be the majority of the party’.185 This was demonstrated when 
Bridgeman’s attempt to pass a resolution at the ILP’s annual dissociating the ILP from the 
LSI’s colonial policy was heavily defeated.186 Thus, Imlay’s claim that Bridgeman’s 
response indicated that ‘the ILP… was disappointed’ with the outcome is not sustainable 
given that Bridgeman’s views were not representative of the majority opinion within the 
ILP.187 Nevertheless, Maxton stressed that as chairman he would, ‘fight for the adoption 
of a militant policy against Imperialism’, assuring his audience that ‘those in the ranks of 
the Party who wish a moderate reformist policy will be discarded’.188 It may well have 
been the case that activists from such a centralised, disciplined organisation as the 
Communist Party were at a loss to comprehend how Maxton, as party chairman, could not 
ensure that ILP members adhered to the leadership’s policy.  
 
By this time, ILP enthusiasm for the project had evidently waned. In a report in the New 
Leader on the ILP’s summer school in August 1929, it was noted that ‘the political 
wisdom’ of Maxton going to Frankfurt ‘was in doubt’.189 The only value was in a ‘social 
sense’ as Maxton had ‘brought back with him a new song, which he taught to the school, 
until the roof nearly fell in with noise’.190 In contrast to Brussels, the Frankfurt congress 
did not generate much coverage in the party’s paper.191 Although Maxton’s speech had 
been reported, a key passage which referred to challenging imperialism within the ILP 
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had been omitted.192 Therefore, it was not without cause that in the communist Labour 
Monthly, Emile Burns argued that the New Leader had produced a ‘completely 
emasculated version of Maxton’s statement’.193 Writing to the New Leader, in his 
capacity as secretary of the British section of the LAI, Bridgeman praised Maxton for 
taking a ‘clear line’ on the subject imperialism and expressed disappointment in the NAC. 
He drew attention to Maxton’s comments at Frankfurt: ‘Maxton is right’, he declared ‘and 
the struggle against imperialism will have to be carried on, not inside the Labour Party 
only but inside the Independent Labour Party as well’.194 In his editorial notes, Ernest 
Hunter questioned whether Maxton had been quoted correctly and dismissed the 
comments regarding the alleged imperialism within the ILP as ‘exaggerated nonsense’.195 
 
The Executive of the British section demanded that Maxton immediately publish his 
statement made at Frankfurt in the New Leader and in addition, explicitly express his 
opposition to Government policy in Egypt and Palestine.196 Bridgeman wrote to Maxton 
several times. But Maxton refused, saying that while he stood by what he had said, he 
would not be ‘bullied, harassed or pestered’ as to his methods.197 Therefore, the LAI 
concluded that Maxton had ‘made no attempts publicly to fight [Labour’s] imperialist 
policy or carry out his pledges’ which he had made at Frankfurt and moved to expel 
him.198 In his memoirs, Brockway recalled that the reason for this was that ‘the 
Communists decided against an ILP chairmanship and a small excuse was made to 
depose him’.199 However, the views expressed in the New Leader on Palestine and Egypt 
were clearly contrary to the perspective of the LAI; therefore, taken at face-value, the 
claims cited were reasonable. After all, the New Leader was, in the words of the party, the 
‘official organ of the ILP’ in which Maxton had his own weekly column. However, 
Maxton did not use this platform to offer alternative analysis. As Bridgeman commented, 
although he felt ‘regret’ at the decision and opined that if Maxton had attended the 
Executive Committee meetings ‘the position would probably have been quite different’, 
he had nevertheless ‘apparently shown no interest in events of tremendous importance in 
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colonial countries’.200 Indeed, Bridgeman believed this had created ‘the impression’ that 
Maxton was ‘looking for an opportunity to resign’.201 This was not without foundation 
given that at Frankfurt, Maxton had claimed he could not ‘remain silent’ on issues such as 
Egyptian independence that if he was judged to have failed he would ‘take the 
consequences’.202 Such evidence appears to present a more nuanced version of the 
reasons behind Maxton’s expulsion, rather than it being purely the result of communist 
sectarianism. As Marwick perceptibly noted, while the Comintern’s ‘tougher line’ was 
unquestionably an important factor; it had to be ‘admitted that Maxton himself was not 
altogether consistent’.203  Although Cook and others resigned, some ILPers who were 
close political allies of Maxton such as Bridgeman and Gossip, as well several ILP 
branches continued to be active in the LAI after his exclusion.204 
 
Initially, Maxton had been portrayed as someone who was himself genuinely committed 
to the LAI’s programme but needed to be considerably more vociferous in his criticisms 
of fellow socialists.205 But now he was deemed to be an outright charlatan. Saklatvala 
stated that the LAI ‘cannot be used as a forum by politicians who wish to gain popularity 
in the colonies by using radical anti-imperialist phrases at international gatherings but 
who do everything in their own country to support the imperialist policy of their own 
government’.206 Maxton was accused of playing a ‘dangerous and demoralising role’ 
within the LAI and the charge was made that the ILP had ‘hypocritically made a pretence 
of seeming sympathy (sic) with Indian nationalism but in the decisive moment it has 
always supported the imperialist policy of McDonald’.207 The international executive 
confirmed Maxton’s expulsion, branding him ‘a traitor to the anti-imperialist 
movement’.208 
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Through the New Leader, the ILP backed its chairman. Hunter emphasised that Maxton 
had taken ‘considerable risks’ in his association with the LAI and had persisted ‘despite 
the advice of close political colleagues’ because he believed this work to be ‘an essential 
service to the subject races’.209 Furthermore, he agreed with Maxton’s refusal to print his 
Frankfurt statement as ‘no responsible officer’ of the ILP ‘would seek to command its 
columns at the bidding of an outside organisation’.210 The Socialist Review branded the 
LAI a ‘farcical organisation’ and gave a platform to Bart de Ligt of the International Anti-
Militarist Bureau who criticised the LAI.211 
 
Yet this experience did not alter the ILP leadership’s vision of the possibility and the 
necessity of a united working-class movement. As such, despite what Maxton described 
as a ‘somewhat ignominious failure’ in the LAI, he immediately ‘set about trying to 
develop schemes for an international united working class through other methods’.212 
This was required because, ‘the main problems of today are not only British problems, 
they are world problems’.213 Neither did it affect the party’s stance on anti-colonial 
movements. Maxton reiterated the position of being in favour of independence whilst 
insisting that socialism should be the ultimate aim of any nationalist movement, ‘I am not 
primarily concerned with Indian national independence. India, I think should rule itself… 
My concern is… in the struggle of the poor people, the working classes, for economic and 
social liberation’.214 
 
Maxton’s expulsion from the LAI did not prevent the CPGB and the ILP from working 
together on anti-colonial issues, most notably demonstrated by the Meerut Prisoners’ 
Defence Committee in 1930.215 Here, the ILP once more came into serious conflict with 
the Labour Party, with the ILP accusing the Labour government of ‘tyranny’ in India and 
branding it a ‘disgrace’ which had brought ‘humiliation and shame’ upon the Labour 
Party.216 Nonetheless, lasting damage was done, and when the Communist Party moved 
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away from its sectarianism and the ILP was invited to send delegates to the LAI congress 
of 1932, the NAC declined.217 However, Maxton did renew contact with the British 
section of the LAI and raised questions in parliament on its behalf.218 In addition, both 
Maxton and Kirkwood spoke up for right of the LAI to operate freely after the Home 
Secretary revealed that its activities were being monitored by the government.219 
Furthermore, despite the acrimonious experience of LAI, in 1932 the ILP leadership 
backed another Münzenberg-inspired group, ‘The Congress Against War and Fascism’, 
which involved a number of current and ex-LAI members.220 
 
Disaffiliation and ‘Revolutionary Socialism’: 1932-1939 
In 1932 the ILP disaffiliated from the Labour Party which signalled the completion of its 
leftward shift into its ‘revolutionary phase’.221 In the words of its general secretary John 
Paton, it represented a ‘complete break’ with the past traditions of the ILP which was 
‘now definitely committed to policies of revolutionary Socialism’. It was the ‘application 
of its militant Socialist ideas to the new situation created by the world crisis of 
capitalism’.222  
 
This section will examine how the adoption of a ‘revolutionary policy’ was reflected in its 
international outlook examining questions such as its international associations, colonial 
policy, and attitudes towards the Soviet Union. In the same year as disaffiliation the ILP 
became the driving force behind the so-called ‘Third and a Half International’.223 The 
organisation went through several name changes; it was initially named the Committee of 
Independent Revolutionary Socialist Parties before becoming known as the International 
Revolutionary Marxist Centre and later the International Bureau of Revolutionary 
Socialist Unity.224 It was also known as the ‘London Bureau’; a moniker which indicated 
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the ILP’s dominance within the organisation.  However, the function of the organisation 
was not to be a new International. Instead, 
 
The Bureau is an association of Revolutionary Socialist parties unaffiliated to either the 
Second or Third international. The purpose of the Bureau is to develop common, 
international action between its own sections and with other revolutionary sections of the 
working class movement, with the object of preparing for the formation of a reconstituted 
International on a Revolutionary Socialist basis.225 
 
In this respect, as the ‘Third and a half international’ label suggests, the IBSRU can be 
seen as a resumption of the policy pursued by the Vienna International between 1918 and 
1921, namely an international socialist organisation which did not function as a new 
international in itself, but whose main purpose was play the role of unifier and bring 
together the two internationals. The ILP hoped this organisation would ‘unite all the real 
revolutionary sections of the working class’.226  
 
By the mid-1930s, the ILP wanted to maintain ‘the widest friendly cooperation with the 
Communist International’, arguing that the LSI had ‘broken down’ and was ‘of no 
effective service to the working class’.227 In contrast to Labour’s gradualism and 
constitutionalism, Brockway called for the ‘coming together’ of the ‘revolutionary forces 
of the working class’ which would not just defeat fascism but advance Europe from 
‘Capitalist Democracy’ to ‘Workers’ Power’.228 The party denounced the League of 
Nations as a ‘Capitalist institution’ and criticised the Soviet Union for its membership. By 
placing its faith in the League, the social democratic movement had ‘substituted 
collaboration with International Capitalism for its war-time policy of collaboration with 
National Capitalism’.229 For the ILP it was ‘illogical’ that the Labour Party should trust 
the British government to serve working-class interests in the League of Nations and yet 
oppose the same government nationally.230 The party’s literature openly lamented the fact 
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that the working class movement had ‘fallen into the trap’ of supporting the League of 
Nations in the post-war era.231 Disaffiliation from Labour was certainly accompanied by 
an increasingly radical rhetoric. Brockway told the IBRSU conference of 1936 that the 
reason why ‘working class parties and governments had failed’ was that both had 
‘departed from the basis of the class struggle which Marx and Engels laid down’.232 
 
The IBRSU incorporated many aspects of the LAI. It did not just unite like-minded 
socialist parties but sought to support and make links with anti-colonial nationalist 
movements. Its colonial policy was virtually identical to that espoused by the LAI. Thus, 
it believed in the ‘right of subject peoples to national independence’ and that this claim 
should be supported by socialists even when this claim was advanced by ‘national 
organisations of a bourgeois character’.233 As such, at one conference, organisations such 
as the Senegal League for the Defence of Blacks, the Indo-Chinese Colonial Union, the 
Madagascar National Liberation Society and the Pondicherry Native Trade Unions were 
all represented. Brockway spoke of the IBRSU as an organisation which could ‘link up 
and co-ordinate all of the workers’ and peasants’ Colonial organisations into centre of 
anti-imperialist activity’.234 After the demise of the LAI, it still remained ‘the duty of the 
Revolutionary Socialist Movement’ to ‘recreate an International anti-Imperialist 
Movement’.235 Furthermore, the IBRSU maintained that the LSI had a ‘Socialist-
Imperialist’ attitude. Once again, India was a central issue. Here, the IBRSU engaged in 
practical assistance, such as raising money to help fund the appeal of imprisoned Indian 
nationalist and revolutionary M. N. Roy. The Bureau believed that the attempts of fascist 
movements to support nationalist movements within the British Empire added an 
additional urgency to their anti-colonial efforts.236 As the British section of the LAI had 
done, the ILP made efforts to inform British public opinion about the empire. In response 
to the Empire Exhibition, the ILP held their own ‘Anti-Empire Exhibition’ in order to 
‘show the workers the intolerable conditions of the empire and the necessity of their 
support for the anti-Imperialist struggle’.237 
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The ILP’s more ‘militant’ political outlook was reflected in the party’s response to 
specific international developments. For instance, the Spanish Civil War in 1936 marked 
a clear shift away from its traditional pacifism.238 By the party’s own reckoning, 
approximately 5,000 of its members had been imprisoned for their opposition to the First 
World War.239 This position was retained in peace time, despite the use of revolutionary 
violence by the labour movement in Russia and Germany. In 1918, the party declared 
itself to be against ‘militarism in all forms, including the ‘Citizen Army’ project’.240 
Furthermore, in the early 1920s Brockway who himself had been imprisoned for his 
pacifist activities wrote, ‘I want to make myself quite clear. I do not believe in the use of 
violence and bloodshed under any conditions whatsoever… the right way to resist a 
tyranny is not to kill the tyrant but to refuse to cooperate in his tyranny’. 241 In the years 
after the war, Brockway had chaired the No More War Movement (NMWM), founded in 
1921 as the British section of the War Resisters International (WRI) and the successor to 
the No Conscription Fellowship.242  
 
However, ILP propaganda now praised its members who had gone to fight in Spain. The 
ILP contingent that had joined with the P.O.U.M. Militia was lauded. Its annual report 
claimed that ‘the whole party takes pride in the contingent and recognises its part in the 
Spanish struggle as one of the finest acts of international solidarity in our records’.243 
Indeed, Brockway wrote in his memoirs, ‘In a sense, the Spanish Civil War settled this 
dilemma for me; I could no longer justify pacifism when there was a fascist threat’.244 In 
1936 he resigned from the NMWM and now explicitly defended the right of the labour 
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movement to use violence: ‘Thus I came to see that it is not the amount of violence used 
which determines good or evil results, but the ideas, the sense of human values, and 
above all the social forces behind its use’.245  
 
During the mid-1930s the ILP began to adopt an increasingly critical approach towards 
the Soviet Union regarding several issues. It argued that the Moscow trials and Trotsky’s 
repudiation of the allegations had ‘raised issues which affected not only Soviet Russia but 
the whole International working class movement’ and called for an ‘impartial 
investigation by representative socialists’.246 Whilst maintaining that a ‘temporary 
dictatorship’ was necessary in order to secure working class power in Russia in the years 
after the revolution, concerns were voiced that dictatorship may ‘become an instrument… 
for the retention of bureaucratic power’.247 Conversely, in the mid-1920s Maxton and 
Cook had described socialist criticism of the Soviet Union ‘whatever the intentions of its 
authors’ as being ‘a contribution to imperialist war propaganda’.248 Not only was its 
involvement in the League of Nations disapproved of, but the Soviet Union’s perceived 
lack of support for nationalist anti-colonial movements was also criticised. The IBRSU 
accused it of having ‘surrendered the fight against Imperialism whenever it conflicts with 
the present foreign policy of the Soviet Union’.249 
 
Conclusion 
Like the Labour party, the ILP contained conflicting perspectives and as such, was not a 
homogenous or monolithic section within the party. This has been recognised by several 
historians of the party’s domestic activities. For example, Gidon Cohen has noted that the 
ILP parliamentary group was ‘politically very diverse, covering almost the entire range of 
opinion within the labour movement’.250 This was not confined to its parliamentary 
members; as David Howell has written, the ILP in the 1920s had become ‘a forum for a 
diverse range of projects and sentiments’.251 Even disaffiliation, a decisive victory for the 
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left within the party, did not resolve these divisions as there still existed an ‘organised 
minority with its directing committee and its own publications’.252  
 
In terms of internationalism, prior to disaffiliation there were essentially three 
perspectives within the ILP. The ‘left’ lead by Maxton and Brockway, the ‘liberals’ like 
Brailsford and Wedgwood, and those members in government such as MacDonald and 
Snowden who implemented mainstream Labour policies. The left called for independent 
workers’ activism, the ultimate aim of which was the destruction of imperialism and 
capitalism. The liberal wing stressed the political and economic cooperation of nation-
states via international institutions such as the League of Nations and demanded a form of 
colonial administration which would benefit native populations. MacDonald’s 
administrations, at least in terms of colonial policy, differed little from previous British 
imperial policy.253 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Labour’s imperial policy was 
criticised by the left, given that it fell considerably short even of the ‘constructivist’ 
imperialism envisaged by the liberal section, and indeed advocated by MacDonald 
himself. However, even within these sections there was not always complete internal 
cohesion. For instance, Maxton and Brockway clashed over the correct line to adopt with 
respect to Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia.254 
 
Much of the scholarship regarding the ILP’s estrangement and eventual disaffiliation 
from the Labour Party has centred around the sharp ideological clashes over domestic 
issues, demonstrated by the issuing of tracts such as Socialism in Our Time in 1926 and 
the ‘Maxton-Cook Manifesto’ of 1928. The former document demanded that Labour 
introduce a national minimum wage and nationalise key industries, while the latter was a 
clear repudiation of gradualism. However, the profound critiques over activities within 
various transnational organisations set out in the manifesto should not be overlooked. 
 
Moreover, disagreements over international and colonial policy were the source of 
dramatic clashes between Labour and the ILP. It was during a parliamentary debate on 
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India in 1930 that John Beckett seized the mace.255 In the same year, a resolution at the 
Labour Party conference which called for dominion status for India was rejected by the 
ILP, which moved instead for self-determination and an immediate end to the suppression 
of the nationalist movement.256 In fact, post-disaffiliation, when the ILP was criticised by 
the CPGB’s Pollitt for not being prepared to consider re-affiliation with Labour, 
Brockway defended this position explicitly on the ILP’s strong objections to Labour’s 
colonial policy: 
 
The Labour Party’s record on India alone is enough to make clear why we cannot under 
present conditions, join the Labour Party. Every Indian will remember how the Labour 
Party participated in the Simon Commission… every Indian will remember how the 
Labour Government suppressed the civil disobedience movement, imprisoned sixty 
thousand Indians for the crime of demanding independence, maintained the infamous 
Meerut trial, and arrested Gandhi and other leaders. When the Labour Party was in office 
its rule was as Imperialist as the rule of any Capitalist Government.257 
 
Indeed, advancing self-determination for India was equally as crucial as pursuing 
socialism domestically, as Brockway elucidated that ‘The ILP cannot give up its 
championship of the rights of India, any more than it can give up its struggle for 
uncompromising Socialism’.258 
 
The emphasis placed upon international questions not only adversely affected relations 
with the Labour Party, but also apparently partly informed the rationale of some ILP 
members who left to join the British fascist movement. In particular, the attempt to move 
away from Eurocentrism and make links with movements in the colonies appears to have 
frustrated Oswald Mosley and John Beckett. After visiting Mussolini’s Italy, Beckett, 
who had attended the founding conference of the LAI in Brussels and served on the 
British section’s executive committee, dismissively commented: ‘I had long felt that 
progress in Britain need not wait for the Zulus to join their union and the Japanese to 
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become members of the Third International’.259 In a similarly derogatory vein, Mosley 
complained that the ‘socialist policy of internationalism’ meant that Britain would be 
‘held back until every Cannibal Islander sees the world in gentle shades of pink and joins 
the ILP’.260 In 1934, Beckett joined with ex-ILPers Mosley and Robert Forgan in the BUF 
before becoming a founder member of the fascist National Socialist League in 1937.261  
 
Although the ILP’s leadership’s formal association with the LAI lasted only from 
February 1927 to September 1929, it certainly had a profound impact upon the direction 
of the party. The foray into the LAI indicated a shift from anti-imperialism to anti-
colonialism, that is to say, advocating the dissolution rather than the transformation of 
empire, which was maintained as party policy even after the party leadership’s 
acrimonious exit from the LAI. There were several reasons behind the ILP’s involvement. 
The first was the belief that the LSI had failed to adopt the correct strategy regarding the 
colonial question and was too Eurocentric in its outlook. The second was that the League 
of Nations had become unfit for purpose, could not be reformed and that involvement in it 
amounted to collaboration with the capitalist class. The third was that an initiative such as 
the LAI could play an instrumental role in the unification of the international working-
class movement. And finally, that by engaging with nationalist movements, socialists 
could influence them towards internationalism.  
 
It is an irony that the ILP leadership were forced out at a time when its colonial policy 
was moving towards that of the communist left. By rights, the ILP should not have been 
admitted to the LAI given its official colonial policy still repudiated the idea of the end of 
empire and believed many ‘races’ to be incapable of self-government. Yet, by 1929, the 
ILP leadership was increasingly critical of Labour in government’s colonial policy. 
Moreover, the ILP was actively striving for the LSI to adopt a more anti-colonial position 
on empire.262 Two key factors counted against the ILP. One was the communist’s ‘class 
against class’ policy. The second was the colonial policy of the MacDonald government, 
elected in June 1929, which meant that the ILP now formed a section of a party that was 
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not only administering empire, but doing so in a manner that was almost indistinguishable 
from that of its Tory predecessors. Again, Labour in government highlighted the dilemma 
for the anti-imperialist activists within its own ranks. When Maxton and Cook formulated 
their policy in 1928, it was uncomplicated to speak of the colonial movements and the 
British labour movement both fighting the same ruling class, given that the Conservatives 
were in power. The episode also proved an instructive example of how attempts at unity 
and collaboration between the non-communist and communist left proved futile and 
damaged the ILP.263 Its association with the Labour Party and the LSI left it open to 
accusations from the communists of being aligned with the ‘social imperialists’, while the 
social democrats were appalled by the ILP’s involvement in what it perceived as 
Moscow-inspired organisations. 
 
Although the ILP’s approach underwent a fundamental change as its leadership rejected 
the League of Nations, preferring independent workers activism which would end 
imperialism and capitalism, there was still a sense of continuity insofar as the ultimate 
aims remained the securing of world peace and the replacement of capitalism with 
socialism. Therefore, the essential shift was not in terms of aspiration but strategy. It was 
characterised by a rejection of attempting to secure change through official channels such 
as the ILO or the Simon Commission, as this amounted to ‘collaboration’ with capitalist 
institutions, in favour of workers and activists taking the initiative to create their own 
autonomous organisations.
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Chapter 2: The ILP and Palestine in the Interwar Years 
 
During the interwar years, official Labour Party policy was overwhelmingly supportive of 
Zionism. As Christine Collette has argued, ‘Labour Party files rarely show so consistent a 
pursuit of policy’.1 An important contributing factor was that many of the wartime and post-
war Liberal recruits to the ILP such as Angell, Josiah C. Wedgewood and Charles Roden 
Buxton were strong advocates of Zionism. Buxton joined the ILP in 1917 and over the next 
few years, published a number of pro-Zionist articles in the labour press.2 Shortly before 
joining the ILP, Wedgwood remarked in February 1918 that he had ‘been a Zionist for 
years’.3 As Kelemen has pointed out, a year earlier, Wedgwood had become ‘one of the first 
British politicians to publicly endorse Zionism’.4 Wedgwood became a relentless advocate of 
Zionism. In the words of N. A. Rose, he was ‘one of the foremost patrons of Zionism in 
England’, evidenced by the pages of Hansard which are ‘littered with his championship of 
the National Home’.5 In the mid-1920s, Wedgwood was the author of two pro-Zionist works, 
Palestine: The Fight For Jewish Freedom and Honour and The Seventh Dominion. 
Wedgwood perceived his support for Zionism to be an expression of internationalism, telling 
a meeting of the ‘United Palestine Appeal’ in the USA that: 
 
… there could be no international spirit of brotherhood among the nations of the world as 
long as some citizens of free countries were kept in a semi-free condition. Zionism, with its 
goal of a rebuilt Jewish Homeland in Palestine, will create self-respect on the part of 
oppressed Jews and that respect for them which goes with being an independent and free 
people… It therefore paves the way for that international spirit of brotherhood among the 
nations which is the goal of all right-thinking people.6 
 
Similarly, on another occasion, Wedgwood told an audience that he supported Zionism 
because ‘Jews needed a place on the map in order to develop a national pride’. Only once this 
had been obtained they would ‘be able to go forward to the further stage of developing that 
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international pride in which, someday, all narrow race prejudices would be submerged’.7 
Norman Angell, who was active in the UDC before joining the ILP in 1920 had forged his 
political reputation as an internationalist, most notably with his book The Great Illusion.8 He 
was acutely aware that his support for a form of nationalism appeared to be contradictory. 
However, Angell contended that the ‘seeming conflict of internationalism with Zionism’ was 
actually ‘an illusion’.9 Like Wedgwood, Angell believed that Zionism, rather than conflicting 
with internationalism ‘instead serves to fulfil it’. Therefore, he argued that the ideal system of 
international organisation ‘must provide for the Jews as for other nationalities’ as to omit the 
Jews from ‘the world link’ would be ‘a fated mistake’.10 This evidence contradicts David 
Cesarani’s claim that in contrast to Wedgwood, Angell ‘said nothing… in support of 
Zionism’ and therefore was not a ‘Gentile Zionist’.11 
 
However, Labour’s support for Zionism pre-dated much of this Liberal migration. Indeed, 
support for Zionism was one of Labour’s first foreign policy statements, drafted by Sidney 
Webb and Arthur Henderson and presented to the Second Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in 
late August of 1917.12 
 
Palestine should be set free from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order 
that this country may form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the 
Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their salvation free from 
interference by those of alien race or religion.13 
 
Commenting on Labour’s recently published ‘Memorandum on War Aims’ in December 
1917; Conservative MP William Ormsby-Gore critically remarked that ‘the Labour party is 
more Zionist than the Zionists themselves’.14 He believed that Labour did not give ‘due credit 
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to the aspirations and achievements of the Arabs’.15 In contrast, Kelemen has argued that the 
‘War Aims’ document did not go far enough for the Zionists.16 Therefore, it would appear 
that Ormsby-Gore was simply using an exaggerated rhetorical phrase to express his 
displeasure at Labour’s policy. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that in key respects, 
Labour’s War Aims went further than the Balfour Declaration, a document which was often 
approvingly cited by the Zionist movement. Balfour’s letter to Lord Rothschild gave 
assurances that despite facilitating Zionist immigration, it was ‘clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine’.17 However, Labour’s policy made no such guarantee. 
Indeed, it appeared to render the native Palestinian Arabs an ‘alien race’ in their own land.18 
Secondly, Labour’s declaration was explicit that a Jewish ‘Free State’ would be formed rather 
than Balfour’s more ambiguous term of a ‘National Home’. Thirdly, Labour’s formulation 
implied that the entirety of Palestine should become a Jewish state, whereas Balfour’s stated 
policy was to create a Jewish ‘National Home’ within Palestine. Poale Zion was evidently 
impressed by Labour’s commitment and sent a message to the Second Inter-Allied Socialist 
conference congratulating British Labour’s Palestine policy.19 
 
Palestine proved to be a subject of considerable interest to several Labour figures in the 
interwar years. The ILP was no exception and prominent figures from across the party’s 
political spectrum such as MacDonald, Brailsford, Wedgwood, Henry Nevinson, Campbell 
Stephen and John McGovern all visited Palestine during the interwar years, while Fenner 
Brockway wrote and spoke extensively about Palestine, particularly in the 1930s. Obviously, 
Palestine was of central concern to Poale Zion members, which affiliated to the Labour Party 
in 1920. The ILP had relatively few Jewish members and as scholar of Anglo-Jewry Sharman 
Kadish has noted, compared with the Communist Party, the ILP had little connection with the 
Jewish community in London’s East End.20 However, an important East End Jewish ILPer 
was Joseph Leftwich who had joined the ILP via the UDC, serving on the Executive Council 
of the former.21 He also served as London editor of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 
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Significantly, Leftwich was secretary of Poale Zion when it affiliated to the Labour Party.22 
Furthermore, Labour’s first Jewish MP, elected in 1922, was the ‘Clydesider’ Emmanuel 
Shinwell who had joined the ILP in 1903 and was an ILP-sponsored candidate.23 Shinwell 
took relatively little interest in the question of Palestine, much to the disappointment of Poale 
Zion activists.24 After meeting Shinwell, Labour Zionist Dov Hoz believed that Shinwell was 
unconcerned about Zionism as he represented a mining constituency.25 Indeed, Shinwell 
promised to visit Palestine, but this did not materialise.26  
 
Ramsay MacDonald: ‘A Socialist in Palestine’ 
The most significant visit took place in February 1922, when MacDonald, who would 
become Labour Party leader later that year, and Labour’s first prime minister and foreign 
secretary in 1924, travelled to Egypt, Palestine and Syria.27 All of these countries, he found, 
were ‘seething with an after-the-war unsettlement’.28 MacDonald had first commented on 
Palestine in July 1917. At this point, although sympathetic to Zionism, he stated that he was 
‘still in the position of one who listens and learns rather than one whose mind is made up’.29 
However, when the Balfour Declaration was issued, he gave it his full backing.30 Thus, he 
was already pro-Zionist prior to his visit. On his return from the Middle East and North 
Africa, MacDonald wrote a lengthy article in Forward, entitled ‘New Wine in Old Bottles’. 
This title was a clear and deliberate reference to the New Testament, demonstrating that 
while it was not the chief reason for support for Zionism, religious ideas certainly shaped the 
perceptions and discourse of some British Labourites regarding the Zionist movement. In 
addition, he discussed his experiences in ILP’s monthly journal The Socialist Review.31 
Although MacDonald clearly viewed Palestine within the context of colonial policy, he 
nevertheless emphasised the distinctive nature of the political situation there, believing that 
‘the problem takes a different and a very novel form’.32 MacDonald characterised it as ‘the 
conflict between the Middle Ages and the Twentieth Century’.33 However, a key difference 
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was that in this case it was ‘caused by the immigration of people, and not only by the growth 
of ideas within a nation’.34 
 
In his writings on Palestine, MacDonald elaborated on and applied his ‘constructive’ 
imperialist policy which he had originally set out in the 1907 document Labour and the 
Empire. He identified what he saw as the two ‘great obstacles’ within the administration of 
imperial rule. Firstly, there was ‘the official who comes with a purely military mind to his 
task, who thinks of a British Empire of subject peoples being ruled by Englishmen’.35 The 
second problem was ‘the man of commercial interest who thinks that his store is the Empire, 
and that his profits must be made sure by British control exercised by British officials, 
soldiers and police’. In short, he reiterated his rejection of exploitative imperialism. 
MacDonald then proposed the remedy, setting out Labour’s policy: 
 
We should regard ourselves as friends in the background, guarding against evil… beginning 
good things always with the co-operation of the people themselves … and guarding as much 
as possible against taking upon responsibility for a government that ought to become more 
and more self-government. British officials should be reduced to a minimum, and they should 
regard themselves mainly as advisors.36  
 
Again, this tallied with his previous work in which the ideal imperial policy sought friendly 
relations with non-self-governing states and equal relations with dominion states. Despite 
identifying the obvious problem that two groups had been promised self-determination in the 
same territory, MacDonald was confident that an ‘Arab-Jewish concordat’ would be 
sufficient to bring about a solution. However, the precise terms of such an agreement were 
not stated. His experiences in the Middle East had only confirmed his previously-held ideas 
on colonial questions, commenting ‘I am back more convinced than ever that if we had at 
home a Labour Government inspired by a Labour and Socialist intelligentsia, the rough 
places here would be made smooth, and the moral reputations of our country would shine 
anew in the world’.37 
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These articles were soon followed by A Socialist in Palestine, a pamphlet which was 
published by Poale Zion in 1922 and incorporated some of his previous material. In this 
work, MacDonald recognised that Palestinian Arab anti-Zionism was ‘In its most 
elementary… form, the claim… for self-determination’.38 However, on two occasions 
MacDonald emphasised that the Palestinian Arab claim to self-determination was deficient; 
stating that it was ‘very incomplete’ and lacked ‘complete validity’.39 The first reason for this 
was that Palestine could not be ‘divested of its traditions, which ‘remained vital political 
considerations’, as for MacDonald, ‘Palestine and the Jew’ could ‘never be separated’.40 The 
second factor was that the Arab population ‘do not and cannot use or develop the resources of 
Palestine’.41 However, MacDonald emphatically rejected population transfer as a solution.42 
Instead, he maintained that Zionism would bring benefits to both Jews and Arabs. Although 
aware of cases where Zionist workers had demanded racially exclusive employment 
practices, he believed these were due solely to economic reasons, as Arab labour was being 
employed to undercut wages.43 After meeting with the leaders of the Zionist labour 
movement in Palestine, he was satisfied that there was no trace of ‘racial exclusiveness’.44 
Therefore, as in his previous articles, MacDonald maintained an optimistic view of the 
conflict, believing that ‘a policy which, whilst keeping Palestine open to a Jewish ‘‘return,’’ 
not only protects an Arab in his rights but sees that he shares amply in the increased 
prosperity of the country, is certainly not doomed to failure’.45  
 
While in Palestine, MacDonald emphasised that contrary to what its critics opined, Labour 
had a coherent foreign policy.46 He argued that Labour was best placed to implement foreign 
policy. Indeed, MacDonald placed Palestine in a wider international context. At a ‘Stop the 
War’ meeting called by the ILP in September 1922, he told the audience that if Britain went 
to war with Turkey ‘trouble would be caused in Egypt and Palestine and wherever Moslems 
were’.47 
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The final section of the work consisted of an English translation of an interview MacDonald 
had given in to the official newspaper of the Histradrut. In this interview, he promised that on 
his return he would endeavour to promote Labour Zionism not just with his colleagues in 
both the Labour Party and the ILP, but also with the electorate.48 And MacDonald did indeed 
attempt to present the case for Zionism to workers in Britain. In January 1923, he gave a 
lecture on Palestine in Cowdenbeath, a mining community in West Fife, Scotland. During 
this discussion, he reiterated his belief that ‘rightly or wrongly’ Britain had ‘contracted 
obligations’ in Palestine which had to be fulfilled.49 Addressing the issue of British 
expenditure in Palestine, MacDonald argued that it was ‘dishonest’ to claim that excessive 
British military expenditure was being spent administering Palestine when in fact it was for 
the entire Middle Eastern region. Moreover, he believed that Palestine would soon be able to 
‘pay its own way’ once Zionist development had been allowed to flourish.50 Clearly, 
MacDonald intended to reach an audience beyond the labour movement as in addition to his 
various writings in the Labour press, he also wrote an article putting forward these arguments 
in favour of Zionism in the liberal publication the Contemporary Review.51 
 
H. N. Brailsford and the New Leader 
Throughout the interwar years and beyond, Brailsford was a leading advocate for the Zionist 
cause. However, his biographer, F. M. Leventhal has presented a misleading picture by 
attributing Brailsford’s support for Zionism to his first-hand experiences of the situation 
there. Leventhal wrote that ‘Ever since his visit to Palestine in 1930, he had championed 
Jewish settlement’.52 Yet, this visit to Palestine took place in late 1930, whereas in January of 
that year, Brailsford had met with leading Labour Zionist activist Berl Katznelson, who 
described him as a ‘true friend’ of the Zionist movement and as someone who was 
‘convinced’ of the ‘justice’ of the Zionist cause.53 In fact, as Gorni has highlighted, 
Brailsford’s first arguments in favour of Zionism were made in his book A League of Nations, 
published in February 1917, some months before the Balfour Declaration was issued.54 
Similarly, both Kelemen and Callaghan have noted that Brailsford, along with MacDonald 
and Lansbury were amongst the first British socialists to support Zionism, on the basis of the 
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Wilsonian concept of self-determination for ethnic groups.55 As the Canadian Jewish 
Chronicle noted when Brailsford gave a series of lectures on international affairs for the 
‘New School for Social Research’ in New York in January 1931, he had been ‘known for 
many years’ as ‘one of the most outspoken of the non-Jewish Zionist sympathisers’.56 Indeed, 
Brailsford himself commented that his visit to Palestine had merely confirmed his previously 
held ideas, ‘I had pretty closely understood the situation. Of course, I gained much from the 
visit; the details of the pictures were filled in. But the main lines had been right’.57 
Brailsford’s political thought provides an instructive example of why it is an over-
simplification to equate pro-Zionism with philo-Semitism and anti-Zionism with anti-
Semitism, as he has been accused of adopting what Stephen Howe has termed a ‘markedly 
anti-Semitic tone’ when opposing the Boer War, yet was a committed champion of 
Zionism.58 
 
In his early writings on Zionism, Brailsford made clear that it was desirable to create in 
Palestine ‘an autonomous province with a Jewish Administration under an international 
guarantee’.59 However, Brailsford believed that this task was of secondary concern compared 
with establishing equal rights for Jews in Europe, maintaining that it was ‘incomparably more 
important in the interest of the Jews to secure a general charter of equal rights for them, than 
to promote their settlement in the Holy Land’.60 Nevertheless, he believed that the two issues 
were not mutually exclusive. Brailsford argued that ‘any thought of turning Palestine into a 
British dependency’ must be resisted. Instead, Palestine should be administered by the 
League of Nations. The League would ‘name a Commission to promote Jewish immigration 
and to watch the interests of the settlers’. Regarding the Palestinian Arabs, Brailsford 
recognised that ‘As yet, however, it must not be forgotten that the Jews are not the majority 
in Palestine’. However, he mentioned this not because he thought that any native Palestinian 
Arab objections to this plan should be considered, but rather because it posed a problem in 
the immediate term to establishing a Jewish state. Therefore, the League’s backing was vital 
as the ‘objections of the Turks to this and other infringements of their sovereignty would 
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yield readily to united pressure’ and the League could provide the necessary ‘financial 
compensations’.61 
 
Accordingly, throughout the 1920s, the official line of the New Leader, a paper which 
commanded admiration from the socialist movement nationally and internationally, was 
supportive of Zionism. As editor since its inception in 1922, Brailsford penned many pro-
Zionist articles and editorial comments. In these pieces, Brailsford outlined in detail the basis 
of his support for Zionism. He emphasised that the Zionists were not dispossessing any of the 
native population. This was because the Zionists were entering Palestine in limited numbers 
and their colonies were being established ‘in waste and neglected areas of an under-populated 
country’.62 Brailsford argued that Zionism was beneficial for the native population as new 
industries and new technologies brought ‘wealth and progress to a backward country, whose 
present population lacks the science and the enterprise to do these things for itself’.63 There 
was also a labour dimension, as he believed that the ‘Socialist immigrants’ were ‘helping the 
Arabs workers to organise and improve their lot’. Thus, Brailsford wrote, ‘Zionism, in short, 
means gain to Palestine in culture as in wealth’.64 Furthermore, under his editorship, the 
paper ran several pro-Zionist articles from various commentators. For instance, Daisy Adler 
contributed a sympathetic piece entitled ‘Practical Socialism in Palestine’.65 In addition, 
Poale Zion activists such as Moshe Shertok were given a platform to praise the ‘Socialist 
Idealism’ of the ‘Kevutza’ (kibbutz) system.66  
 
A further pro-Zionist article came from Brailsford’s longstanding friend, the campaigning 
journalist Henry W. Nevinson. In the post-war years he joined the Labour Party, and had 
declined an approach to stand as a parliamentary candidate.67 Although he never formally 
joined the ILP, by virtue of his connection with Brailsford, he was a regular contributor to the 
New Leader.68  In 1926, the World Zionist Organisation asked Nevinson to publicise in 
Britain the Zionist development in Palestine and paid his expenses for a six-week trip to 
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Palestine in September of that year.69 On his return, Nevinson published a number of articles 
in various British and American publications, as well giving a lecture on Palestine for the 
UDC. In the New Leader Nevinson contributed an article entitled, ‘The Zionists Go Back To 
Their Home: A Great Movement’. This emphasised the progressive nature of Zionism. In 
short, it was ‘a hopeful movement - a movement that looks forward’.70 Nevinson’s arguments 
were an example of the influence of Christian ideas in pro-Zionist thought.71 Because of his 
Evangelical Christian upbringing, he wrote, ‘To go to Palestine is to me like a return to a 
traditional home’.72 Consequently, he entirely accepted the rationale of Zionism on the 
grounds that given his own emotional attachment to Palestine; he imagined that the Jewish 
identification with ‘their Holy Land’ would be even more intense.73 In key aspects, 
Nevinson’s analysis tallied with that of MacDonald. Nevinson believed that ‘the objection of 
the Palestinian Arabs’ to Zionism was ‘easily understood’, because this was ‘The meeting of 
European immigrant Jews with Arabs means the clash of two civilizations – or of two ages in 
history’.74  
 
For Nevinson, the Palestinian Arabs had benefited as both British administration of the 
Mandate and Zionism had brought about numerous improvements. These included a more 
rigorous judiciary, better infrastructures such as roads, water supply, sanitation, the 
eradication of diseases such as malaria and the end of Ottoman military conscription. 
Nevinson’s understanding of the Zionist movement was that it had no designs to transform 
Palestine into a Jewish state. Rather, its objective was merely ‘to create a national home for 
Jews in Palestine, not to convert Palestine into a Jewish country, as the Arabs feared, and as 
certain English officials and clergy still pretend to believe’.75 It is interesting to note that 
when outlining the various forms of opposition to Zionism, he omitted to mention left-wing 
anti-Zionism. It is also striking that, despite meeting leading Labour Zionist David Ben-
Gurion, in Nevinson’s piece in the New Leader, Labour Zionism did not feature at all 
prominently. 
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However, some opposition did emerge in the form of letters from readers of the party’s paper. 
For example, in April 1925, one correspondent, writing under the name ‘Haifa’, argued that 
Brailsford’s claim that Zionist immigration did not dispossess the Arabs was ‘obviously 
absurd’. Zionist settlements were not growing up on waste lands as ‘there is practically no 
cultivable land in Palestine which is not already cultivated’.76 In contrast to the view 
expressed by MacDonald and Brailsford, the ‘Moslem and Christian Arabs of Palestine’ were 
not ‘primitive’ but rather were a ‘clever and industrious race’ which had produced ‘skilled 
craftsmen’, ‘successful agriculturalists’ and ‘excellent road-makers’. Significantly, the 
contributor went on to argue that ‘The people of Palestine have been deprived of every shred 
of political liberty, of local self-government [and] of belief in the sincerity of the I.L.P’.77 
Brailsford’s response was to reiterate his belief that Zionist colonies were not dispossessing 
natives as they had been ‘built up on land which they [the Zionists] have irrigated’. 
Moreover, he insisted that although ‘the Arabs may be a clever race’, the Jewish immigrants 
were still more advanced as they had established ‘botanical laboratories’ in order to find 
crops which were suited to the climate in Palestine and were using electricity in agriculture. 
This was responded to again by ‘Haifa’, who quoted the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 
November 1918 in support of the Arab claim for self-determination. The correspondent was 
clearly unconvinced and answered Brailsford in a dismissive tone: 
 
‘You appear to suggest… that because immigrant Jews may have secured a botanical 
laboratory… we are entitled to deny to the people of Palestine the ‘‘national government and 
administration deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous 
population’’ which we promised them, and which in any case, is their due. Is this the sort of 
teaching for which our I.L.P. stands to-day? 78  
 
Brailsford responded by maintaining that the ILP had always been opposed to the British 
mandate for Palestine. Moreover, he conceded that ‘the British strategical interest in the Suez 
Canal had vitiated the whole idea of Zionism’.79 However, Brailsford attributed the lack of 
Arab political representation not to British misrule, but to the decision of Palestinian Arabs to 
boycott the Legislative Council.80  
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Any voices which could be construed as being critical of British policy in Palestine were 
quickly responded to by Zionist activists. For instance, in December 1922, an article in the 
paper questioned the presence of the ‘Black and Tans’ in Palestine. The columnist ‘Scissors’ 
believed that they were ‘waiting for trouble’ and that this ‘seemed likely to come’.81 A recent 
report by the Daily Express was quoted which had commented that ‘British popularity has 
declined into positive hate, and belief in British policies has faded’. Moreover, the point was 
made that the Black and Tans were ‘expensive and we pay for them!’82 In the next edition of 
the paper, Israel Cohen, General Secretary of the Zionist Organisation, responded in a critical 
manner. In his letter, Cohen reminded the ILP that maintaining the mandate was official 
Labour Party policy: ‘As the Labour Party has officially approved of the policy of the British 
mandate for Palestine, it is strange that you should appear to lend assistance to those who are 
bitterly opposing that policy’.83 In the editorial notes, Brailsford assured Cohen that the ILP 
did indeed back the Zionist claim, pointing out that during the general election of 1922, the 
New Leader had reminded the Labour Party that ‘the promise to the Jews in Palestine must be 
kept’. However, Brailsford stood by the paper’s characterisation of the ‘Black and Tans’, but 
only out of concern for Zionism, noting ‘we shall be surprised if Jewish interests are served 
by police trained in the school of the Irish Black and Tans’.84 It might seem contradictory that 
Brailsford accepted that Zionism was backed by British imperialism and was opposed to 
Britain having taken on the mandate, yet supported the goal of the Zionist movement. 
However, this was because Brailsford believed that the proper solution was the 
internationalisation of control over Palestine and the promotion of Zionist aims within that 
framework.85 
 
Cohen also dismissed the economic argument against Britain’s administration of Palestine by 
stating that military expenditure there amounted to ‘less than one quarter percent of the 
British Budget’.86 This economic argument against Zionism was a feature of anti-Zionist 
thought within British labour movement. For example, in April 1923, The Blaydon Courier 
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carried a report of John Joseph Jones, Labour MP for Silvertown speaking in County 
Durham: 
 
Mr Jones referred to the question of unemployment and said that the same people who could 
find money for ‘flommery’ (sic.) and in making Palestine a land fit for the Hebrews to live in 
– (laughter) – told them that the they could not find the means whereby to make England a 
decent place to live in.87 
 
It should be noted that while the report indicates that these comments, a reference to Lloyd 
George’s promise of a ‘land fit for heroes’, were made in jest, Jones’ remarks nevertheless 
reveal that neither he nor his audience recognised a working-class dimension to the Zionist 
project and saw it as an endeavour which was diverting funds away from important domestic 
issues.  
 
Although Brailsford’s standing in the party diminished after his removal as editor of the New 
Leader in October 1926, he remained in the ILP until it disaffiliated from the Labour Party in 
1932.88 Even after he had been replaced by Brockway as editor of the New Leader, Brailsford 
continued to be a prominent contributor regarding international questions and the paper’s 
only writer on Palestine. Outside the paper, in his 1928 work Olives of Endless Age 
Brailsford reaffirmed his belief that there was a ‘strong case’ for Zionism.89 Furthermore, 
under Brockway’s editorship, the New Leader continued to provide a platform for pro-Zionist 
views and Brockway himself was certainly supportive of Labour Zionism.90 For instance, in 
April 1928, Harry Snell wrote an article which endorsed Wedgwood’s study on Palestine, 
The Seventh Dominion.91 In this text, Wedgwood proposed that Palestine should become fully 
incorporated into the British Empire and in February 1929, established ‘The Seventh 
Dominion League’ which campaigned for this objective. The League made no secret of its 
sympathy with imperialist aims and emphasised the strategic importance of Palestine for 
British imperialism: ‘The Suez means more to the British Empire than any other great 
empire’. Therefore, it was ‘most vital in British interests’ for the Suez to be ‘protected from 
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the dangers of hostile control’.92 According to Snell’s review, Wedgwood’s book was ‘full of 
fact and argument’, which provided a ‘real introduction’ to the situation in Palestine and 
contained ‘constructive proposals’.93 
 
Labour in Government: 1929-1931 
The second Labour government which came to power in June 1929 was soon forced to give 
serious attention to Palestine by the emergence of the Palestinian Arab revolt, which began in 
late August 1929.  Reaction to these events demonstrated the disparity of opinion within the 
ILP. In early September 1929, the LAI, in which the ILP leadership was still officially 
involved, issued a manifesto which set out clearly its policy on Palestine. The statement 
argued that the revolt of the Arabs against the Zionists was ‘in reality a revolt against the 
economic and political serfdom to which they have been reduced by British Imperialism in 
Palestine’.94 The Zionists in Palestine were deemed to be ‘lackeys of Imperialism’ and in this 
‘function’ had ‘received the whole-hearted support of the Social Democratic Parties of the 
Second International and most especially of members of the British Labour Party’.95 The 
leaders of the mainstream Jewish labour movement in Palestine were also blamed for having 
‘systematically played upon the racial sentiment’ of Jewish workers and ‘used them as tools 
of British Imperialistic policy’. Thus, the Zionist movement and European social democrats 
were ‘the most bitter enemies of the Arab national revolutionary movement’. The activities of 
these two groups had prevented the ‘united front’ of Arab and Jewish workers which was 
necessary to defeat British imperialism. Furthermore, referring to the activities of 
Wedgwood’s Seventh Dominion League, the Zionists and social democrats were accused of 
demanding the ‘conversion’ of the British mandate for Palestine ‘into open and flagrant 
annexation to the British Empire’. The manifesto concluded with slogans which summarised 
the LAI’s position:  
 
Down with British Imperialistic exploitation in Palestine! Long live the united revolutionary 
struggle of the Jewish and Arab workers and peasants! Down with Zionism! Long live the 
federation of independent Arabian countries! 96 
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The LAI made a deliberate effort to win over the Anglo-Jewish community to this analysis. 
The organisation’s records show that this manifesto was printed in English and Yiddish for 
distribution in East London and other (unspecified) areas where the LAI believed there was ‘a 
considerable Jewish population’.97 After the Labour government sent troops into Palestine, 
the secretary of the British section of the LAI and ILPer, Bridgeman, condemned both the 
Labour government and the Zionist movement in strong terms, even presenting Zionism as a 
form of fascism. The ILP newspaper Forward quoted an article by Bridgeman in the Daily 
Worker as stating: 
 
It is the policy of the Labour Government to support this Zionist Fascism, which is one of the 
instruments of Imperialism in the Near East. The speed with which troops, warships, 
aeroplanes were rushed to the scene is proof that the zeal of the MacDonald government is 
even greater than that of Baldwin.98 
 
Later that month, on 17 September 1929, Maxton was expelled from the LAI by the 
Executive Committee of the British Section for his ‘refusal to carry out the League’s work 
according to the decisions of the executive committee’.99 The conflict arose when the London 
District Committee of the LAI passed a resolution which stated, ‘Since the Frankfurt 
Congress, the ILP through the New Leader has supported the Labour Government’s 
imperialist policy in Egypt, and has come out in favour of the crushing of the Arab revolt in 
Palestine’.100 This was a reference to Brailsford’s article in the New Leader on 30 August, 
1929 in which Brailsford supported the Labour government’s policy.101  
 
The Executive Committee of the British Section of the LAI demanded that Maxton 
immediately publish in the New Leader his statement made at Frankfurt and in addition, 
explicitly express his opposition to Government policy in Egypt and Palestine. But Maxton 
refused, saying that while he stood by what he had said, he would not be ‘bullied, harassed or 
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pestered’ as to his methods.102 Therefore, the LAI concluded that Maxton had ‘made no 
attempts publicly to fight [Labour’s] imperialist policy or carry out his pledges’ which he had 
made at the Second World Congress in Frankfurt and moved to expel him.103 In his memoirs, 
Brockway dismissed the reasons given for Maxton’s expulsion as a ‘small excuse’.104 
However, such views as those expressed by Brailsford were clearly anathema to the LAI. It 
should be recognised that, taken at face-value, the claims cited by the LAI were reasonable. 
After all, the New Leader was, in the words of the party, the ‘official organ of the ILP’ in 
which Maxton had his own weekly column. However, Maxton did not use this platform to 
offer any kind of alternative analysis on Palestine to that of Brailsford.  
 
Furthermore, although this was not cited by the LAI, it should be noted that on 1 September 
1929 Maxton spoke at a mass demonstration at the Albert Hall called by the English Zionist 
Federation.105 The meeting, chaired by Alfred Mond was addressed by Weizmann. 
Wedgwood and Maxton were reportedly ‘the only well-known non-Jews on the platform’. At 
the end of the meeting a resolution was passed which expressed ‘the determination of the 
Jewish race to continue, undeterred by persecution, and with unshaken determination to build 
the Jewish National Home’.106 This evidence appears to present a more nuanced version of 
the reasons behind Maxton’s expulsion, rather than it simply being the result of Communist 
Party sectarianism. Furthermore, it demonstrated that despite having entirely different 
perspectives on empire and indeed Zionism, Wedgwood and Maxton could unite in these 
circumstances. The explanation appears to be that while Wedgwood was there to show his 
support for Zionism, Maxton’s presence is better explained as a show of solidarity with the 
grieving Anglo-Jewish community.  
 
In October 1929, Maxton openly reaffirmed his opposition to Zionism at a meeting of 
socialists in Berne, Switzerland. He told the audience that Palestine was ‘not suitable’ for the 
Jewish National Home and that ‘the Arabs should be given control of Palestine’.107 
Therefore, it appears that while Maxton did not share the view that the outbreak of violence 
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was legitimate, he nevertheless maintained the view that Palestinian Arab demands for 
impendence were. 
 
Palestine revealed that it was not just the former Liberals or ‘constructivist imperialists’ 
within the ILP who did not subscribe to an anti-colonial perspective. ILP MP for Maryhill, 
Glasgow John S. Clarke wrote an article which supported the dispatching of troops to 
Palestine. Clarke, a ‘Clydesider’, had a radical pedigree, having attended the Communist 
International in 1920 as a delegate of the Clyde Workers’ Committee.108 Therefore, although 
Clarke may have been aligned with Maxton in other respects, his analysis was certainly not 
anti-colonial. Much of the article consisted of a history of Arab and Jews and differed from 
Brailsford’s analysis in the sense that it expressed positive views about both Jewish and Arab 
civilisations. He believed that Zionism was fundamentally an unattractive prospect for the 
vast majority of the Jewish community in Europe: 
 
To get a proper perspective today we must distinguish between the Jew of Palestine (except 
the few western Jews who have settled there) from the typical western Jew of civilisation. The 
latter is a Jew by inheritance. In all other respects he is like the people among whom he lives. 
Not one in ten thousand would dream of abandoning the twentieth century to go back to 
Palestine and live the life of the Old Testament.109  
 
The article defended the Labour government’s policy as an unfortunate but necessary step. 
‘That ‘‘peace’’ is ensured by somewhat doubtful means is beside the mark… so Peace [sic] 
frequently wears a threatening aspect, more’s the pity’.110 Clarke’s interpretation of events in 
Palestine informed his opposition to the idea of decolonisation elsewhere in the British 
Empire. For instance, writing about India in January 1930 he stated, ‘I remember what 
happened in Jerusalem recently between the devotees of only two mutually antagonistic 
faiths, when no white man’s army was present. God knows what would happen in a land 
where half a thousand mutually antagonistic faiths exist’.111 Therefore, although he was ‘no 
believer in Capitalist Imperialism because I hate Capitalism,’ he maintained the position that 
‘… if the presence of the British is an evil, which I grant that it is in the ultimate, a far worse 
evil would follow their withdrawal’. Therefore, Clarke’s entire analysis on the question of 
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colonialism differed considerably from that pursued by Maxton and Brockway in the LAI. 
According to Clarke, ‘Smashing the Empire merely to kill Capitalism will not bring 
Socialism, but the same kind of horror and anarchy which followed the downfall of Rome 
when barbarians from without o’erwhelemed (sic.) it, let us, in discussing India, preserve our 
sanity’.112 This was a view shared by Thomas Johnston MP, the editor of Forward and a 
leading proponent of ‘Empire Socialism’ who complained that in the 1920s that ‘the farther 
left you fellow-travelled in politics the more apparently you were persuaded that the best 
thing to do with the Empire was to bust it up’.113 
 
Regarding Palestine, Clarke rejected the Zionist idea on account of his hostility towards 
nationalism as a concept, writing that ‘the Jew who brags about his Nationalism is as big a 
fool as the Scot who brags about his’. However, he did not offer any kind of practical 
solution to the situation in Palestine but rather hoped that with a radical economic 
reorganisation of society, nationalist and interreligious conflicts would be transcended. 
 
Some day [sic.] a higher and nobler civilisation than has ever been will arise in which neither 
frontier, race nor religion will be matters of much concern. When private ownership, which 
breeds both racial and inter-racial antagonisms, will have been banished forever, and when 
men, if they do still hold to a religion, will be content to regard all mankind as the children of 
the one creator. They will glorify him not by each crowing puerile challenges from the top of 
his Nationalist midden-heap until mutual slaughter results, but by deeds of generosity 
calculated to elevate all humanity.114 
 
Therefore, while Gorni was correct to describe this as an ‘anti-Zionist’ article, it should be 
emphasised that it was equally dismissive of Arab nationalism and backed the British 
government using military force to subdue the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine.115 
 
However, for some ILP activists, the government’s actions were in absolute opposition to the 
anti-imperialist ideals of the labour movement and it was unacceptable for the ILP to express 
any kind of support for the government’s colonial policy. Writing to the New Leader, Joseph 
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Southall of Birmingham ILP believed that the Labour government was pursuing a ‘policy of 
Imperialism or continuity’.116 This policy was ‘not merely negative to Socialism but in active 
opposition to it’. Thus, there was ‘Imperialism in India, in Egypt, in Palestine in China, and 
everywhere else’. This clearly fed into the debate regarding disaffiliation, as according to 
Southall’s letter, the official Labour Party was now an ‘impenetrable oligarchy’ from which 
the ILP must ‘separate ourselves forthwith’. 117 At the ILP annual conference in Scarborough 
in 1931, Southall again stated that ‘There was imperialism in India, in Egypt and Palestine. 
The ILP must be on one side or the other’.118 
 
In December 1929, Brailsford shifted his position. He now believed that a limit should be set 
on Jewish immigration to ensure that it did not exceed 45 percent of the population of 
Palestine.119 First and foremost, Brailsford believed this would have the effect of eliminating 
the fear ‘which haunts the Arab mind today that he is destined to be overwhelmed by alien 
thousands’.120 Secondly, he did not believe this proposal would be damaging to the Zionist 
movement as ‘little of anything would be sacrificed’ because ‘the chances of exceeding such 
a figure during the probable duration of the Mandate are remote’. Brailsford estimated that at 
the present rate, it would take ‘one hundred and sixty years’ for the Jewish community to 
form a majority in Palestine. Therefore, he called on the Zionist movement to be realistic and 
take British public opinion into account. Brailsford believed that Zionists must ‘coldly face 
the fact that... an immense change has come about in the attitude of the whole nation towards 
territorial expansion overseas’. Therefore, given this ‘changing attitude toward imperialism’ 
Britain could not continue indefinitely with the Palestine mandate.121 His writings at this time 
led contemporary observers to believe that he had explicitly ruled out population transfer as 
an ‘indefensible procedure’.122  
 
On 20 October 1930, Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield issued the White Paper on Palestine. 
Four days later, the editorial line of the New Leader backed the Labour government and thus, 
for the first time, articulated an unambiguously anti-Zionist line. It declared, ‘However 
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sympathetic one may be to Jewish aspirations, it is difficult to see how the Government could 
refrain from interfering if it were to discharge its responsibilities to the Arab population’.123 
The editorial quoted the White Paper which discussed the increase in the Jewish population in 
Palestine. The conclusion was drawn that Zionist immigration was indeed dispossessing the 
native Arab Palestinians and that the Zionist movement was seeking to subjugate the Arabs: 
‘Clearly if this process had been allowed to continue unchecked, in a comparatively short 
time the Arabs would have been wholly a landless proletariat in permanent subjection to the 
Jewish colonists’.124  
 
Writing in the New Leader, Brailsford responded forcefully to this new line by penning a 
series of pro-Zionist articles. Passfield’s proposals ‘incredibly tactless’.125 The dominance of 
Brailsford in relation to the ILP’s Palestine policy was clearly demonstrated in Brockway’s 
memoirs. Brockway was keenly interested in a range of international and colonial issues.126 
However, he recalled that during his visit to the USA in January 1930, a debate on Palestine 
at the Foreign Policy Association, came as ‘a surprise’.127 When asked to speak on this issue, 
Brockway protested: ‘I know nothing about Palestine’.128 Such a remark about India or China 
would have been unthinkable. When one of the organisers of Brockway’s tour Mary Fox, 
secretary of the League for Industrial Democracy, commented that the organisation’s official 
literature had often carried reports of Brockway’s contributions on Palestine in parliament, 
Brockway explained: 
 
My questions had been efforts to save both Arabs and Jews from execution: I realised that 
hanging, whether on one side or the other, would only make any solution more difficult, but 
what the solution was I had no idea! 129 
 
Brockway’s deliberations on Palestine are very revealing in articulating the dilemma that 
Palestine presented for many in the labour movement. In his first memoir, he recalled: 
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One of the most difficult questions was Palestine. To most problems one can apply general 
principles, but to Palestine – no. By no other question have I been so puzzled: on no other 
question have I so allowed facts and influences to surround me, examining them quietly, 
weighing and estimating them before reaching a conclusion. I found nearly everyone divided 
into opposite camps.130 
 
Brockway claimed that the line which he had developed for this debate was to form the basis 
of the ILP’s policy thereafter, namely that ‘Palestine must become an Arab-Jewish State freed 
from British Imperialism’.131 However, according to a contemporary report of the debate in 
The New York Times, Brockway based his solution to the situation in Palestine upon Jews and 
Arabs realising the ‘full meaning of the Balfour Declaration’, which for Brockway meant 
establishing a Jewish National Home without infringing upon the rights of the Palestinian 
Arabs.132 He advocated the setting up of a ‘round table conference under an impartial 
chairman’. This round table would then create a legislative assembly ‘in which Jews and 
Arabs would have proportionate representation’. There should also be a conference of Jewish, 
Muslim and Christian leaders which would deal with the problems surrounding the holy sites 
in Palestine. In the immediate term, he reiterated his call for the ‘cancellation of the death 
penalties’ for both Jews and Arabs implicated in the riots of August 1929 as it would ‘create 
better feeling on both sides’.133 Therefore, at this time, it appears that Brockway had no 
explicit ideological objection to the Zionist goal of establishing Jewish National Home. 
However, he must have been aware of the implication of this policy, namely that a system of 
proportional representation would almost certainly have resulted in the Arab majority 
blocking any attempt to establish a Jewish state. Secondly, the processes by which the end of 
British imperialism was to be achieved, seemingly in gradual steps by a constitutional 
assembly organised on a communal (rather than a class) basis was at odds with the policy 
which was to follow.  
 
It was later that Brockway first expressed his unequivocal opposition to the Balfour 
Declaration. When interviewed in September 1931, he was stated that he was ‘opposed to it 
in the form in which it was issued’, because it provided ‘an opportunity for ambiguous 
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interpretations’. More fundamentally however, Brockway thought that it was ‘issued with a 
view to winning the support of Jewish capitalism’ and thus ‘that in itself is a sufficient reason 
why we should oppose it’.134 Speaking on behalf of the ILP, Brockway revealingly declared 
‘The Palestine problem interests us only in as much as it affects British Imperialist policy, but 
as a specifically Jewish question Palestine does not interest us at all’.135 Placing Palestine in 
the colonial context, Brockway claimed that the ILP had  ‘never been satisfied… with the 
policy which the Labour Government has been conducting in Palestine, just in the same way 
as we have not been satisfied with its policy in India, and we have been in open conflict with 
our Ministers on this question’.136 However, this account appears difficult to reconcile with 
Brailsford’s numerous pro-Zionist, pro-mandate articles which dominated the New Leader in 
the aftermath and the fact that the ILP championed Indian nationalism but not Palestinian 
Arab nationalism. 
 
‘A Socialist Policy for Palestine’: 1932-1939 
Notwithstanding Brockway’s contributions, in the aftermath of Passfield’s White Paper and 
its subsequent retraction in the form of MacDonald’s letter to Chaim Weizmann, the ILP as a 
party did not formulate any kind of detailed policy on Palestine. However, one telling 
response was the promotion of immigration to the Jewish colony of Birobidzhan, a territory 
of 14,000 square miles in the Soviet Union, bordering Manchuria.137 This project, which 
officially began in 1928, was an attempt to create an autonomous Jewish region away from 
Palestine and as such, served as a clear rival to Zionism.138 The Soviet government 
announced that in Birobidzhan, Jews would possess their own administrative, education and 
judicial institutions, with Yiddish as the official language.139 Under Brockway’s editorship, 
the New Leader was very enthusiastic about the project and evidently perceived it more 
favourably than Zionism. An article discussing fascist persecution of Jews, concluded by 
referring to the existence of ‘one striking contrast’: 
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No we are not referring to Palestine! Despite all the talk of Britain providing a ‘national 
home’, the Jews in Palestine thought it necessary to declare a general strike last week against 
the British administration. The great contrast is in Soviet Russia, where the free Jewish 
colony of BiroBjan [sic.] has now been recognised as an autonomous territory.140  
 
When the colony was officially declared as the ‘Jewish Autonomous Region’ in 1934, 
Brockway spoke at a celebratory meeting in East London. In his speech, he remarked that the 
causes of ‘workers’ freedom and Jewish freedom’ were ‘linked together’ and called upon 
British Jews and British workers to unite in order to resist fascism which ‘threaten(ed) both 
with slavery’.141 In late August, the New Leader carried an article drawing attention to the 
scheme, alongside an advert for a fundraising event at Golders Green in East London.142 This 
was not the first time Brockway had taken an interest in the plight of Soviet Jewry. In his 
capacity as ILP political secretary, Brockway had lent his support to a campaign to aid Jews 
who had been ‘declassed’ by the Soviet regime.143 The ‘People’s Tool Campaign’, which also 
gained support from the likes of Einstein, Blum and Bernstein, sought to support Jews who 
had been ‘forced from their mercantile occupations by the new…economic system’.144 
 
It was not until 1936, after the Palestinian Arab revolt had begun in late April, that the ILP 
started to give serious consideration to the situation in Palestine. In June, a document entitled 
‘The View of the ILP’, authored by Brockway, was submitted to a discussion held by the 
International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist Unity (IBRSU), entitled ‘A Symposium on 
Palestine’. This text set out a series of points which outlined the key features of the party’s 
political analysis. The first of these reaffirmed the long-held belief that the decision of the 
British government to establish a ‘National Jewish Home in Palestine’ was made ‘for War 
and Imperialist purposes’.145 Specifically, the report claimed, it was made for two reasons, 
firstly ‘to secure the support of Jewish populations and particularly Jewish finance during the 
War,’ and secondly, ‘to provide an excuse for a British mandate over Palestine after the War’. 
British imperialism it argued, was interested in Palestine for three reasons. First, in order ‘to 
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protect the route to India’, second, ‘to control the Eastern Mediterranean’, and thirdly, ‘to 
guard the oil of Mosul which flows through a pipe-line to Haifa’. According to the report, 
Zionism was an instrument of British imperialism in the sense that the British government 
had ‘deliberately used the Jewish population in Palestine to weaken any Arab revolt against 
imperialism in the Near East and to destroy the movement for Arabian Independence’. 
However, at the same time, Jewish migration to Palestine had ‘raised the standard of life’ and 
socialist Jewish workers had introduced trade unionism, the cooperative movement and 
socialist ideas.146  
 
The report demonstrated that the ILP did not see Labour Zionism as a homogenous entity and 
sought to distinguish between the right and left of the movement. The right wing was 
criticised as being ‘intensely nationalist’, whereas the left wing had ‘advocated Jewish-Arab 
working-class unity and has sought to bring the Arabs into trade unions and to influence them 
with Socialist ideas’.147  
 
This was followed by an analysis of the Arab nationalist movement, which was deemed to be 
not only devoid of a labour dimension but was profoundly anti-socialist. Arab nationalism 
was ‘dominated by aristocratic Effendis and religious leaders, who have exploited the Arab 
peasants’. Furthermore, the nationalism of these leaders was ‘intensified by opposition to the 
Socialistic influence which Jewish workers are exerting on Arab workers’. Like the 
mainstream view of the Labour Party, the ILP concluded that the Arab nationalist movement 
‘has been led by its antagonism to the Jews to sympathise with Hitler and has adopted much 
of the mentality of Fascist Nationalism’.148  
 
British imperialism feared ‘both the Arab Nationalists and the Jewish Socialists’ as both 
groups were ‘a menace to Imperialism’. Therefore, Britain was pursuing a policy of divide 
and rule. As a result, the ‘first duty’ of the socialist movement was to ‘encourage unity 
between the Jewish and Arab working-class populations’. This was to be achieved by 
supporting the Left Poale Zion and Hashomer Hatzair in their efforts to ‘develop a sense of 
class unity between Jewish and Arab workers’. Hence, ‘all attempts to exclude Arabs from 
employment, land cultivation, and education must be resisted’. Instead, the Arab workers 
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‘must be encouraged to join trade unions, Co-operative organisations, and working-class 
parties’. The ultimate aim was summarised as ‘to combine the workers and peasants of both 
races in the struggle against Jewish Capitalism, Arab Feudalism and British Imperialism’. It 
should be noted that the reference here to ‘Jewish Capitalism’ was different to the anti-
Semitic Nationalist Socialist notion. In this context, Jewish capitalism was the counterpart to 
Arab feudalism, namely the anti-working-class element within the nationalist movement in 
Palestine.   
 
The ILP’s stance was resolutely anti-Zionist in the sense that it insisted that: 
 
The Jews in Palestine must give up the idea that they will have any right to establish a 
predominately Jewish State. They must face the fact that ultimately Palestine will become 
part of a federation including the Arab States of Syria, Trans-Jordania, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and 
probably Egypt.  
 
One reason cited for the necessity of Jews in Palestine to adopt an anti-Zionist position was 
the belief that the reliance upon British imperialism to defend the ‘National Home’ and 
failure to bridge the gap between Jews and Arabs would mean a ‘terrible fate’ for the Jews in 
Palestine when the ‘inevitable’ Arab national revolt brought independence. However, 
although the position was anti-Zionist, it still was not pro-Arab nationalist. Like the Labour 
Party, the ILP saw the way to socialism as being under a ‘Jewish (socialist) leadership’, the 
only difference being that this would be achieved by the left-wing of the Labour Zionist 
movement rather than the right-wing Histadrut.149 
 
The question of immigration was especially problematic. The report reiterated that Jewish 
immigration had brought about many positive developments, ‘raising the standard of life’ and 
spreading socialist ideas. However, it was argued that the question must be judged 
‘objectively by the actual situation in Palestine’. The conclusion was drawn that ‘if continued 
immigration at this moment makes more difficult the realisation of unity between the Jewish 
and Arab workers and peasants’, then ‘Left Jewish Socialists should ask themselves whether 
it is immediately desirable in the light of the object which they have in view – the 
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establishment of a united Arab-Jewish Republic, part of a Socialist Federation, which must 
include the surrounding Arab nations’.150 
 
This was followed by the creation of a ‘special commission’ consisting of Maxton, 
Brockway, McGovern and Stephen, which published a report, entitled ‘A Socialist Policy for 
Palestine’. This statement was submitted to the Peel Commission, which the British 
government had launched in the aftermath of the Arab revolt and ultimately recommended 
partition.151 The ILP’s document overwhelmingly reiterated what had already been outlined 
but included with some key additions and amendments. An important shift was in relation to 
organisation. Rather than the emphasis being placed upon Palestinian Arab workers being 
organised by Left Labour Zionists, it was now argued that entirely new workers’ 
organisations should be created.152 Immigration once again proved the most difficult issue. 
For instance, the report declared that the Jewish colonisation of Briobhizan was proving 
inadequate for non-Russian Jews and that facilitating Jewish migration to Australia should be 
considered.153 In his preface to the pamphlet Whither Palestine? written by Labour Zionist 
Zeev Abramovitch in 1936, Maxton clearly expressed the tension between socialist 
ideological opposition to Zionism and the humanitarian concern for Jewish refugees fleeing 
fascist persecution:   
 
The Independent Labour Party in common with most other Socialist Parties, is not inclined to 
accept the Zionist view. It does, however, recognise the urgent need for some place, or places 
on the surface of the globe where Jewish workers can live without having to face daily danger 
of imprisonment, torture, starvation or butchery.154 
 
Indeed, in these circumstances Maxton even appears to have regarded the British Empire 
itself as a potentially benevolent entity. In a parliamentary debate on providing assistance for 
persecuted Jews in Nazi Germany in November 1938, Lansbury brought up the possibility of 
consulting with the High Commissioners of the various dominions in order to grant asylum 
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there. When Chamberlain replied that this was ‘not a matter for the government’, Maxton 
asked, ‘While the Dominions are not a matter for this Government, is there not a vast colonial 
empire in which something definite could be done?’155 Therefore, rather paradoxically, 
Maxton demanded an end to limits on Jewish immigration into Palestine while remaining 
ideologically anti-Zionist and called on the British government to utilise its colonies’ lack of 
political autonomy to provide refuge to persecuted European Jews, while maintaining an anti-
colonial stance. Like Brockway, Maxton also emphasised that ‘no problem’ was ‘more 
insistent, complex and more difficult of solution’ than the situation in Palestine.156 
 
The ILP commission made clear that socialists must ‘accept the principle of freedom of 
migration, irrespective of race or colour’.157 But this was predicated upon the condition that 
such immigration did not adversely affect the standard of life and the economic conditions of 
the native workers. Thus, it was argued that Jewish immigration to Palestine must not take 
‘the political form of a foreign occupation’ which sought to establish a Jewish state. The 
‘desirable’ solution was to quickly establish joint Jewish-Arab workers’ organisations. 
Immigration would then be carried out ‘in conjunction’ with these organisations, but the 
practicalities of this policy were not explained. In the immediate term, immigration should be 
allowed to continue on the basis that employment was guaranteed to each immigrant and that 
Jewish labour organisations no longer refused to employ Arab workers.158 
 
Labour support for the Palestinian Arab cause was rare, indeed as Kelemen has written, ‘the 
[Palestinian] Arab case did not have a single prominent Labour Party advocate in the 
1930s’.159 In the House of Commons, Labour denied the legitimacy of the Palestinian Arab 
revolt and urged the government to resist its demands.160 However, within the post-
disaffiliation ILP, anti-Zionism was widespread. Hence, one exception to the prevailing 
opinion within the Labour movement was Alex Gossip, an ILPer and leader of the National 
Amalgamated Furnishing Trades’ Association, who, as we have seen, was centrally involved 
in the British section of the LAI. Gossip moved a motion at the Labour Party conference of 
1936 which attempted to put forward the Palestinian Arab nationalist case but was heavily 
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defeated.161 Pacifist intellectuals Reginald Reynolds and Ethel Mannin emerged as perhaps 
the most strident anti-Zionists in the ILP 162 Reynolds had been a disciple of Gandhi before 
being appointed secretary of the No More War Movement (NMWM). Mannin was a prolific 
author and had developed ties with numerous anti-colonial activists. She was unequivocal in 
her support for Palestinian Arabs. Palestine was she wrote ‘after all, their country, the 
property of neither the British nor the Jews’.163 Reynolds was adamant that because Zionism 
was supported by British imperialism, socialists should oppose it, and instead support Arab 
demands for self-government.164 In the 1930s, Maxton too supported the Palestinian 
nationalist case, repeatedly rejecting Zionism and asserting the demand for Palestine to be an 
independent Arab-majority state. But given that he put his name to the Socialist Policy For 
Palestine document, he clearly had reservations regarding the Arab nationalist movement and 
furthermore, as we have seen, was strongly opposed to the Arab nationalist demand to end to 
Jewish immigration. 
 
In early 1937, ILP MPs Campbell Stephen and John McGovern visited Palestine in a tour 
organised by Left Poale Zion. They both returned with pro-Zionist sympathies.165 Indeed, 
McGovern’s subsequent support for Zionism was so strong that at the party’s annual 
conference, Reynolds angrily accused McGovern of contradicting party policy.166 During this 
visit, George Mansur of the Arab Workers’ Society made repeated attempts to meet with 
them but was turned down.167 Not only did the ILP MPs in question refuse to hear Mansur’s 
case, but they actively challenged his claims to be an authentic representative of the 
Palestinian Arab labour movement. In a parliamentary debate, when the point was made that 
the Peel Commission had taken evidence from Mansur ‘on behalf of Arab labour’, Campbell 
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Stephen remarked that Mansur ‘represented no one but himself’.168 In The Arab Worker 
Under the Palestine Mandate, Mansur referred to this incident and stated that part of the 
rationale for his pamphlet was ‘in order to give the English reader some idea of why Arab 
labour… resents the well-known attitude of Col. Wedgwood and Mr Stephen’.169 As 
Lockman has pointed out, the Palestinian Arab labour movement lacked the Histadrut’s 
‘strong connections’ with the international trade union movement and with ‘European, 
especially British Labour and socialist parties’. Consequently, they were ‘extremely 
frustrated by the inability to put their case before world public opinion’.170  This was 
recognised by some in the interwar British labour press. An article discussing political 
situation in the Palestine published in the Glasgow-based ILP newspaper Forward 
commented, ‘At anyrate [sic], our readers will do well to remember that all the news and 
propaganda coming to our press is Jewish – the Moslem side, so far, has hardly had a 
show’.171  
 
It was not until November 1938 that Mansur contributed a piece in the New Leader, which 
was the first unequivocally pro-Arab piece from a Palestinian author that the paper had 
featured. This took the form of a reply to Mordekhay Orenstein of Hashomer Hatzair, whom 
Mansur accused of concealing the ‘spirit of Zionism’ behind a ‘socialist façade’. On the 
question of immigration, Mansur compared the Palestinian situation to New Zealand. He 
pointed out that in New Zealand the Labour government had ‘drastically restricted 
immigration excluding thousands of would-be Jewish settlers’.172 Therefore, argued Mansur, 
‘We Arabs demand for our county the same self-determination as the people of New 
Zealand’. He insisted that just because Hitler and Mussolini were attempting to undermine 
the British Empire, it did not mean that the Arab nationalist movement was fascist. Recent 
scholarship on this question suggests that although some Arab nationalist leaders ‘tried to 
gain German support’ and ‘were open to German propaganda’, ultimately fascist influence on 
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Palestinian society was ‘clearly very limited’, with the vast majority of Palestinian Arab 
society rejecting its doctrines.173 
 
 Mansur identified what he perceived as a double-standard in the ILP’s policy, remarking 
‘from a paper such as the New Leader, which prides itself on its anti-imperialist policy one 
might have expected some expression of sympathy for our national struggle… I have looked 
in vain for such an expression’.174 While Mansur was disappointed at the ILP’s official 
stance, in contrast to the Labour party, the ILP had at least given Mansur a hearing. His 
repeated attempts to put the case to the Labour Party were dismissed.175 
 
In May 1939, the ILP issued a policy statement signed by Brockway, Maxton and others 
which called upon Jewish and Arab workers to unite and form a ‘strong militant Socialist 
Party’ which would prove to be a force of ‘social emancipation and national liberation’.176 By 
now, the ILP leadership had dropped all objections to Jewish immigration into Palestine. It 
was imperative that while ensuring that other countries were open to Jewish immigration that 
the ‘gates of Palestine’ also remained ‘open to the Jewish masses’, persecuted by fascism.177 
This statement was signed by the ILP leadership and by leading anti-colonialists such as 
George Padmore. However, it appeared to have a broader appeal as further signatories 
included notable Labourites who were not connected with the ILP such as George Bernard 
Shaw, Leonard Woolf and Henry Nevinson.178 As part of this effort, in June 1939, the ILP set 
up a British-based organisation entitled ‘The Socialist Committee for Arab Jewish Workers’ 
Unity in Palestine’ which was chaired by Maxton.179 Plans were made to hold a conference in 
Palestine which aimed to bring together Jewish and Arab socialists not only from Palestine 
but also from neighbouring countries.180 However, with the outbreak of the Second World 
War, this failed to materialise.181  
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Conclusion 
Throughout the interwar years, the Labour Party, in common with European social 
democratic parties, supported the claims of the Zionist movement, while the sympathies of 
the communist left lay with the Arab nationalists. For some years after the war, the ILP was 
dominated by the pro-Zionist voices of foreign policy specialists such as MacDonald, 
Brailsford and Wedgwood. But Palestine demonstrated the ambiguity of Labour’s new 
foreign policy in the sense that although all were agreed that no more secret treaties should be 
made, opinion was divided as to whether previous acts of secret diplomacy such as the 
Balfour Declaration should be adhered to. In the 1920s, the role of Zionist activists was 
crucial in shaping Labour’s perceptions of Palestine. Not only did Poale Zion repeatedly help 
secure pro-Zionist motions at party conferences but in addition virtually all the visits to 
Palestine had been arranged by either Zionist or Labour Zionist organisations.  
 
When, from 1927 onwards, the ILP leadership of Maxton and Brockway began to pursue a 
more strident anti-colonialist policy, Palestine proved to be problematic. For instance, George 
Lansbury, although firmly backing India and China’s claims to national independence was a 
supporter of Zionism rather than Arab nationalism in Palestine.  
 
In the 1930s, the ILP’s policymakers recognised the need for a safe-haven for European Jews 
fleeing persecution but also feared that Jewish immigration into Palestine might damage the 
prospects for Arab-Jewish unity. As fascist persecution intensified, these concerns were 
eventually discarded. The party praised the work of the Jewish labour movement in Palestine 
but criticised the ethnically exclusivist policies. Like the Labour Party, the ILP expressed 
deep concerns about the ‘feudal’ leaders of the Palestinian Arabs and their fascist 
connections. However, whereas the Labour party distanced themselves, the ILP saw this as a 
reason to engage with the anti-colonial nationalists and steer them away from fascist 
influence. Essentially, the ILP repudiated the central aim of Zionism, namely the creation of a 
predominantly Jewish state in Palestine, believing Zionism to be supported by British 
imperialism as a pretext in order to continue to Britain’s administration of Mandatory 
Palestine and undermine Arab nationalism. The party leadership saw the solution as being 
joint action by Arab and Jewish workers against the capitalist elements within the Zionist 
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movement, the feudal elements within the Arab nationalist movement and against British 
imperialism. 
 
The case of Palestine demonstrated how the ILP were faced with a genuine dilemma and 
were forced to attempt to reconcile conflicting aspects of its internationalist ideology, as 
sympathy for Jewish people facing fascist persecution in Europe and admiration for the 
activities of fellow labour activists had to be weighed against its anti-colonial sympathy for 
Arab nationalism. Within the social democratic movement as a whole, anti-Zionism proved to 
be a marginal force, and some of the anti-Zionism that did emerge did not translate into 
support for Palestinian Arab nationalism. The line of thought which rejected Zionism because 
it was a form of nationalism was equally as critical of Arab nationalism. Likewise, the 
economic argument against British expenditure in Palestine was unconcerned with 
championing the Palestinian Arab case. However, in the mid-1930s significant opposition to 
Zionism could be found within the ILP. From the late 1920s onwards, Maxton emerged as 
one of the few advocates of the Arab claim for independence, even if he did not support Arab 
nationalist demands vis-à-vis the stoppage of Jewish immigration into Palestine. 
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Chapter 3: Transnational Labour and Zionism in the Interwar Years 
 
During the interwar years, Zionism was a genuinely transnational movement. When Josiah C. 
Wedgwood called for a ‘united Jewish front’ (by which was meant Zionist) ‘from San 
Francisco to Shanghai’, it was not simply a rhetorical flourish, as Zionist groups did indeed 
exist across North America, throughout Europe, Australasia and even in China.1 Labour 
Zionism was no exception and Poale Zion was active in Britain, across Europe and in the US 
and South America.2 Unsurprisingly therefore, there was a definite transnational dimension to 
pro-Zionist advocacy.  
 
One significant way in which this manifested itself was that several prominent British 
Labourites promoted Zionism abroad, particularly in the English-speaking world. For 
example, Wedgwood, Harry Snell, Henry Nevinson, Ethel Snowden and H.N. Brailsford all 
lectured in the United States advocating the Zionist cause.3 Meanwhile, articles on Palestine 
by MacDonald, Brailsford, Angell and Nevinson were published in the North American 
press.4 Later in the period, John McGovern’s censored pamphlet My Impressions of 
Palestine, which caused much controversy within the ILP, was published in New York by the 
American Zionist Student Federation.5 Equally, those who took a more ambivalent view of 
the Zionist project such as Fenner Brockway addressed North American audiences on the 
topic of Palestine.6 When, in the late 1930s, Brockway and Maxton endeavoured to create a 
united Arab-Jewish workers’ movement in Palestine, Manya Schochat travelled from 
Palestine to New York in order to set up a ‘Committee for Arab-Jewish Unity in America’.7 
Therefore, this network, which Maxton and Brockway had envisioned could result in Arab-
Jewish unity was a transnational one. Although the idea originated with the ILP leadership in 
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London, plans were made to hold a conference in Palestine which would bring together 
activists and intellectuals from across Britain, Europe, North America and the Middle East in 
order to resolve the Palestine conflict.8 A transnational solution was also promoted by 
Palestinian Arab socialist George Mansur, who posited the idea of a British labour committee 
to make a decisive declaration upon the question of Zionist immigration.9 The internal debate 
within the labour movement over the future of Mandatory Palestine was not confined by 
national borders. For instance, when a correspondent to the New Leader wrote 
sympathetically about Arab nationalist claims, prominent German socialist Eduard Bernstein 
quickly responded by publishing a defence of Zionism and a scathing critique of the 
Palestinian Arab nationalist movement.10 
 
Migration played a role too. For instance, Bernard Stone, who had previously served on the 
National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party, became a leading figure in 
numerous US-based organisations such as the Palestine Foundation Relief, the United 
Palestine Appeal and the Jewish National Fund of America.11 These groups often hosted the 
likes of Wedgwood, as well as raising significant finances for the Zionist movement.12 
Activities also extended into Europe. For instance, Wedgwood met with the League of 
Revisionist Zionists in Berlin and attended the Zionist Congress in Zurich in an attempt to 
obtain wider support for his vision of Palestine becoming the ‘Seventh Dominion’ of the 
British Empire.13 It is also important to take into account that the dissemination of literature 
had an impact within Palestine itself. For example, in an interview, the Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem revealed that he was familiar with MacDonald’s A Socialist in Palestine, a text 
which al-Huseyni believed had ‘misrepresented the situation before the world’.14 Nevinson 
noted that some of the Jewish immigrants that he met in Palestine were readers of 
Brailsford’s articles in the ILP’s New Leader.15 Various commentaries were also published in 
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Palestine itself, for instance Brailsford wrote for the Histadrut official journal Davar.16 
Equally, numerous articles by Palestine-based Zionists appeared in the British labour press 
such as the Labour Leader, the New Leader and the Socialist Review.17 A number of these 
were translated and published in Europe.18 Throughout the period, many British and 
European socialists maintained regular correspondence with labour activists in Palestine. 
 
Labour Zionists evidently perceived their activism as internationalist and regarded their 
project as an integral part of the international socialist movement. For instance, a few days 
before MacDonald’s visit to Palestine in February 1922, David Ben-Gurion wrote to him 
remarking how delighted his organisation was to host ‘one of the most foremost 
representatives of the international socialist movement’.19 Furthermore, Ben-Gurion believed 
that the activity of Labour Zionism in Palestine was of interest to ‘every socialist and thinker, 
of whatever nation he may be’.20 When, in April 1923, Shlomo Kaplansky addressed the 
ILP’s annual conference as an international fraternal delegate, he told the conference that the 
ILP had ‘educated a whole generation in socialism and international solidarity’.21 Another 
leading Labour Zionist Berl Locker told delegates gathered at the LSI congress of his pride 
that Labour Zionists had created what was in his opinion, ‘the sole… outpost of International 
Socialism in the Orient’.22 Meanwhile, Kaplansky argued that the creation of a pro-Zionist 
committee affiliated to the LSI was vital to ‘remind the Jewish bourgeoisie and all anti-labour 
elements inside Zionism and outside Zionism that Poale Zion does not stand alone in their 
fight’.23  
 
The British Commonwealth Labour Conference 
One of the first significant transnational forums that paid serious attention to Palestine was 
the inaugural British Commonwealth Labour Conference, held at the House of Commons in 
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the summer of 1925. This conference was initiated by the Labour Commonwealth Group 
which had been established by Johnson and Lansbury and advocated what has been termed 
‘Empire Socialism’.24  Thus far, when scholars have discussed this conference it has been in 
the context of discussions between representatives from the Dominions and British 
Labourites over issues such as a united foreign policy and the debate on whether Labour 
should advocate emigration to as a solution to unemployment.25 
 
On the agenda were questions such as international labour legislation, migration, inter-
commonwealth political relations and labour conditions in mandates and colonies. The 
conference included delegations from Australia, Canada, Ireland, India, South Africa, British 
Guiana and Palestine.26 Maxton, Snell and Lansbury were among the delegates representing 
the PLP. In addition, Friedrich Adler was present on behalf of the LSI and W.J. Brown 
represented the IFTU.27 In his opening address, MacDonald informed the delegates that such 
a conference had been a long-term aim of the British Labour Party and reiterated his vision of 
creating an empire based not upon exploitation but the ‘co-operative unity of nations and 
coming nations’.28 
 
As discussed previously, Palestinian delegations to transnational labour gatherings consisted 
entirely of Labour Zionists and this conference proved to be no exception. Significantly 
however, while British and European labour had endorsed Zionism in its war aims without 
any notable opposition, the movement was met here, even in its socialist variant, with a 
significant degree of scepticism, confusion and even outright hostility. In the third session of 
the conference, which dealt with ‘Industrial Legislation and Labour Protection in Mandated 
Territories’, the contributions of Ben-Gurion and Isaac Benzevie provoked considerable 
opposition. For instance, Thomas Johnson, an Irish Labour Party TD, questioned Ben-Gurion 
over whether the proposals he had outlined amounted to segregation.29 Serious criticism was 
expressed by labour representatives from colonial nations. For example, Johnson’s concern 
was shared by India’s Chaman Lall, who described the prospect of segregation as ‘thoroughly 
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pernicious’ and insisted that the Arabs and Jews in Palestine must combine ‘in order to work 
up to one national community’.30 His fellow Indian MLA N.M. Joshi stated that although he 
had ‘great sympathy’ with the aspiration of a Jewish national home, he found the project 
difficult to reconcile with his ‘democratic spirit’.31 Apparently ridiculing the intellectual basis 
of Zionism, Joshi drew laughter from the conference when he remarked ‘if they started going 
back to the beginning of the world he did not know what country any of them would belong 
to’.32 He argued that had the British government been sincere, it would have pursued a 
territorialist solution and endeavoured to create Jewish national home in Australia or Canada 
where there were ‘vast tracts of land... still waiting for emigrants’, rather than in Palestine 
where an Arab population already existed.33 Essentially, Joshi accepted the labour but not the 
Zionist aspect of Labour Zionism. He concluded that the Indian labour movement were, 
‘quite prepared to help their friends in Palestine as a working-class people for their working-
class movement’, but not ‘if they wanted to remain separate in culture and other things from 
the Arabs’.34 For the Indian delegation, what distinguished Indian nationalism from Zionism 
was that the former sought to unite Hindus and Muslims whereas the latter was deemed to be 
potentially divisive force.35     
 
In his contribution, George Lansbury appeared to characterise Zionism as a form of European 
settler-colonialism, referring to the Zionists in Palestine as the ‘white minority’.36 In addition, 
he queried how central government in Palestine would function and which of the two 
communities would control the various aspects of the state.37 Lansbury concurred with the 
Indian delegation’s point that while Arab and Jewish individuals should possess equal rights, 
it appeared problematic to them for the Jewish minority and the Arab majority to enjoy equal 
political representation.38 Despite praising the achievements of socialist Zionism, prominent 
ILPer and miners’ leader Robert Smillie also expressed misgivings about what he described 
as Ben-Gurion’s ‘extraordinary... proposal’ for ‘some form of dual government which, in the 
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same community, would give the Arabs and the Jews the right of separate self-government’.39    
However, in reply, Ben-Gurion insisted that his arguments were consistent with 
internationalism. In his concluding remarks to the session he argued that: 
 
Internationalism meant the brotherhood of nations, and he did not think he need say they were 
in favour of full Internationalism. They were out to promote International brotherhood and 
understanding in the working-classes but they were entitled to national independence, as well 
as the Indians and other nations... In England there was no national question... In other 
countries it was different, and they could not ignore it, especially if they were true 
Internationalists and were standing on the right of each nation to be free and equal.40  
 
These remarks reveal that for Ben-Gurion, internationalism meant the right to national self-
determination and the unity of the working class regardless of ethnicity. Moreover, Ben-
Gurion manifestly held that it was self-evident that as socialists, Labour Zionists adhered to 
this internationalist creed. Similarly, his fellow delegate Chaim Arlosoroff appealed to the 
notion of socialist internationalism with regard to the issue of Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, reminding the conference: ‘they claimed [to support] free emigration... As 
Socialists and Internationalists they would not dispute that. Therefore, how could they deny it 
in the case of Palestine?’.41 Thus, it is evident that these discussions were profoundly 
informed by two central and interrelated questions, namely: what did it mean to be an 
internationalist and how should this concept be applied to Palestine? 
 
The Labour and Socialist International: 1923-1931 
In the years following the first world war, Zionism became a pressing question for the 
institutions of the Eurocentric international socialist movement. This was reflected in the fact 
that the question of establishing a Jewish national home was included in the war aims 
statement adopted in February 1918.42 Established in May 1923, the LSI was the successor to 
the Second International and often continued to be referred to as the Second International in 
interwar political discourse. Prior to the First World War, the Palestine-based Poale Zion had 
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been unsuccessful in its efforts to affiliate to the Second International.43 The party then joined 
the short-lived Vienna Union before successfully affiliating to the LSI in July 1924 and 
gaining representation on its executive.44 Indeed, it was the transnational nature of Poale Zion 
which had initially caused difficulties for the LSI. Because the LSI was strictly organised by 
the affiliation of national parties, it proved ‘somewhat difficult’ to include Poale Zion.45 
However, an arrangement was made whereby Poale Zion was recognised as the national 
representatives of Palestine and Poale Zion groups in other countries would be considered as 
sections of their respective socialist parties.46 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, a number of prominent British Labour figures visited 
Palestine and wrote enthusiastically about the Zionist project upon their return. This 
phenomenon extended to Europe as several socialists, most notably LSI president, Belgian 
socialist leader and statesman Emile Vandervelde as well as the Austrian socialist Julius 
Braunthal, who later wrote the first comprehensive history of the LSI, both toured Palestine 
during the interwar years.47  
 
After MacDonald’s 1922 excursion, the most prominent visitor to Palestine was Vandervelde. 
During his tour in April 1928, he emphasised what he perceived to be Zionism’s 
internationalist credentials. In a lecture given at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
Vandervelde claimed that Zionism, ‘with its upbuilding work and its fraternal tendencies 
toward the Arabs’ was proving to be ‘an important factor toward international peace’.48 
Commenting upon Vandervelde’s support for Zionism, Christine Collette has described it as 
‘remarkable that a nationalist vision should act so powerfully upon an internationalist’.49 
While theoretically true, in the historical context, Vandervelde’s advocacy of Zionism was 
not particularly extraordinary. After all, European social democracy had been officially 
committed to Zionism since the publication of its War Aims memorandum of February 1918 
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and many other outstanding self-professed internationalists such as Léon Blum, Albert 
Thomas, MacDonald, Brailsford and Angell supported Zionism.50 This was because in their 
vision of internationalism, there was no tension between nationalism and internationalism, as 
the ideal form of international relations was based upon the co-operation of free nation states.  
 
On his return, Vandervelde wrote a book praising the activities of Labour Zionists in 
Palestine. Its title, Le Pays d’Israel: un Marxiste en Palestine, directly echoed MacDonald’s 
1922 work A Socialist in Palestine. Vandervelde was clearly familiar with MacDonald’s and 
Wedgwood’s work on Palestine and approvingly cited both authors.51 So congruent were 
their perspectives that an article in the communist theoretical journal Labour Monthly 
criticised all three of these works, particularly in regard to the claim that Zionism had brought 
about improvements in Palestinian Arab wages and working conditions.52 However, 
Vandervelde’s book was a considerably more substantial study, particularly when compared 
with MacDonald’s, which was essentially a compilation of essays, articles and interviews. It 
also appears that Vandervelde was influenced by developments abroad in an organisational 
sense. In both Britain and France, cross-party pro-Zionist groups had been established.53 A 
few months after returning from Palestine, Vandervelde was the driving force behind the 
creation of an equivalent Belgian parliamentary committee.54 
 
When assessing the factors involved in European labour’s support for Zionism, scholarly 
opinion has been divided. Kelemen has highlighted receptiveness to the ideology of Labour 
Zionism whereas Sargent considered the activism of Poale Zion to be the key factor in 
ensuring this support. However, another interconnected aspect which requires emphasis is the 
role of individual agency. Labour Zionism was not merely tacitly accepted but actively 
promoted by British and European labourites. It is evident that key concepts such as the 
notion of ‘upbuilding’, were directly taken from the repertoire of Labour Zionist rhetoric.55 
However, when Labour Zionism was transmitted across borders, it was not simply reiterated 
but re-imagined within a national context. For instance, to a British audience, MacDonald 
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compared the socialist Zionists in Palestine to the founders of the British ILP.56 Additionally, 
MacDonald told an audience in a mining area that the Zionists in Palestine were ‘building a 
New Jerusalem’, an expression which was widely used in the British labour movement. In 
Belgium, Vandervelde made a direct comparison between Labour Zionist leaders and heroic 
figures in Flemish folklore.57 In Braunthal’s memoir, published in English by the Left Book 
Club in London, Wales was utilised in an analogy to illustrate the comparatively small size of 
Palestine.58 Furthermore, Vandervelde and MacDonald were very influential figures within 
their own national labour movement and the international socialist movement. For example, 
Brockway regarded Vandervelde as a ‘remarkable leader’ and the finest orator he had ever 
witnessed.59 This was a considerable accolade when one considers the numerous talented 
orators that Brockway encountered during his political career. Through his leadership role, 
Vandervelde ensured that despite internal divisions within the LSI, official policy was 
resolutely pro-Zionist. During Vandervelde’s presidency of the LSI, its executive passed a 
number of pro-Zionist resolutions. For instance, one typical statement called upon the British 
government to actively facilitate ‘intensive and widespread Jewish colonisation’.60 While 
Poale Zion in London published MacDonald’s work, the relationship was reciprocal as 
MacDonald edited the ILP’s journal the Socialist Review, which provided a platform for 
Labour Zionists.61 
 
Although there was no discussion of Palestine at the LSI congress in Marseilles in 1925, 
Zionist concerns were brought before the World Migration Conference which took place in 
London in June 1926. This event was a joint initiative of the LSI and the IFTU. Here, Poale 
Zion successfully submitted proposals which called for the lifting of immigration restrictions 
in both North America and Europe and called on both the conference and the League of 
Nations to provide ‘material and moral support’ for the creation of the Jewish National Home 
in Palestine.62 However, senior figures sounded a note of caution. For instance, despite 
praising the activities of the Jewish trade unions in Palestine, and deploring anti-Semitism in 
Europe, W.J. Brown’s report also expressed the view that Palestine could only take in ‘small 
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numbers’ of Jewish immigrants given that its capacity was limited ‘both politically and 
economically’.63  
 
At its congress in August 1928, the LSI gave serious attention to the colonial question for the 
first time. During this discussion, the British Labour Party’s report revealed a key factor in 
British and European socialists’ support for Zionism. It noted that the ‘Jewish Socialist 
Labour Federation of Palestine’ or Histadrut was one of the established few labour 
movements in the colonies, given that only in Palestine and the British Guiana were there 
labour movements affiliated to the LSI.64 However, Poale Zion avoided full discussion of the 
issue of Palestine. As Shlomo Kaplansky argued, ‘Palestine as a country of Jewish 
colonisation occupies a special position and does not come into the category of colonial 
countries’.65  
 
Further progress from a Zionist point of view was made in August 1928 with the 
establishment of the Socialist Committee for Workers’ Palestine.66 However, pro-Zionist 
activities within the LSI did not go unchallenged and significantly, the opposition 
overwhelmingly emanated from leading Jewish figures in the European socialist movement. 
In February 1927, Wedgwood approached Otto Bauer with a view to convince the Austrian 
social democrats to support the Zionist movement, only for Bauer to reject these overtures. 
Bauer regarded Zionism as a ‘bourgeois affair’ and deemed those on the left who supported it 
as ‘not perfect socialists’.67 Furthermore, when Poale Zion first made its attempt to establish 
a pro-Zionist Palestine committee within the LSI, the proposal was firmly opposed by Bauer, 
along with Freidrich Adler and leading Bundist Raphael Abramovich. As the Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency reported, ‘Action was blocked by the opposition of the Jewish socialists 
until a special conference of all Socialist leaders… undertakes a thorough discussion of the 
matter’.68 Adler was critical of the activities of the Poale Zion, claiming that they were 
‘playing too prominent a part in the International compared with the other parties’.69 
Furthermore, he branded their ‘independent actions’ as ‘unconstitutional’ and moreover 
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opined that Poale Zion was ‘introducing chaos and trouble into the Palestinian problem’.70 
Similarly, in the LSI’s youth section, although the majority proved supportive of Zionism, the 
move did not go uncontested. In August 1928, a Jewish delegate unsuccessfully moved a 
motion which argued that the Palestine question should not be discussed ‘on the grounds that 
it was a national and chauvinist question’, and that Zionism aimed ‘to drive the Arabs out of 
their country’.71 Eventually, the Socialist Committee for Workers’ Palestine was created; 
however, the establishment of the group did not result in the end of anti-Zionist criticisms. 
For example, in March 1931, at a meeting of the executive committee of the LSI, Victor Atler 
of the Polish Bundists continued to characterise Zionism as a ‘dangerous Utopia’ which was 
‘an ideal of the Jewish bourgeoisie’.72 Indeed, such was the extent of the scepticism regarding 
Zionism that European advocates such as Braunthal felt it necessary to address in detail the 
left-wing anti-Zionist case.73 By contrast, MacDonald and Wedgwood associated anti-
Zionism with conservative politics and made no reference to the left-wing argument against 
Zionism.74     
 
From the outset, the LSI Palestine committee stressed the connection between Zionism and 
socialist internationalism. When Vandervelde moved the resolution which brought the 
committee into being, he argued that Labour Zionism deserved ‘the assistance of all 
socialists’ because it was a movement based upon ‘socialist transformation and international 
solidarity’.75 The committee declared that the Histadrut was ‘bearing high the banner of 
international socialism and seeking peace with the Arab working class’.76 Furthermore, in the 
aftermath of the Palestinian Arab nationalist uprising of 1929, the organisation reaffirmed its 
belief that ‘international social democracy’ would support the creation of a Jewish national 
home ‘based upon the principles of international socialism’.77 
 
According to its socialist advocates, what distinguished Labour Zionism from typical 
nationalism was that it advocated a form of nationalism which was inclusive. The committee 
declared:  
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Imbued with your ideas of international socialism, you, Jewish workers, have taken upon 
yourselves this great task of planting in this little corner of Asia… a society from which 
hatred, chauvinism and narrow and limited nationalism would be banished forever.78  
 
Thus, the appeal to internationalism operated on two levels. First, the establishment of a 
Jewish national home would mean national status for an oppressed people. Secondly, it was 
argued that Labour Zionism itself was an internationalist movement as it sought to unite 
Jewish and Palestinian Arab workers. 
 
The ILP, for its part, evidently perceived Labour Zionism as being a potentially anti-colonial 
force in Palestine. However, unlike the mainstream Labour movement, it adopted a critical 
attitude towards Labour Zionism. Thus, when in 1929 the ILP established an ‘Imperialism 
Committee’, it met with leading Labour Zionists to pressurise them to increase their efforts to 
establish a joint Arab-Jewish conference.79 However, when the ILP attempted to push the LSI 
towards a policy which engaged with and supported anti-colonial nationalism, Labour 
Zionists sounded a note of caution. The ILP resolution presented to the congress of 1931 
called upon the LSI to announce its support for anti-colonial national liberation movements: 
 
It declares that every people has the right to independence and that the recognition of this 
right is the only foundation of a true internationalism. It sends its greetings to all the peoples 
who are engaged in the struggle against imperialism. [My emphasis].80 
 
After congratulating the nationalist movement in India and highlighting the socialistic 
policies adopted by the Indian National Congress, the ILP went on to affirm support for 
various anti-colonial nationalist movements, which seemingly included Palestinian Arab 
nationalism at the exclusion of Zionism: 
 
The [LSI] Congress expresses its sympathy and support of the peoples of Egypt, the Near 
East, Palestine, the Dutch East Indies, Africa, China and other parts of the world in their fight 
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for political and social liberty, and calls upon the Socialist Parties in imperialist countries to 
support their claims by every means possible.81 
 
At this time, Brockway completely rejected Zionism on the grounds that it served the 
interests of capitalism and imperialism.82 He claimed that the ILP has ‘never been satisfied... 
with the policy which the Labour Government has been conducting in Palestine, just in the 
same way as we have not been satisfied with its policy in India’.83 Maxton too had stated his 
support for Palestinian Arab claims.84 Defending his party’s position, Brockway compared 
Britain’s occupation of India and Egypt to the war-time German occupation of Belgium and 
stressed that it would be a ‘shameful thing if this Congress passed away without making a 
strong declaration against imperialism, which means that subject people are kept under an 
alien rule against their will by force of arms’.85 Furthermore, the ILP proposed that as part of 
its attempt to create an ‘all inclusive international’, the LSI ought to ‘take steps to establish 
and maintain sympathetic contact with nationalist bodies in various countries engaged in the 
struggle for national independence and against imperialist domination’.86  
 
In the discussion that followed, Labour Zionist Berl Locker told the congress that he fully 
agreed with ‘the trend of the idea’ that the LSI should ‘show more interest in the colonial 
problem’ and provide more support to working class movements outside Europe.87 However, 
he added a serious criticism of the ILP’s analysis and proposals, remarking: 
 
How is it, though, that our friends of the I.L.P., who in Europe see the class antagonisms so 
clearly, do not appear to see that these class antagonisms are also present in the East, for 
which reason every Socialist Party must be very careful before it gets into contact with 
anyone there.88 
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Locker argued that the focus of the LSI must be to help create ‘a strong Labour Movement in 
all the eastern countries... so that the Labour Movement is no longer merely a matter for 
Europe and America’.89 Therefore, the emphasis was placed upon creating workers’ 
organisations rather than supporting existing anti-colonial nationalist movements. For 
Locker, Labour Zionism represented ‘the nucleus for a great Labour Movement throughout 
the Orient’.90 This view tallied with the analysis of the LSI leadership who concluded that it 
was ‘particularly necessary to limit close relationship to real Labour organisations. The 
general national movement should certainly be studied also, but the hope of a close 
collaboration with the International can only be supported in the case of those organisations 
which are built up as organisations of the working class’.91 
 
There was also a gender dimension to support for Zionism. At the LSI’s women’s conference, 
Martha Hoffman, a delegate from Palestine, argued that one of Zionism’s merits was its 
progressive stance on women’s rights, blaming the difficulty in implementation on 
Palestinian Arab society:  
 
Arab women are far from possessing any rights, and in Palestine, in that oriental country, it 
has been fearfully difficult for the Jewish Socialist immigrant women to obtain equal rights, 
although they were long ago given to Jewesses by the Zionist organisation. But to put them 
into practice in that country, where the Arab woman is still so entirely without rights, and 
indeed enslaved, is extraordinarily difficult.92 
 
Thus, many western socialists evidently shared with Labour Zionists an Orientalist outlook 
and discourse. As well as Hoffman, Locker also spoke of Zionism challenging the ‘stagnation 
of the Near East’.93 
 
The League Against Imperialism: 1927-1932 
At the founding congress of the LAI in February 1927, both the left-wing faction of Poale 
Zion and the Arab National Congress of Palestine were represented.94 Extending the 
invitation to both of these organisations was a clear indication of the inclusiveness of 
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Münzenberg’s strategy. After all, Zionism, even its socialist variant, had long been anathema 
to the communist movement, while the Palestinian Arab delegate Jamal al-Husayni, nephew 
of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was a prominent member of Palestine’s elite class.95 This 
episode vividly illustrated the competing and mutually exclusive nature of these two 
nationalist movements, both of which sought recognition as the sole legitimate anti-colonial 
nationalist force in Palestine.  
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, both sides attempted to discredit each other. At the first congress, 
the Left Poale Zion raised concerns about the ‘feudal-reactionary’ nature of al-Husayni’s 
politics and indeed, soon after, the LAI moved to expel him.96 In its attempt to explain why 
the LAI should support Zionism rather than Palestinian Arab nationalism, the Left Poale Zion 
argued that the Arab National Congress was inherently reactionary because the bourgeoisie 
sided with the feudal ruling class in Palestine.97 On the other hand, they maintained that the 
Zionist bourgeoisie was more progressive in the sense that it had an interest in the economic 
development of Palestine. Therefore, on these grounds, it was argued that the LAI should not 
be opposed to Zionist immigration into Palestine.98  
 
A further consequence of the LAI’s initial non-sectarian outlook was that personalities who 
were sympathetic towards Zionism, such as Albert Einstein and Lansbury, held leading roles 
within the organisation. It is clear why Lansbury could simultaneously support both colonial 
nationalism and Zionism. In an article reflecting on the LAI’s Brussels congress, he wrote 
that part of ‘the ideal of international solidarity’ was the ‘recognition of the right of all 
peoples in all lands to organise and develop their own national life’.99 Therefore, it followed 
that if the Jews were a nation, then they too should have the right to develop a ‘National 
Home’. However, as we have seen, Lansbury was not an uncritical supporter of Zionism, 
expressing concerns about the prospect of a ‘white minority’ of European Jews ruling the 
native Arab population.100 Nevertheless, soon after his departure from the LAI, Lansbury 
joined the LSI’s pro-Zionist Palestine committee.101  
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Like Lansbury, Einstein saw Zionism as being compatible with both internationalism and 
anti-colonialism. While Einstein believed that nationalism was ‘the curse of mankind’, he 
equally maintained that Zionism was ‘quite different’.102 For Einstein, ‘The nationalism of 
many a modern state stands for an extension of its power through territorial aggrandizement 
and through the subjectivity of smaller nationalities. Zionism is the opposition to that force. It 
is a defensive nationalism. I mean not only Zionism but all the movements for independence 
and self-determination by oppressed peoples’.103 He visited Palestine and wrote in glowing 
terms about the Zionist project, arguing that it had not dispossessed ‘a single Arab’ and had 
bestowed numerous benefits upon the Palestinian Arab population.104 Ultimately, Einstein’s 
Zionism was evidently more cultural than political.105 Indeed, he argued that the ‘unity of the 
Jews the world over is in no way a political unity and should never become such’.106 
Nevertheless, he participated in the mainstream Zionist movement. For example, he attended 
the founding conference of the Jewish Agency in Zurich. However, other prominent anti-
colonial nationalists associated with the LAI such as Gandhi and Nehru were resolutely 
opposed to Zionism.107 
 
At the second congress of the LAI, held in Frankfurt in July 1929, an explicitly anti-Zionist 
policy was confirmed. A typical comment came from an Iraqi delegate who condemned the 
Balfour declaration as ‘camouflage’ for British imperialism.108 The resolution adopted by the 
LAI not only attacked Labour Zionism but also its social democratic supporters. Zionism, the 
majority view claimed, was ‘dangerous’ because it was ‘in the cloak of humanitarian work 
and develops in Palestine a social reformism patterned after the ideas of the second Socialist 
International’.109 For the LAI, this explained the activities of Vandervelde, MacDonald, Blum 
and others in the LSI’s Palestine Committee.110   
 
Despite the severe tensions on display at this congress, the uneasy coalition of communists, 
left wing social democrats, nationalists and intellectuals remained largely intact. However, 
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reactions to the events in Palestine in August finally fractured the organisation. Official LAI 
pronouncements backed the Arab uprising as a revolt against ‘the economic and political 
serfdom’ created by British imperialism.111 Consequently, honorary president Albert Einstein 
resigned, explicitly citing the organisation’s ‘pro-Arab’ policy.112 Einstein did not see the 
events of August 1929 as a legitimate anti-colonial uprising against Zionism and British 
imperialism but as ‘brutal massacres [carried out] by a fanaticised mob’.113 Similarly 
Maxton’s unwillingness to comply with LAI demands to directly challenge his ILP 
colleagues’ assessment of the situation in Palestine suggests that he did not share the official 
LAI view regarding the violent episodes. Indeed, on 1 September, Maxton addressed a mass 
demonstration at the Albert Hall called by the English Zionist Federation in protest at the 
‘disturbances’ in Palestine.114 At this meeting, which was addressed by Chaim Weizmann and 
other leading Zionists, Josiah C. Wedgwood and Maxton were reportedly ‘the only well-
known non-Jews on the platform’.115 Unlike Wedgwood, Maxton was not a supporter of 
Zionism, and thus his presence is better explained as an act of solidarity with the grieving 
Anglo-Jewish community. Nevertheless, at the end of the meeting, a pro-Zionist resolution 
was passed.116 Just over two weeks later, Maxton was expelled on account of his supposed 
‘support for the government’s measures to crush the Arab revolt in Palestine’.117 The 
suggestion that Maxton had openly backed the despatching of troops to Palestine was untrue, 
but his failure to speak out was seen as tacit approval. As Bridgeman wrote, ‘there was no 
doubt whatever’ that Maxton had ‘displayed no interest whatever in the events of tremendous 
importance in colonial countries leading to the despatch of troops and warships to Palestine, 
with much bloodshed’.118 It is evident that by late 1930, a number of prominent ILPers such 
as Brockway, W.J. Brown and Cecil L’Estrange Malone who had once been involved in the 
LAI project were to varying degrees sympathetic to Zionist aspirations.119 Furthermore, at the 
LAI’s next executive meeting, after significant deliberation, the Arab nationalists, along with 
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the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) which had an overwhelmingly Jewish membership, 
successfully made the case to expel the Left Poale Zion representatives.120  
 
The LAI’s leading activist in Palestine was another member of the al-Huseyni dynasty. 
Hamedi al- Huseyni, who served on the international executive of the LAI, also headed up 
the left wing of the Arab National Congress. On his return from LAI activities in Cologne in 
January 1929, he was placed under police surveillance and in the aftermath of the August 
uprising was jailed along with other LAI activists.121 The LAI deemed the response of the 
MacDonald government to be part of ‘a wave of terror’ unleashed against anti-colonial 
nationalist movements across the world. It declared that in Palestine, India and Ireland, the 
prisons were ‘overflowing with political prisoners who have fought for the independence of 
their countries’. Reaffirming its belief in the shared interests of workers in imperialist and 
colonial countries, the LAI declared ‘the working masses of Palestine, India, Ireland Great 
Britain and the whole world have no interest in supporting the imperialist plans of a so-called 
Labour government’.122 In Britain, the now diminished LAI attempted to actively challenge 
the pro-Zionist narrative. For instance, in early 1932, Bridgeman and Saklatvala both 
addressed a meeting of the (pro-Zionist) Palestinian Students Association in London. 
Saklatvala insisted that the Balfour Declaration was an imperialist measure and called on the 
students ‘not to allow British politicians to engender hatred between Jews and Arabs in 
Palestine’. Similarly, Bridgeman emphasised that Palestine was under British control which 
was ‘a challenge and a menace to other nations’. He hoped that Arabs and Jews could unite to 
overthrow British imperialism.123 In the wake of the Palestinian general strike and revolt of 
1936-9, the British LAI reiterated its strong support for the demands of the Arab nationalist 
movement.124 
 
The International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist Unity: 1932-1939 
Unlike the LSI and the LAI, which both took proactive stances on either side of the debate on 
Zionism, the IBSRU in which the ILP was a major player, was essentially reactive. Despite 
being established in 1932, the organisation did not initially formulate a ‘revolutionary 
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socialist’ position on Palestine and it was not until the Palestinian Arab revolt of April 1936 
that it moved to devise a comprehensive policy. In June 1936, the IBRSU held a ‘Symposium 
on Palestine’. This symposium featured contributions from a number of diverse, even 
conflicting perspectives. These debates are of interest as the discussions provide an indication 
of the kind of ideas arguments which the ILP leadership engaged in while formulating its 
own Palestine policy. Furthermore, the reports illustrate the deeply contested nature of the 
Palestine conflict amongst those who aligned themselves to the revolutionary socialist 
movement in the interwar period. At this point, the IBRSU contained within it the anti-
Zionist Polish Bund as well as several Palestine based Labour Zionist organisations such as 
the Left Poale Zion which although not formally affiliated, had contacts with the IBRSU 
through Brockway who served as secretary.125 
 
The first piece of commentary was supplied by an unnamed ‘Jewish Socialist of Polish 
descent’.126 This individual, who had been active in the labour movement in Palestine from 
1927 until late 1935, produced a lengthy anti-Zionist case. First, it was argued that a Jewish 
state could only be a solution to the problems faced by European Jews if it included ‘at least 
the majority of Jews within its bounds’. Therefore, given the size of Palestine and its 
increasing Arab population, it was argued that to create such a state it would be necessary not 
only to exclude the Palestinian Arabs, but also to expand its territories into Transjordan. 
Consequently, according to this view, the logic of Zionism inevitably meant ‘a national 
struggle against the Arab people’. The second objection was that Zionist aims could only 
succeed if they became ‘agents of an Imperialist World Power’. Therefore, the author argued 
that all Zionists, including socialists, were in effect, ‘agents of British Imperialism’. 
Furthermore, problematically for revolutionaries, it was deemed impossible for socialists in 
Palestine to be both revolutionary and Zionist. Instead, socialist Zionists could only be 
reformist because the foundation of the Jewish state ‘must be carried out in a Capitalist 
way’.127  
 
In addition, the claim was made that because Zionists formed a minority in Palestine, in order 
to achieve their political ambition, they had to ‘oppose all fundamental social reforms’ and 
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‘resist democratic representation of the people’. Therefore, instead of Zionist immigration 
having a positive effect, winning Arab workers to socialist ideas, the author maintained that it 
had instead produced a ‘reactionary effect’ upon the Arab population, as it encouraged the 
peasants, workers, and the middle class to form a ‘United Front’ with the ‘reactionary 
Effendis’.128 
 
In response to the argument that the Zionists had introduced progress into Palestine, the 
writer demonstrated that he perceived Zionism as a form of imperialism. The report stated: 
‘Mussolini also introduces progress in Abyssinia. All Imperialisms brings progress in some 
way – should we therefore become pro-Imperialist?’. Moreover, it was argued that other Arab 
states such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Persia had all demonstrated ‘progressive 
development’ without Zionist immigration. Furthermore, even if it were true that Palestinian 
Arabs had benefited and continued to benefit from Zionist immigration, it was not deemed 
credible, given the ‘powerful’ national movements in Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, 
that the Palestinian Arabs ‘awakening to nationalism’, would ‘sell their national feeling… for 
material profit’.129 
 
Contrary to the claims of Labour Zionism and its supporters, the contributor declared that the 
only class to significantly profit from Zionist immigration was not the workers but ‘the 
aristocratic Effendis’, while for the Arab workers ‘misery and distress’ still existed ‘much the 
same as fifteen years ago’. However, it was conceded that there were some ‘exceptional 
cases’ to which the Zionists had ‘repeatedly brought attention’. It was acknowledged that 
‘new possibilities of employment’ had been created and that wages had risen, although not 
dramatically. However, it was claimed the Zionists had adopted ethnically exclusive slogans 
such as ‘Seize Work’ and ‘Jews Buy Jewish Goods’ and had made ‘assault upon the 
workplaces occupied by Arabs’.130 Here, the activities of the Histadrut were severely 
criticised. The report claimed that in Jaffa, when the government had announced a new 
construction project, the contract was given to a firm belonging to the Histadrut, ‘which was 
able to underbid the estimates of the Arabs through a subsidy from the general funds’. 
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Therefore, the Histadrut, with its cooperatives and colonies was able to function as ‘a 
powerful trading monopoly’.131  
 
The proposed solution was first and foremost to ‘intensify’ the struggle against capitalism 
which was ‘the root of [Jewish] misfortune’. The second obligation for socialists was to 
struggle for an ‘opening to territories in which Jews can be given an opportunity of living 
without interfering with others’. Thirdly, financial support should be given to such territories 
as Birobidzhan, which it was believed could be expanded by financial assistance. The Jewish 
population already settled in Palestine could ‘remain there as an acknowledged minority’. 
Instead of a Jewish state, the political aim of revolutionary socialists in Palestine should be 
what was termed ‘a Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic of Greater Syria within the bounds of 
an Arabian Federation’. Unlike the prevailing perspective within mainstream Labour, here, 
the historic connection between Jews and Palestine was completely rejected and Zionism was 
deemed to be a wholly unrealistic enterprise: 
 
Some will point to the ‘‘historical rights’’ of the Jews in Palestine. We refuse to accept this. 
Were the world to be re-modelled on the lines of 2,000 years ago, what a gigantic migration 
there would be… Zionism cannot succeed. Amidst an awakening national colonial movement, 
in an age of collapsing Capitalism, in the face of the approaching world war, Zionism is a 
fantasy.132  
 
The author’s concluding remarks drew attention to the relationship between colonial 
nationalism and socialists. It was argued that the European left ‘rarely possess(ed)… the trust 
of colonial peoples’. As such, socialists should recognise the ‘disturbing fact’ that while 
previously national independence movements had been influenced by the ideas of the French 
Revolution and later had looked to the Soviet Union, it was now apparent that ‘Japan and 
Hitler are greatly respected by the colonial peoples’.133 Therefore, rather than using this as a 
reason to reject Arab nationalism in favour of Labour Zionism, the author argued that this 
should be a ‘warning to Socialists’ that they must support anti-colonial nationalist 
movements.134 
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The second report to the symposium, which came from the Left Poale Zion, contained an 
altogether different analysis. As Lockman has noted, the ILP leadership had ‘developed close 
ties’ with the group’s leading figures Abramovitch and Yitzhaki .135 Like the mainstream 
Poale Zion, the left-wing faction argued that the general strike to stop Jewish immigration 
was not a genuine strike, and even claimed that ‘representatives of the Arab labourers’ had 
submitted a letter of protest to the organisers of the strike.136 Therefore, they declared that the 
strike had ‘little sympathy’ among the Arab masses. For Left Poale Zion, this episode was 
‘easily explained’ by the considerably improved economic conditions of the Arab masses as a 
result of Zionist immigration. Furthermore, so the argument went, because Labour Zionists 
were spreading trade union and socialist ideas and thus creating class consciousness within 
the Arab working class; the ruling class had been driven to stop Zionist immigration, in order 
to ‘impede the wakening of the Arab labourer, and to slacken the speed of progress in the 
country’. Furthermore, it was alleged that in this the Arab ruling class had ‘joined with the 
activities of the Nazi agents, who are interested in strengthening anti-Jewish propaganda in 
Palestine’.137 Moreover, according to Left Poale Zion, this development also had the 
‘sympathy of the Imperialist government’, which was determined to slow down the pace of 
economic and social developments that Jewish immigration had apparently brought.138 
 
The third statement was received from Hashomer Hatzair, a Marxist-Zionist group which 
advocated a binational solution.139 Similarly, it claimed that those responsible for ‘the recent 
anti-Jewish riots in Palestine’ were ‘the most reactionary’ Arab nationalist parties, which 
were ‘composed entirely of feudal and religious lords’. These forces were opposed to Zionist 
immigration because of its ‘modernising and progressive effect’ on the economic and social 
conditions in Palestine, which was challenging the ruling class’ power over ‘the dark masses 
of the illiterate Arab population’.140 As before, Arab nationalism was deemed to be fascistic 
in character because ‘the idea of the ‘National Front’ in the Fascist sense’ was increasingly 
‘dominating a large section of the Arab population’. Similarly, according to Hashomer 
Hatzair, the mainstream Zionist labour movement was increasingly ‘subordinating its 
Socialist principles to the idea of a Jewish National Front’. Therefore, it was the 
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‘unpardonable neglect’ of the Histadrut with regard to organising the Arab workers which 
had prevented the creation of ‘a real United Front of Jewish and Arab workers’.141 
 
In October 1936, having received these various reports, as well as a brief statement from the 
Palestine Arab Workers’ Society (PAWS), the ILP Palestine commission comprising of 
Maxton, Brockway, McGovern and Stephen published its policy statement. It rejected the 
rationale for Zionism but recognised that Palestine could serve as a refuge for Jews who were 
being persecuted in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the report, the solution lay in 
the creation of new political and industrial organisations which were interracial and operated 
upon an independent working-class basis.142 The IBRSU then convened a congress in 
Brussels at which a resolution was passed which denounced the British government’s 
decision to increase its military presence in Palestine and reaffirmed the ILP commission’s 
policy.143 
 
However, after visiting Palestine just a few months later, in a visit facilitated by the leaders of 
Left Poale Zion, both McGovern and Stephen returned as vocal champions of Zionism on the 
grounds of its socialist achievements.144 An account of the visit was provided by Yigael 
Gluckstein who would later found the Trotskyist group the International Socialists as Tony 
Cliff. In his memoirs, Cliff who at this point was a member of the youth section of the Left 
Poale Zion recalled attending meetings in Jerusalem and Haifa during McGovern and 
Stephen’s tour.145 
 
Under Brockway’s editorship, the New Leader was a forum where these debates continued to 
be played out as Mansur of the PAWS and Orenstein of Hashomer Hatzair contributed 
articles outlining their varying perspectives. Therefore, the ILP, and particularly Brockway as 
its chief foreign policymaker, faced a dilemma. Given the complexities of the situation in 
Palestine he argued that socialists must ‘apply their principles in a new way’.146 Brockway 
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maintained that neither the communist left’s support for Arab nationalism nor the LSI’s 
support for Zionism was the appropriate position. Instead, he continued to advocate the 
creation of new joint Arab and Jewish working-class organisations which would challenge 
British imperialism and the bourgeois elements with both the Arab and Jewish population in 
Palestine. Significantly however, for several reasons, Brockway rejected the idea that 
Zionism itself could be equated to imperialism. Firstly, in his view, unlike classic 
imperialism, the Zionists were not exploiting Palestine.147 Secondly, the Jews in Palestine 
were not an insignificant minority but formed two fifths of the population and importantly, 
the majority of the Jews in Palestine were working-class.148 Furthermore, Brockway argued 
that because industrial workers were central to achieving social revolution and Jewish 
workers constituted the vast majority of Palestine’s industrial working-class, then Zionist 
immigration acted in an anti-imperialist way.149  
 
The existing transnational networks were integral to the ILP’s attempts to contribute towards 
a resolution to the conflict in Palestine. After securing the endorsement of the Palestine 
Workers’ Party for the ILP’s policy, which had now formally affiliated to the IBRSU, 
Brockway then worked closely with its secretary Itz’haki to translate this ‘paper policy’ into 
something concrete.150 Brockway recalled in his memoirs that Iz’hakhi became ‘such  a 
familiar figure in my rooms… that one particular chair… seems incomplete without him 
now’.151 As we have seen in chapter two, this effort began with the issuing of a statement by 
the ILP calling for Arab Jewish unity on a class basis and the creation of a new socialist 
party.152 A further development was the creation of the British-based organisation ‘The 
Socialist Committee for Arab Jewish Workers’ Unity in Palestine’, chaired by Maxton.153 
Meanwhile, the Palestine Workers’ Party set up similar forums in Palestine which sought to 
bring together Jewish and Arab workers and intellectuals, and distributed thousands of copies 
of the ILP’s statement in both Arabic and Hebrew.154 Ambitious plans were also made to 
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convene a conference in Palestine which aimed to bring together Jewish and Arab socialists 
not only from Palestine but also from neighbouring countries, as well as India.155 
 
Conclusion 
As far as the ILP were concerned, deliberations within transnational forums illustrated early 
divisions which had not been as apparent at a national level. While figures such as 
MacDonald and Wedgwood enthusiastically promoted Zionism, others, mainly Jewish 
figures in the LSI expressed reservations. The first conference of the British Commonwealth 
Labour in 1925 saw opposition to Labour Zionism, which had not been expressed at Labour 
Party or ILP conferences. 
 
From the late 1920s, the ILP’s inability to work out a consistent policy was indicative of its 
political isolation in the international arena. The leadership’s decision to pursue a line 
apparently sympathetic to anti-colonial nationalism was met with disapproval by the LSI. 
However, its refusal to strongly condemn the Labour government’s response to the outbreak 
of violence in August 1929 contributed towards its leadership’s removal from the LAI and 
fierce attacks by the communist left and some anti-colonial nationalists. Its efforts in the early 
1930s to convince the LSI to recognise the legitimacy of the Arab nationalist struggle ended 
in failure and criticism. The party’s subsequent attempts to promote its ‘revolutionary 
socialist’ position which ultimately rejected Zionism but accepted the necessity of Jewish 
immigration into Palestine proved challenging. Soon after, two of its leading figures broke 
ranks and unequivocally supported Zionism and the party’s strategy of creating new working-
class organisations in Palestine failed to materialise.  
 
To conclude, it is evident that during the interwar years the nature of and solution to the 
Palestine conflict were profoundly contested issues. It did not merely cause intense 
disagreement between the social democratic and communist left, but also created significant 
internal divisions within these movements. An analysis of the debate at a transnational level 
demonstrates the importance of ideas regarding internationalism in informing attitudes 
towards Palestine. Central to these discussions were questions such as the nature of 
imperialism and colonialism, the concept of national self-determination and immigration. 
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Furthermore, the evolution of the ILP’s Palestine policy during 1936-9 was clearly influenced 
by its transnational connections and its hopes for implementing its policy of creating unity 
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine on a class basis rested on the development of 
transnational networks. 
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Chapter 4: Labour, the ILP and League of Nations Mandates 
 
In the aftermath of the First World War, the Covenant of the League of Nations was drawn 
up, which formalised the creation of the League and set out the organisation’s structures and 
objectives. Article 22 of the League’s Covenant spoke of ‘peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ whose ‘well-being and 
development’ were ‘a sacred trust of civilisation’.1 These territories were to become 
‘mandates’ which would be administered by a western mandatory power on behalf of the 
League. Palestine was deemed to be one of those former Ottoman territories whose ‘existence 
as an independent nation’ could be ‘provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand 
alone’.2 Furthermore, Article 22 stipulated that a permanent commission was to be 
established, to which mandatory powers were obliged to report on an annual basis and which 
would advise the League Council. Thus, in late 1920, the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC) was established.3 
 
Recent scholarship has challenged the interpretation that mandates were a mere continuation 
of imperialism. Michael D. Callahan has argued that previous historians had either 
misunderstood or underestimated the significance of the mandates system.4 According to 
Callahan, mandates had received ‘almost no systematic scholarly attention’ and as such the 
idea that mandates differed only in name from other colonial possessions was an assertion not 
backed up by the historical evidence.5 Fundamentally, imperial powers understood that 
mandates were not simply colonies and moreover, the existence of the mandates system was 
a ‘permanent reminder’ of the anti-imperialist and humanitarian condemnation’ of European 
colonialism.6 While accepting that the PMC was ‘not a fierce critic of colonialism and had no 
intention of demolishing Europe’s empires’, Callahan advanced the argument that the PMC 
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‘through informal connections’ and ‘the implied threat of international criticism’ did in fact 
impact upon ‘every level of European imperial rule’.7  
 
Susan Pedersen has maintained that the mandates system ‘certainly aimed at legitimating and 
prolonging imperial rule’.8 However, she has concluded that the PMC proved ‘less docile and 
more disruptive than its framers intended’ as although the majority of its members were 
former colonial officials, these members were often ‘eager to expose abuses or cause 
difficulties for other imperial powers’.9 Furthermore, the PMC’s published records and 
reports made it ‘a magnet’ for those wishing to challenge the rule of the mandatory power.10 
Pedersen has argued that the legacy of mandates was not more ‘enlightened’ form of rule or 
higher levels of development. Rather, the true significance of the mandate system was that it 
displaced ‘some amount of conflict’ over non-consensual rule into ‘the international realm’.11 
This was used strategically by both imperial powers and nationalist movements. Additionally, 
Pedersen has stressed that there was considerable variation in the ways in which different 
powers governed mandates.12 
 
The arrangement embodied in the mandates system was advocated by Labour prior to the 
creation of the League. Labour’s war aims memorandum of December 1917, the party’s first 
comprehensive statement on the post-war international order, stated that territories in the 
Ottoman Empire such as Mesopotamia and ‘Arabia’ should neither be returned to Ottoman 
rule nor controlled by victorious imperial powers ‘as instruments of exploitation or 
militarism’.13 Instead, it insisted that if these nations were deemed unable to ‘settle their own 
destinies’, the territories should be placed under the administration of ‘a commission acting 
under the authority of the super-national authority or League of Nations’.14 Palestine was 
envisioned as ‘a free state, under international guarantee’ in which Jews could ‘work out their 
own salvation’.15  
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Accordingly, when the leaders of the great powers met at San Remo in April 1920, the 
Labour leadership urged the British representatives to accept the Palestine mandate, (which 
had been under British control since the summer of 1918), ‘with a view to the country’s 
reconstruction as a national home for the Jews’.16 The outcome of the conference was to 
designate both Palestine and Mesopotamia as ‘A’ status mandates under British rule and draft 
mandates were drawn up in December 1920.17 Immediately after the San Remo conference, 
pro-Zionist Labour MPs Josiah C. Wedgwood and Ben Spoor pressed the government to 
replace the military administration with a civil administration so that the Jewish national 
home policy could be pursued ‘without delay’.18 As the Labour leadership had hoped, the 
Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the text of the Palestine mandate.19 Hence, the 
preamble stated that ‘the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect 
the declaration originally made… by the Government of His Britannic Majesty in favour of 
the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly 
understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’.20 Furthermore, several of the mandate’s 
articles referred to the specific ways in which the Jewish national home policy would be 
practically implemented.21  
 
On 24 July 1922, the Council of the League of Nations officially conferred the Palestine 
mandate to Britain, which finally came into force in late September 1923.22 It is worth noting 
the clear contradiction in designating Palestine a category ‘A’ mandate, given that these 
mandates were those supposedly deemed most prepared for self-government.23 After all, any 
genuine political independence for Palestine unquestionably would have seriously 
jeopardized the nascent Zionist project. Therefore, if the British government were to fulfil the 
terms of the mandate and facilitate the creation of a Jewish national home, it could not 
realistically consider creating genuinely democratic institutions or granting independence in 
the near future. This was acknowledged by the PMC in one of its first sessions after the 
 
16 ‘Palestine, British Mandate Urged’, West Australian, 26 April 1920. 
17 Zara S. Steiner, The Lights That Failed: European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2005), p. 105. 
18 H.C. Deb., 29 April 1920, vol. 128, col. 1397. 
19 Rory Miller, ‘Introduction’ in Miller (ed.), Britain, Palestine and Empire, p. 3. 
20 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine Together With a Note by the Secretary General Relating to its 
Application to the Territory Known as Trans-Jordan Under the Provisions of Article 25 (London, 1922) Cmd. 
1785. 
21 See, for example Articles 2, 4, 6 and 11 in Ibid. 
22 Miller, ‘Introduction’ in Britain, Palestine and Empire, p. 3 
23 Steiner, Lights That Failed, p. 105. 
147 
 
mandate came into force. The commission observed that while the Palestinian Arabs were 
correct to assert that Article 2 of the mandate guaranteed the development of self-governing 
institutions, ‘the Administration could not agree to the admission of a majority resolved to 
oppose the establishment of a Jewish National Home’.24 
 
Debates within the Labour movement on the Palestine Mandate and the Mandates 
system, 1918-1924 
In the years immediately following the First World War, many voices in the ILP were critical 
of the mandates system in the former Ottoman Empire. Concerning Britain’s administration 
of Mesopotamia, for example, an ILP pamphlet of 1921 completely rejected any claims of 
benevolence and instead viewed mandates as a continuation of conventional imperialism, 
concluding that ‘Mandate is indeed merely a respectable name for annexation’.25 
MacDonald’s response was not to reject the mandates system but rather to argue that only 
under socialist government could ‘the idea underlying the mandates… be carried out’.26 As 
far he was concerned, socialists could not ‘refuse responsibility for the weaker peoples 
known as the native races’.27 
 
Regarding Palestine, concerns were raised about the deployment of former members of the 
‘Black and Tans’, a notorious British army unit which a Labour party commission had 
condemned for its brutality during the Anglo-Irish war.28 An article in the New Leader 
described them as ‘waiting for trouble’ and complained that ‘they are expensive, and we pay 
for them!’.29 This was soon responded to by Israel Cohen of the World Zionist Organisation, 
who claimed that the article had expressed ‘remarkable ignorance’ and a ‘reckless disregard 
of the responsibilities involved in the mandate conferred upon Great Britain by the Council of 
the League of Nations’.30 Furthermore, questions were raised as to whether Britain was 
fulfilling the terms of the mandate in regard to preparing the country for self-government. In 
July 1923, after the creation of a legislative council had been abandoned, Labour MP for 
Blaydon William Whiteley enquired in parliament into the number of officials appointed to 
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the advisory council who were ‘natives of Palestine’.31 Others, however, for instance 
Wedgwood, were opposed to the extension of self-government based on the belief that it 
would put the Jewish minority population at risk.32 When a correspondent to the New Leader 
raised the issue, Brailsford was unsympathetic, attributing the lack of political representation 
to the decision of Palestinian Arabs to boycott the Legislative Council.33  
 
Labour’s official policy reaffirmed Britain’s commitment as the mandatory power in 
Palestine. In late 1922, Arthur Henderson insisted that Labour had ‘no sympathy with those 
who would abandon the responsibility of Palestine, which the British government voluntarily 
assumed before the whole world and which have been defined in the Mandate’.34 According 
to Henderson, this duty had to be fulfilled, in order to ensure the ‘economic prosperity, 
political autonomy and spiritual freedom of both the Arabs and the Jews’.35 Thus, from this 
perspective, committing to the mandate was an expression of internationalism as it was 
carrying out a policy on behalf on the international community. Labour’s intervention was 
also significant because there was a genuine possibility at this time that Britain’s pro-Zionist 
policy could have been reversed or significantly modified.36 Under Brailsford editorship, the 
New Leader endorsed the official Labour party policy, stating ahead of the 1922 general 
election that ‘the promise to the Jews must be kept’ .37 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, many leading Labourites, including parliamentarians 
such as Ramsay MacDonald and Emile Vandervelde, and prominent intellectuals like George 
Bernard Shaw and R. H. Tawney, all visited Palestine to observe first-hand the development 
of the Zionist project.38 In addition to being the site for the development of the Jewish 
national home, Palestine was also of interest due to its status as a British mandate. 
MacDonald’s reports from Palestine discussed the British administration there, speaking 
favourably of the High Commissioner Herbert Samuel. MacDonald was an enthusiastic 
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advocate of British officials possessing a political, rather than a military background, and 
thus he believed that Palestine was ‘fortunate’ as Samuel had been ‘trained in politics’.39 
Moreover, according to MacDonald, Samuel was proving ‘true to his Liberal principles’ and 
‘handling a delicate position with tact and patience’.40 Therefore, Samuel’s leadership did 
much to account for MacDonald’s optimism that in due course, there could be a resolution to 
the situation in Palestine.41  
 
Another first-hand observer was Ethel Snowden, a leading feminist, socialist, pacifist and 
wife of Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden.42 She visited Palestine in early 
1923 and upon her return, gave a lecture for the Zionist organisation Keren Hayesod, before 
publishing an account of her experiences in a lengthy article in the Empire Review.43 
Responding to British press reports questioning her objectivity, Snowden insisted that she 
had produced an impartial and in-depth study of the situation in Palestine based upon 
interviews with 200 people.44 Snowden’s account repeatedly commended the British 
administration in Palestine, presenting British efforts in Palestine as wholly benevolent. Like 
MacDonald, Snowden praised the High Commissioner Samuel and claimed that the British 
administration had ‘accomplished marvels in the improvement of the social condition of 
Palestine’.45 These included significant improvements in areas such as public sanitation, 
infrastructure, the education system, agriculture and industry.46 Yet, in her appraisal of 
Samuel, Snowden cannot be regarded an objective observer given that she was hosted by the 
Samuels for the duration of her stay in Palestine.47 Like MacDonald, Snowden was given a 
tour of some of the Jewish settlements by Labour Zionist activists. Indeed, one of her guides 
was the future Prime Minister of Israel, Golda Meir.48 However, unlike MacDonald, 
Snowden expressed some criticisms of the Zionist movement and even levelled mild criticism 
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at the Labour Zionist movement, believing that leading figures such as Ben-Gurion should 
adopt a less critical attitude toward the British administration.49  
 
In Snowden’s interpretation of the terms of the mandate, Britain had a duty to permit Jewish 
immigration into Palestine to ensure the creation of a Jewish national home but ‘not a 
dominant Jewish power in Palestine’. Instead, she envisioned the creation of a ‘gradually to-
be-democratised Palestinian State’ in which both Jews and Arabs would cooperate and enjoy 
‘full and equal electoral rights’.50 In her view, this was the policy which had been endorsed 
by the League of Nations and which the British government was attempting to pursue. 
Snowden claimed that the widespread Palestinian Arab boycott of elections for the proposed 
legislative assembly was not an indication of deep-seated Palestinian Arab resentment vis-à-
vis British rule, but stemmed from of a combination of apathy and a belief that an elected 
assembly would not bring about ‘better government or better protection of their interests’. 
Essentialising Palestinian Arabs as ‘fanatical’ and ‘backward’, Snowden concluded that the 
attempt to create an elected legislative assembly had been ‘too large a step in democracy’ and 
that the decision to revert to an unelected advisory council had been correct.51  
 
In a scathing critique of Palestinian Arab nationalism, she charged Palestinian Arab culture 
with anti-feminism and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, Snowden contended that the Arab ruling 
elite objected to the British mandate not primarily on the grounds of Britain’s commitment to 
the creation of a Jewish national home, but because the mandatory authorities sought to 
prevent the exploitation of Arab workers and peasants and had insisted upon the payment of 
taxes.52 She expressed her disapproval that despite Britain’s ‘liberation’ of Palestine from 
Ottoman rule, social improvements and its ‘promise of eventual self-government’, she could 
not find ‘the slightest trace of gratitude’.  
 
Snowden concluded her article by emphasising the necessity of continued British presence in 
Palestine. Firstly, she contended that British withdrawal from Palestine would inevitably lead 
to a ‘moral disaster’ and a ‘material loss’ for the British empire. British interests would be 
jeopardised as the Suez Canal would be at the ‘tender mercies’ of another imperial power 
 
49 Snowden, 'Palestine Under the Mandate', p. 402. 
50 Ibid., p. 394.  
51 Ibid., p. 395.  
52 Ibid., p. 400. 
151 
 
such as France or Italy who would then assume the mandate. Secondly, it would also 
endanger the Jewish population of Palestine as the subsequent ‘lawlessness’ resulting from 
British withdrawal would mean ‘martyrdom for the Jews who trusted us’. Thirdly, Snowden, 
who was active in the pacifist movement, contended that the continuation of the British 
mandate was ‘the best guarantee of peace’ in the region.53 Finally, she emphasised the 
internationalist dimension of British involvement in Palestine, asserting that Palestine was 
‘the proud possession of mankind’ and therefore, ‘whoever builds up its life does so for the 
[human] race’.54 
 
The First Labour Government, 1924 
During the early 1920s, Labour continued its electoral rise. The 1922 general election saw 
Labour become the official opposition for the first time and in January 1924, Labour formed 
its first government, with MacDonald leading a minority administration. ILPers held key 
cabinet posts and constituted a considerable proportion of the PLP. 45 ILP-sponsored MPs 
were elected and 120 Labour MPs out of a total of 190 held membership of the ILP.55 Labour 
taking office resulted in a party which self-identified as ‘anti-imperialist’ being tasked with 
administering the British empire at its height. It has been argued that once in power, Labour 
pursued a policy of continuity in imperial matters.56 The first Labour government’s 
administration of Britain’s League of Nations mandates certainly supports this view. For 
instance, the machinery of government remained intact. British mandates continued to be the 
responsibility of the colonial office and on the ground, mandates continued to be managed by 
a high commissioner.  
 
There was, however, a minor change in terms of interacting with the Permanent Mandates 
Commission. In the first session of the PMC held during 1924, Britain was represented by 
William Ormsby-Gore, a Conservative MP who had been the under-secretary of State for the 
Colonies until Labour’s election victory.57 However, in the second session of that year, 
Britain was represented by Herbert Samuel, who had been a senior member of Asquith’s 
Liberal government, and had served as High Commissioner for Palestine since 1 July 1920. 
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He gave a detailed report covering issues such as local government, education, taxation.58 As 
we have seen, MacDonald was evidently an admirer of Samuel’s political abilities.59 It 
appears that the decision to send Samuel as Britain’s accredited representative was influenced 
by the attitude of other mandatory powers towards the PMC. During a League of Nations 
committee meeting in September 1924, Charles Roden Buxton commented that South Africa 
had set an ‘excellent example’ by sending ‘the high official actually in charge of the 
administration of their mandated territory’. This policy, he argued, ‘should be followed as 
often as possible by the other mandatory powers’.60 
 
Fundamentally, Labour did not seek to alter Britain’s administration of Palestine from the 
policy which it had inherited. As contemporary press reports noted, several members of the 
cabinet, including MacDonald and Snowden, were on record as supporting the creation of a 
Jewish national home and although initially there had been some uncertainty over colonial 
secretary J. H. Thomas’ views regarding Palestine, Labour ‘was not expected to advance any 
modifications’.61 When the cabinet met in late February 1924, it agreed to re-affirm the 
Balfour Declaration and agreed to authorise a loan to Palestine, a policy which had also been 
under consideration by the previous Conservative government.62 A few days later, Thomas 
relayed this decision to the House of Commons, and emphasised that the policy was 
‘embodied in the Mandate for Palestine which was approved by the League of Nations’.63 As 
Ormsby-Gore informed the PMC, the precise definition of what was meant by creating a 
Jewish national home in Palestine had been ‘adopted by Mr. Lloyd George’s Government and 
reaffirmed by the governments of Mr. Baldwin and Mr. MacDonald’.64  
 
However, there were some tentative attempts to reform the mechanisms by which mandates 
and colonies were governed. Representing Britain in the League’s Political Questions 
committee, Roden Buxton praised the work of the PMC, but called for measures that could 
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increase its effectiveness. For instance, he called on it to better publicise its activities.65 More 
significantly, Buxton also advocated that in future, the PMC should set out general principles 
which could then be adopted by all states with colonial territories, not just mandatory powers. 
However, senior figures in the PMC were extremely cautious about the prospect of extending 
the remit of the PMC. Portugal’s Alfredo Freire d’Andrade argued that the PMC must act 
with ‘the greatest prudence and not even appear to interfere in the internal affairs of colonial 
powers’.66 Similarly, Fridtjof Nansen – the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees – 
stressed that the commission had to be ‘very careful’ as its task was limited ‘namely to 
supervise the administration of the mandated territories’.67 Ultimately, therefore, the request 
proved unsuccessful. 
 
Developing a Mandates Policy, 1924-1929 
In October 1924, Labour fell from office after losing a de facto vote of no confidence and 
suffering defeat at the subsequent general election.68 Despite this brief experience in 
government, there was still a distinct lack of consensus regarding its policy for mandates. In 
1925, The Book of the Labour Party was published – a three-volume work consisting of a 
series of articles comprehensively outlining various aspects of Labour’s programme, authored 
by its leading policymakers. It also served as a defence of the record of the first Labour 
government and contained glowing biographical accounts of its parliamentary leadership as 
well as other prominent figures in the British labour movement.69 C. Delisle Burns’ chapter 
on ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, which dealt with mandated territories, was 
ambiguous and noted that: 
 
As for the A Mandates Irak and Palestine, the position is too unstable for a full statement of 
Labour policy here… We are not likely to retain direct British power for much longer; but the 
whole situation in the Near East seems at the moment to be fluid. There is (sic.) no detailed 
applications of principle into his matter which would be generally accepted by all sections of 
Labour.70 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 Records of the Fifth Assembly, Meetings of the Committees, Minutes of the Sixth Committee (Political 
Questions), 16 September 1924, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 29, p. 14. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Shepherd and Laybourn, Britain’s First Labour Government, p. 175 and p. 184.  
69 Herbert Tracey (ed.), The Book of the Labour Party: Its History, Growth, Policy and Leaders, vols. I - III 
(London, 1925). 
70 C. Delisle Burns, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, Ibid., vol. III, p. 85. 
154 
 
 
Burns’ assessment regarding a lack of consensus was borne out in the Labour press. When in 
April 1925, Brailsford wrote an editorial note in the New Leader praising the Zionist 
movement, it resulted in an exchange with a correspondent who maintained the view that 
Zionism had resulted in Palestinian Arab dispossession and that under the mandate ‘the 
people of Palestine’ had been ‘deprived of every shred’ of political liberty and self-
government.71 
 
Some in the ILP were strident critics of the first Labour government’s administration of the 
mandates system. One strand of opposition emerged from the ILP’s pacifist wing, Walter 
Ayles, who had been imprisoned as a conscientious objector before serving as Labour MP for 
Bristol North during MacDonald’s minority government, made no distinction between 
mandates and conventional forms of empire, arguing that the inevitable consequence of 
administering mandates was war. At the ILP’s annual conference in 1925 Ayles condemned 
the Labour government’s use of military force to put down an uprising in Transjordan: 
 
Recently Lord Thomson had said that when a rising of the population of Trans-Jordania had 
taken place he had sent, at short notice aeroplanes to bombard them, and 600 tribesmen had 
been killed and the rest driven into the desert. That was a Labour Minister’s policy… If they 
wanted an army to defend their Empire, it meant that they believed in war.72 
 
Similarly, pacifist George Lansbury strongly criticised the Labour government’s use of 
military force – which included aerial bombings – in Iraq.73 Furthermore, the ILP leadership 
pressed Labour to commit to ending the Iraq mandate. In late 1925, a statement was issued in 
which the ILP expressed ‘alarm’ and ‘indignation’ at the prospect of plans to prolong the Iraq 
mandate for a further 25 years.74 Soon after, the ILP leadership called on Labour to break 
with its continuity doctrine. It called on Labour to ‘repudiate’ any treaties that the 
Conservative government entered into with Iraq and ‘give notice of its intention to terminate 
the mandate as soon as it assumes office again’.75 This was significant given that this would 
be the first ‘A’ status mandate to be terminated. Some were so angered by the Labour 
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government’s record with respect to British colonies and mandates that they urged the ILP 
group to remove MacDonald as leader of the PLP. Citing the examples of Egypt, India and 
Iraq, Joseph Southall stated at the ILP’s annual conference in 1926: ‘It was notorious that 
whenever the I.L.P attacked the Tories the spokesmen of the Government had only to look up 
the record of the Labour government and say they were following the lead of Ramsay 
MacDonald’.76  
 
Another vocal critic of mandates was Frederick Seymour Cocks, one of the numerous Liberal 
converts to the ILP. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Cocks had been the author of an 
influential UDC pamphlet which collated and published the secret treaties.77 In his 
concluding observations, he called upon governments to ‘revise their war aims’ and repudiate 
the idea of incorporating ‘reluctant populations’ within European empires.78 Unless a 
‘democratic peace’ was ensured, cautioned Cocks, there would inevitably be ‘fresh wars’.79 
During the mid-1920s, Cocks continued to be a vocal critic of mandates. In articles published 
in the UDC journal Foreign Affairs and the ILP journal Socialist Review, Cocks levelled 
strong criticisms against French administration of Syria and British rule in Mesopotamia. He 
also expressed a fundamental objection to the way in which the mandates had been allocated. 
In accordance with Article 22 of the League’s covenant, the League of Nations was supposed 
to select an appropriate mandatory power and the native inhabitants were to be consulted. 
However, what had transpired instead was that France and Britain had chosen these 
territories, imposed their rule upon ‘unwilling populations’ by military means, and then the 
League of Nations had conferred the mandate.80 Thus, he argued, these developments had 
rendered the sentiments expressed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
‘piercing in their irony’.81 Mandates, he concluded, were better described as ‘camouflaged 
annexation’.82 Yet despite his clear sympathy for the nationalist aspirations of various Arab 
nations, Cocks did not at this point highlight the case of Palestine.83 
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However, despite these various criticisms, official ILP policy remained largely supportive of 
the mandates system. In March 1926, its empire policy committee, which included Buxton, 
Leonard Woolf and Harold Laski and was chaired by Harry Snell MP, concluded that while 
its current operation was ‘open to criticism in some respects’, the mandates system was 
nevertheless ‘in the main based on right principles’.84 The report argued that mandates did 
not represent conventional imperialism but were ‘a trust’ which, if carried out appropriately, 
would help mandated nations develop self-governing institutions. Moreover, it claimed that 
mandates were an important recognition that development in these territories was an 
international concern rather than allowing for their exploitation by a single imperialist 
power.85 This, it was contended, had the potential to remove one of the main causes of war, 
namely ‘economic imperialism’. Rather than challenge the basis of mandates, the ILP 
commission backed Buxton’s recommendation that the powers of the PMC should be 
extended to periodically monitor the administration of ‘colonial dependencies of all 
nations’.86 Furthermore, it demanded the implementation of a code of rights for ‘subject races 
and countries’. It was envisioned that these regulations, which would be drawn up by the 
ILO, would become the ‘general standard of the world’ and would include the right to access 
education as well as the ‘progressive development’ of self-governing institutions.87 In 
addition, the report recommended that all those appointed to the colonial service ‘dealing 
with native races’, must possess ‘an adequate training in ethnology and anthropology’.88     
 
The report also proposed some significant alterations in the way that the PMC operated. 
Rather than a representative of a mandatory power reporting to the League, the PMC should 
be given ‘full powers of inquiry and inspection by its agents on the spot’.89 This work would 
be carried out by a commissioner, who would be assigned to each mandate and would be of a 
different nationality to that of the mandatory power. Each commissioner would act as the 
League’s ambassador for the mandated territory and report independently to the League.90  
 
However, these proposals did not go entirely uncontested. One member of the committee, 
Fred Longden, completely rejected the report. At the party’s annual conference, he outlined 
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his objections. He argued that from a socialist perspective, only two approaches were 
acceptable: either total non-interference with native rights or co-operation on an equal basis. 
Thus, Longden criticised the proposals as being predicated upon an assumption of 
superiority: ‘God’s Englishmen appointed to guide natives along the lines of self-
government!’.91 Accordingly Londgen backed attempts to amend party policy to a position 
which would call on the next Labour government to dismantle the empire including mandates 
and create a ‘real commonwealth based upon common and individual contact and equality’ to 
ensure ‘real liberty’.92 This effort however, proved unsuccessful as the majority of delegates 
voted to endorse the report. 
 
Brailsford continued to advocate reform of the mandates system. He called for the powers of 
the PMC to be ‘considerably strengthened’. One proposal was for the PMC to have more 
powers of supervision to ensure that imperial powers could not derive significant economic 
benefits from their mandated territories. This he believed would result in ‘the guardians’ 
taking ‘a more flattering view’ of a nation’s capacity for self-government.93 Another 
suggestion was for the PMC to be empowered to employ inspectors who would travel to 
various mandates in order to inform itself of ‘the daily working of the administration which it 
is expected to supervise’.94 This measure he claimed would be beneficial for two reasons. 
First, because the League’s inspectors would become aware of any ‘misgovernment’ before 
native populations had been ‘driven to rebellion’. The system of petitioning to highlight 
grievances had proved inadequate. Secondly, it would enable the inspectors to make 
‘comparative’ reports regarding the polices of the various mandatory powers. He was not 
optimistic about these developments given that the Council of the League was dominated by 
the major powers which ‘openly displayed its jealously of the Mandates Commission’.95 The 
only way this could be overcome was for the League’s Assembly to assert its authority and 
give such measures ‘firm support’. Brailsford also argued that the principles of mandates 
system should be extended and applied to all colonies. Furthermore, he advocated for the 
creation of an international civil service comprising of various European nationalities who 
would essentially learn best practice from each other’s colonial experiences and would 
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‘administer all these non-self-governing areas, under its direct control’.96 Developments such 
as these would ensure the end of imperialism and in its place ‘the Great Society, which is all 
humanity, incarnated in the League, would bear the ultimate responsibility for the destinies of 
all immature peoples subject to alien rule’.97 Brailsford, clearly still had influence within the 
ILP in his capacity as a member of its International committee, as many of these suggestions 
were included in the resolution on the colonial question submitted by the ILP to the LSI’s 
congress of 1928.98 
 
As far as Palestine was concerned, Brailsford noted that the country could not become a 
Jewish national home without ‘a foreign garrison’. Therefore, he suggested that if and when 
Britain decided to relinquish control, the League of Nations should continue to provide ‘the 
necessary police force’ to ensure the successful realisation of the nascent Zionist project.99 In 
a glowing review in the ILP’s journal Socialist Review, Hugh Dalton endorsed Brailsford’s 
vision, claiming that his ‘constructive proposals’ were ‘consistent with Socialist 
principles’.100  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, the emergence of the LAI in 1927 posed a challenge to the 
mandates system. The LAI was a transnational network which brought together western 
communists, intellectuals, and socialists together with anti-colonial nationalists. A 
distinguishing feature of the LAI was its demand for immediate and unconditional national 
independence. Accordingly, activists in the LAI adopted an uncompromising stance against 
mandates. As Reginald Bridgeman, an ILPer and chair of the LAI’s British section 
articulated: ‘Just as I reject the view expressed by the Conservatives that Labour is not fit to 
govern, so I reject the idea that one country can claim to decide whether another country is fit 
for self-government or not’.101 LAI literature was stridently critical of Labour and the LSI’s 
support of the mandates system. ILPers such as Brailsford who as we have seen, advocated 
reform rather than the dismantling of the mandates system were castigated for holding 
‘imperialist’ views.102 Therefore, the central involvement of ILP leaders Maxton and 
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Brockway as well as several parliamentarians, ILP branches and activists in the LAI marked 
a radical and contentious departure from official policy. 
 
It was at this time that Wedgwood promoted his idea of Palestine as the ‘Seventh Dominion’. 
Wedgwood argued that the British government should actively assist in the intensive 
colonisation of Palestine in order to create a Jewish majority. Once this had been obtained, 
Palestine should at the expiration of the mandate become a dominion state within the British 
empire. This ‘Equal Union’ would ‘confer protection without destroying independence or 
self-respect’.103 He envisioned Palestine becoming one of the free ‘self-governing 
dominations of the British empire’.104 As such, he rather unconvincingly attempted to claim 
that such a policy would be in accordance with Article 2 of the Mandate which, as we have 
seen, required the administration to prepare Palestine for self-government.105 However, this 
proposal did not gain much support, even from many pro-Zionist Labourites as it clearly 
breached the intended terms of the mandate.  
 
The Second Labour Government and the Crisis in Palestine, 1929-1931 
On 5 June 1929, Labour returned to office, forming its second minority government under 
MacDonald’s leadership. Again, the ILP was well-represented, with 160 Labour MPs holding 
ILP membership, of which 37 were ILP sponsored.106 Yet, as we have seen, only a small 
minority of these MPs were supportive of the more left-wing direction under Maxton’s 
leadership.107 Palestine quickly became an exceptionally pressing matter for both the Labour 
government and the League of Nations when, in late August 1929, unprecedented levels of 
inter-communal violence broke out resulting in hundreds of fatalities.108 The Labour 
government responded by deploying troops, commissioning two official inquiries and issuing 
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a White Paper. Meanwhile, the League of Nations called an extraordinary session of the PMC 
which issued a report to the League Council. The Labour government’s decision to launch an 
official inquiry followed by a White Paper was consistent with the response of previous 
British administrations to episodes of violence. Violent clashes in Jerusalem in 1920 and in 
Jaffa in 1921 had resulted in commissions of inquiry and the Churchill White Paper had been 
issued in June 1922, which sought to clarify the criteria governing Jewish immigration into 
Palestine.109 
 
These events sparked intense debate within the Labour movement, which once again 
highlighted the fractures within Labour on the question of mandatory Palestine. In late 
August 1929, as tensions were escalating, Brailsford complained that ‘the statesmanship of 
the Labour movement had made no contribution of its own’. 110 He emphasised that the 
mandate had been accepted ‘for the express purpose’ of founding the Jewish national home. 
Therefore, Britain ‘could not yield’ to Arab objections to Jewish immigration and purchase of 
land. Brailsford levelled numerous criticisms at the British administration of Palestine and 
called for ‘fresh thinking’. His basic argument was that the British administration had 
adopted a ‘passive attitude’ giving ‘little direct help’ to the creation of a Jewish national 
home and should now take a more active role.111 After the fatalities, Brailsford penned 
another piece, reiterating the need for Britain to continue as the mandatory power in Palestine 
and remain committed to creating a Jewish national home. ‘Rightly or wrongly’ he wrote, 
‘from a mixture of motives, the British Empire assumed this mandate’.112 Therefore, there 
could be ‘no going back on our word. In the hearing of all the world we promised this home 
to the Jews. We must labour to preserve the mandate that we claimed.’113 Brailsford’s argued 
that the respective religious leaders in Palestine should be made to ‘answer for the behaviour 
of the faithful’ and in terms of the economic objections to pursuing the mandate, he 
recommended that a less expensive police force might be recruited from ‘some other part of 
what once was Turkey’ such as Albania.114  
 
 
109 Ibid., p. 129.  
110 H.N. Brailsford, ‘The Problems of Palestine’, New Leader, 22 August 1929.  
111 Ibid.  
112 Brailsford, ‘Blood on the Wailing Wall’, New Leader, 30 August 1929. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid.  
161 
 
But Brailsford’s view did not go unchallenged. One correspondent argued that the 
commitment to establishing a Jewish national home was indefensible because the Balfour 
Declaration was a secret agreement made ‘without the assent’ of the people either in Britain 
or in Palestine which could only be enforced through ‘military despotism’.115 He argued that 
the Labour government should therefore continue to administer Palestine but renounce this 
‘unjust’ policy and instead ensure a ‘precise equality of status’ between Jews and Arabs in 
Palestine.116 Another correspondent – a Labour prospective parliamentary candidate – was 
sympathetic to the Palestinian Arab case. He maintained that Britain had implemented a 
‘divide and rule’ strategy and ‘exercised a military dictatorship’ in Palestine and called on the 
Labour government to alter British policy so that it did not favour the Jewish population over 
the Palestinian Arab population.117  Brailsford replied with the insistence that promoting 
Jewish national home was the Mandatory authority’s ‘first duty’.118 
 
The LAI viewed the outbreak of violence as a legitimate anti-colonial nationalist uprising and 
condemned the British government’s response as ‘imperialist terror’.119 The LAI deplored 
Brailsford’s articles in the New Leader, accusing the ILP of being ‘in favour of the crushing 
of the Arab revolt in Palestine’.120 Maxton was pressed to publish a response which reflected 
the LAI position. His refusal to comply was one of the key reasons cited for his expulsion 
from the LAI. While other factors such as the Communist Party’s ‘class against class’ policy 
were certainly at play in this episode, it was true that the ILP leadership had refrained from 
demanding the immediate end of the mandate. While Maxton appeared unwilling to endorse 
the LAI’s stance, Brockway merely pressed for an inter-racial round table conference, 
protested against the treatment of political prisoners and the use of the death penalty and 
called for the publication of the McMahon-Husayn correspondence of 1915.121 The latter 
demand referred to a series of letters exchanged between the British high commissioner in 
Egypt and the Sharif of Mecca, which, Palestinian Arab nationalists maintained, showed that 
prior to the issuing of the Balfour Declaration, Britain had already promised Palestine to the 
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Sharif of Mecca, thus invalidating the Zionist claim.122 Furthermore, Brockway voted in 
favour of government’s security measures which had been implemented in the wake of the 
revolt.123  
 
MacDonald’s first speech to the League’s Assembly had been Eurocentric, focusing 
exclusively on issues such as maintaining peace in Europe and the admission of Germany to 
the League.124 However, when MacDonald addressed the Assembly on 2 September 1929, he 
told the delegates that ensuring peace in Europe, although still ‘important and essential’. 
would only ‘carry us a small way... towards universal peace’. There were much more 
‘intricate problems’ which had to be addressed. In a speech that echoed his earlier writings on 
Palestine and the Middle East, he referred to the existence of ‘An old world, old in 
civilisation, old in philosophy, old in religion, old in culture, which has hitherto been weak in 
those material powers that have characterised the western peoples’.125 MacDonald opined that 
largely because of western influence, there was now a growing demand for national self-
determination in the east and cautioned that unless this was recognised by European powers 
and channelled into negotiated agreements, there was the risk of war.  
 
MacDonald also reported on the situation in Palestine. He stressed that it was of vital 
importance to the League for Britain to continue as the mandatory power in Palestine: 
 
No nation, no civilised nation, no nation with any political responsibility, no nation 
cooperating with other nations to do their best for all the peoples of the world will ever yield 
to outbursts of criminality and murder. No, never; for to do so would be to permit the triumph 
of the very forces which the League of Nations we have founded is called upon to control.126  
 
Furthermore, he assured the delegates that the British government had restored order and 
would launch an inquiry to prevent a recurrence. Nansen approvingly remarked that 
 
122 Elie Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 
1914-1939 (London, 2000), p. 3 and pp. 224-5. 
123 H.C. Deb., 24 February 1930, vol. 235, col. 2007. 
124 League of Nations, Official Journal of the Records of the Fifth Assembly: Text of the Debates (Geneva, 
1924), pp. 41-45. 
125 League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Tenth Assembly: Text of the Debates (Geneva, 1929), p. 
33. 
126 Ibid.  
163 
 
MacDonald’s comments had made the Assembly a truly ‘international forum’ and placed the 
League ‘in the centre of world affairs’.127  
 
The following day, on 3 September 1929, the Colonial Office announced its intention to 
appoint a commission of inquiry and in October, the Shaw Commission, consisting of a 
cross-party delegation of MPs and chaired by jurist Sir Walter Shaw, was despatched.128 
Labour’s representative on the commission was Harry Snell MP, who previously had chaired 
the ILP’s empire committee. The Labour government repeatedly stressed that the commission 
would not affect Britain’s fundamental policy of remaining the mandatory power in Palestine, 
nor its commitment to the creation of a Jewish national home. The commission’s remit was 
limited to establishing ‘the immediate causes’ of the violence and ‘suggest means of 
preventing a recurrence’.129  
 
In December 1929, Brailsford returned to the subject of Palestine, outlining a strategy in 
which he argued that Britain should signal its intention to relinquish the Palestine mandate 
within 15 years and set a limit on Jewish immigration of between 33% and 45% of the total 
population. Brailsford believed that guaranteeing an Arab majority would improve Arab-
Jewish relations by placating the central Palestinian Arab concern of becoming a minority. 
The Palestinian Arabs, said Brailsford, formed an overwhelming majority and had ‘settled in 
Palestine for almost as many centuries as our Germanic ancestors have held England’.130 
Therefore, even if Zionism had brought about cultural and economic gains, the Palestinian 
Arabs could not be refused their right of self-determination. The current and future benefits 
of Zionism were ultimately ‘irrelevant’ because in the final analysis ‘it is they and not we 
who must decide what is best for them’.131 
 
According to Brailsford, given the rate of immigration, to secure a Jewish majority Britain 
would have to retain control over Palestine for a further 160 years, which was not only 
legally and morally dubious, but also politically impossible due to a shift in British public 
opinion. Therefore, he appealed to the Zionist movement to accept this compromise and to 
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‘coldly face the fact that… an immense change has come about in the attitude of the whole 
nation towards territorial expansion overseas’. Brailsford predicted that given ‘the whole 
trend of the development of British imperialism since the War’, it was more than likely that 
in the near future Britain would simply agree a treaty with ‘an autonomous Arab Palestine’ to 
maintain control of the Suez Canal and ‘save face’ by ensuring that the League of Nations 
safeguarded the rights of the Jewish minority as it did in Romania and Poland. 132  
 
The Union of Democratic Control (UDC) closely followed events in Palestine. Since the end 
of the First World War, the anti-militarist pressure group had continued to actively engage in 
issues regarding international politics. Its journal Foreign Affairs featured articles on various 
international issues, many of which were penned by the publication’s editor Norman Angell. 
As we have seen, Angell was a committed supporter of Zionism and supported the 
continuation of the British presence in Palestine. He was acutely aware that this was a 
seemingly inconsistent stance for someone who had forged his reputation as a critic of both 
nationalism and imperialism. As he noted, he was often asked: ‘How do you reconcile anti-
Imperialism with your support for British bayonets in Palestine; self-determination with the 
defiance of the will of the immense majority of the people in Palestine?’133 In answer to this, 
Angell began his analysis of the situation in Palestine with an overarching critique of political 
nationalism and, in particular, the significance which nationalist movements placed upon the 
principles of independence and self-determination. Angell remarked: 
 
I would like to see the definition or interpretation of sweeping remarks like ‘‘self-
determination’’, ‘‘independence’’ [and] ‘‘majority rule’’… Majority of what? The world, the 
nation, the state, the city, the religious community, the race, the industrial groups? What 
makes the unit within which the rule shall operate? Similarly as to ‘‘self-determination’’. 
Does it mean that Moslems may claim to be ruled by Moslems, Jews by Jews, Protestants by 
Protestants? Then why not Baptists by Baptists, blondes by blondes, brunettes by brunettes? 
134 
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According to Angell, the Palestinian Arab thesis was a ‘simple one’, namely that ‘Arabs are 
in a majority’ and therefore it followed that the imposition of Zionism was a violation of 
democracy, independence, nationalism and self-determination.135 However, in his view, when 
applied to the modern, interdependent world, such concepts were ‘inadequate’ and 
‘unworkable’.136 Like MacDonald’s view of the British empire, Angell argued that whatever 
the rights and wrongs of previous invasions, occupations and migrations, these were now 
historical facts which could not be undone.137 Therefore, ‘absolute principles’ were ‘reduced 
to absurdity… by the facts of history’. Consequently, for Angell, both Indian and Arab 
nationalist claims for complete self-determination were as unrealistic as it would be for 
Native Americans to demand ‘that the invaders of New York or Chicago should kindly go 
back home’.138 Instead, he argued that all credible discussions on the subject must accept ‘the 
plain fact of world-wide interdependence of peoples, and the consequent mutual 
obligation’.139 As Martin Ceadel put it, at this time, Angell’s ‘anti-nationalism took 
precedence over his anti-imperialism’ and he was ‘more sceptical than many on the left of 
demands to replace imperial rule with national self-determination’.140  
 
Regarding the specific situation in Palestine, Angell maintained that there was an important 
distinction to be made between the claims of the Arab nationalists and those of the Zionists. 
In his interpretation of Zionism, the movement did not demand complete independence for 
the Jewish national home, that is to say the right ‘to live under a government of their own 
people’.141 Rather, the Zionist movement demanded an ‘impartial government’ under which 
‘their community’ and ‘special cultural traditions and qualities’ could be ‘freely developed’. 
By contrast, Palestinian Arab nationalism ‘invoked the… unworkable principles’ of 
independence and self-determination which Angell held to have been responsible for so much 
damage in Europe. Moreover, Angell argued that Zionism would solve a world problem, and 
therefore its successful realisation took precedence over what he termed the ‘lesser 
consideration’ of Palestinian Arab independence. When speaking about ‘majority right’, 
argued Angell, the unit which internationalists must argue for was not a particular nation but 
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‘the world itself’.142 This was a view shared by Brailsford, who when speaking at a debate 
under the auspices of the League of Nations Union asserted that Zionist claims took 
precedence over Palestinian Arab nationalism because ‘the welfare of humanity comes before 
that of a tribe, a nation, or even an empire’.143 
 
Angell subscribed to the notion that mandates were a nascent form of international 
government. Thus, he stressed that the administration in Palestine was an ‘international’ 
government, which should strive to be an ‘impartial’ one. The significance of this was that if 
this model were to prove successful, ‘it may be a forerunner of a type of government’ 
according to Angell would be ‘more and more necessary, in some form or other, in various 
parts of the world’.144 For these reasons, there could be ‘no question’ of terminating the 
mandate. 
 
In March 1930, the Shaw Commission published its findings. It determined that the 
fundamental cause of the violence was the ‘disappointment’ of Palestinian Arab ‘political and 
national aspirations’ and ‘fear for their economic future’.145 The report also contained 
criticisms of the Zionist movement, mostly notably regarding the rate of Jewish immigration 
into Palestine, which was deemed to be excessive and in contravention of the terms set out in 
the 1922 White Paper. It concluded that the British government should make a clear policy 
pronouncement which unambiguously stated that the rights of Palestinian Arabs would be 
safeguarded, and which was ‘more explicit’ regarding the issues of immigration and land 
purchase. While the report did not make any formal recommendations regarding the creation 
of self-governing institutions, it did highlight that the absence of ‘any measure of self-
government’ was an issue which was ‘greatly aggravating’ the difficulties faced by the 
British administration in Palestine.146   
 
MacDonald responded to the report’s publication by giving assurances that Britain would 
continue with the Palestine mandate. It was, he stated, ‘an international obligation from 
which there could be no question of receding’. Significantly, MacDonald framed the 
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government’s responsibilities as a ‘double undertaking’ – namely on the one hand creating a 
Jewish national home, and on the other ensuring the rights of the non-Jewish population were 
not affected. He argued that both responsibilities had to be pursued in ‘equal measure’.147 The 
latter part of this statement was certainly a new interpretation of the mandate. The PMC had 
previously characterised the mandate having a ‘dual nature’ which placed a ‘twofold duty’ 
upon the mandatory power.148 However, MacDonald’s remarks making it explicit that these 
obligations were of equal weight was without precedent.  
 
However, Labour’s representative Harry Snell dissented from the commission’s findings in 
several substantial respects. Firstly, Snell attributed considerable responsibility to the Mufti 
of Jerusalem and to the Arab nationalist leaders for inciting violence. He also rejected the 
report’s criticisms of the nature of Jewish immigration and the purchase of land. Furthermore, 
he objected to the suggestion of extending self-government. While acknowledging that such 
Palestinian Arab demands were ‘keen and entirely honourable’, he denied that the absence of 
self-governing institutions was a contributing factor in the recent violence.149 Snell’s basic 
argument was that the solution did not lie in steps toward self-government, which he 
characterised as ‘political concessions’, but rather in ‘social and economic reconstruction and 
the establishment of public security’. This was entirely at odds with the policy which he had 
advocated in his capacity as chair of the ILP’s empire committee which had unequivocally 
recommended creating self-governing institutions in mandated territories.150  
 
Instead, Snell was convinced that the priority was inter-racial harmony and cooperation and 
outlined several initiatives to achieve this. Rather than a legislative assembly, he advocated 
the establishment of a bi-racial conference focused on securing ‘agreement on specific 
proposals affecting the welfare of the nation as a whole’.  If successful, this could then form 
the basis for the creation of local bi-racial committees dedicated to implementing ‘practical 
steps’ toward ‘social improvements’.151 Writing in the New Leader, Brailsford backed Snell’s 
analysis regarding the causes of the violence and his objections to the Shaw commission’s 
recommendations. For instance, he argued that the majority of Palestinian Arabs were not 
ready for self-government and that such a development was unacceptable because it would 
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‘thwart’ the creation of a Jewish national home. However, he was equally adamant that self-
government could not be denied indefinitely, especially when it had been granted to ‘the 
sister population’ in Egypt.152 Cautioning against placing restrictions on Jewish immigration, 
he claimed that it would ‘feed’ the Palestinian Arab opposition which would in turn ‘delay 
the reconciliation of the two races’ which would ultimately ‘postpone the time’ when self-
government could be ‘safely granted’.153    
 
Brailsford emphasised that the British government must not be neutral or impartial, rather it 
was the ‘first duty’ of the British administration to promote development of the Jewish 
national home. He framed this as an ‘anti-imperialist’ stance in two ways. First, he argued 
enabling successful Jewish colonisation would result in arriving at a position whereby the 
mandate could be ended sooner. Secondly, if the British government did not ensure the 
creation of a Jewish national home, then it would ‘stand before the world as hypocrites’, who 
had used this merely as a pretext to secure its imperial strategical aims vis-à-vis the Suez 
Canal.154  
 
It was at this point that Brailsford first raised the idea of population transfer as a solution. 
This was an idea which Weizmann had pressed for in his meetings with MacDonald and 
other leading Labourites, citing the precedent of the transfer agreement between Greece and 
Turkey.155 ‘Has due attention been paid’, Brailsford asked, ‘to the reasonable suggestion of 
the Zionists that in the fertile but sparsely populated province of Transjordania the surplus 
Arab population might easily be accommodated?’156 The proposal was later publicly 
supported by Snell, who claimed that he had previously refrained from expressing such a 
view during his time serving on the Shaw commission on the grounds that the Palestinian 
Arab response would be: ‘This Labour man has nothing to suggest except that we should be 
exiled from our native country in order that strangers may come in’.157 
 
Labour’s policy was also met with criticism from the League of Nations. In June 1930, an 
extraordinary session of the Permanent Mandates Commission was convened to address 
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Palestine.158 During the session, several members of the PMC challenged the findings of the 
Shaw Commission and criticised the Labour government for failing to prevent the outbreak 
of violence.159 The PMC’s chair Van Rees approvingly cited Snell’s comments, describing 
his analysis as ‘far more logical… than that adopted by the majority’.160 
 
Commenting on this, Buxton argued that the Labour government’s interaction with the PMC 
marked a crucial development. In his capacity as Britain’s representative in the League’s 
committee on Political Questions he stated: 
 
Our government has always treated the mandates commission with the greatest respect and 
has followed its work with general approval. We cordially support the principles on which the 
mandate system is founded, because we look upon them as representing the first beginning, 
shall I say the first faint beginning, of the sense of an international responsibility in regard to 
this great question. Only recently we have had particular examples. It is well known as 
regards Palestine, for instance… that the British representative [Drummond-Shiels] has 
clearly indicated that, while he might disagree with particular criticisms, yet he recognised 
that the mandates commission had a right to criticise. He even went farther and said that it 
was its duty to criticise – a very significant remark, I venture to say.161 
 
The PMC’s report to the Council endorsed the Labour government’s interpretation of the 
Mandate that the obligations to both Jews and Arabs were of equal weight.162 Nevertheless, it 
also contained criticisms of the British government which dismayed MacDonald who 
responded by branding the PMC’s report a ‘dreadful document which every enemy of 
England had had a hand in drafting’.163 This reaction illustrated the gulf between rhetoric and 
reality. MacDonald had been a longstanding proponent of the League of Nations providing 
international oversight of imperial rule. However, when the League made criticisms of his 
own government it proved to be unwelcome. 
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As he had done in 1924, Buxton reiterated the ILP’s official policy of generalising the 
principles of trusteeship to all colonies, not just mandated territories. He claimed that when 
he explained the mandates system to labour audiences in Britain, the response had often been 
to approve of the system but query why its application was limited to mandated territories 
rather than all colonies. Buxton argued that if Article 22 and 23 of the League’s Covenant 
were properly applied, it would ensure that this anomaly would be addressed. However, he 
sounded a note of caution, stating that the Labour government was not actually taking any 
concrete steps to achieve this.164 Nevertheless, Buxton’s comments were enough to alarm 
pro-imperialist Conservatives such as Anthony Eden, who raised the issue in the House of 
Commons. Eden claimed that it amounted to an ‘invitation to the Mandates Commission to 
extend their authority over all British Colonies’.165 MacDonald responded by defending 
Buxton’s comments, remarking that the principle of trusteeship was ‘derived not only from 
the provisions of the Mandates but also from Article 23 of the Covenant which applied to all 
territories under the jurisdiction of members of the League’ and rejected Eden’s contention, 
with the instance that such a policy ‘has never entered our minds’.166 
 
The Shaw Commission led to the establishment of the Hope-Simpson inquiry which carried 
out an in-depth examination of the issues of immigration, land settlement and 
development.167 On 20 October 1930, the Labour government issued its White Paper on 
Palestine which insisted that the creation of a Jewish national home remained government 
policy and reiterated MacDonald’s formulation of a ‘double undertaking’ of ‘equal weight’, 
noting with satisfaction that this interpretation of the mandate had been ‘rendered 
authoritative’ by the Council’s approval of the PMC’s report.168 It was repeatedly stressed 
that this was largely an exercise in continuity which built upon the 1922 White Paper. 
However, it included a proviso that if Jewish immigration resulted in preventing the 
Palestinian Arab population ‘from obtaining the work necessary for its maintenance’, or if 
Jewish unemployment ‘unfavourably affected’ ‘the general labour position’, it was ‘the duty 
of the Mandatory Power under the Mandate’ to reduce, or, if necessary, to suspend, such 
immigration until the unemployed portion of the ‘other sections’ were in a position to obtain 
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work.169 The White Paper did not propose to create genuinely democratic self-governing 
institutions on the basis that this could affect the British government’s obligations under the 
mandate, but did state that the plan to create a legislative council would be revived.170  
 
The ILP editorial line endorsed the proposals declaring: ‘However sympathetic one may be to 
Jewish aspirations, it is difficult to see how the Government could refrain from interfering if 
it were to discharge its responsibilities to the Arab population’.171 The editorial quoted the 
section of the White Paper which discussed the increase in the Jewish population in Palestine. 
The conclusion was drawn that Zionist immigration was indeed dispossessing the native 
Palestinian Arabs and that the Zionist movement was seeking to subjugate the Arab 
population. Therefore, the government had been correct to intervene as ‘Clearly if this 
process had been allowed to continue unchecked, in a comparatively short time the Arabs 
would have been wholly a landless proletariat in permanent subjection to the Jewish 
colonists’.172  
 
Similarly, Cocks (now a Labour MP) defended the government’s White Paper and presented 
a comprehensively anti-Zionist case. In his opening remarks, he criticised his parliamentary 
colleagues for disregarding Article 6 of the Palestine mandate which, he emphasised, 
included the clause guaranteeing that ‘the rights of other sections of the population’ would 
not be ‘prejudiced’.173 Addressing the previous speaker, David Lloyd-George, he claimed that 
rather than assessing the situation objectively, Lloyd-George’s pro-Zionist stance was 
influenced by electoral concerns the upcoming by-election in East London. Earlier 
contributors to the debate had argued that Palestine, allocated as the site of the Jewish 
national home was a relatively small area when compared to the total size of Arab territories, 
only the size of Wales. Cocks took up this analogy and drew a radically different conclusion: 
 
As comparison has been made between Palestine and Wales, I wonder what the right 
honourable member for Canvorn Boroughs [Lloyd-George] would say if it were suggested 
that a number of Scotsmen should invade Wales and purchase land and refuse to employ any 
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Welshman on the land and should say to the Welsh people, ‘‘You can go across can go across 
the Severn to England’’. This is what is happening in Palestine.174  
 
Cocks returned to the subject of secret treaties and understandings. He insisted that the 
McMahon correspondence – which he claimed to have seen extracts of – had indeed 
promised independence to the Arabs and complained that successive British governments had 
‘shielded themselves’ by supressing the publication of the correspondence. Since late 1929, 
Cocks had repeatedly used parliamentary questions as an opportunity to urge the Labour 
government to ‘abandon the practice of secret diplomacy’ and publish the McMahon 
correspondence.175 But if Cocks had hoped the Labour government might commit itself to 
more transparency, he was to be disappointed as the request was denied by the under-
secretary of state for the colonies.176 The Labour cabinet subsequently concluded that it was 
not ‘in the public interest’ to publish the correspondence.177  
 
Cocks reiterated his objection made in his earlier writings to the way mandates had been 
drawn up, whereby contrary to the claim in Article 22 of the League Covenant, native 
populations had not been consulted in the selection of the mandatory power. Thus, he 
declared ‘a great deal has been said about the sacredness of the [Palestine] Mandate. There is 
more humbug talked about mandates, especially this mandate, than about any international 
subject’.178 Furthermore, the Balfour Declaration (subsequently incorporated into the 
mandate) had ‘very little moral basis or moral validity’, not only because it reneged on the 
previous commitments made in the McMahon correspondence, but more significantly, 
because it had violated ‘the great principle of self-determination’. Britain, he argued, had ‘no 
moral right’ to create a Jewish national home ‘in a country inhabited by some other people 
who did not wish to receive them’.179 Nevertheless, Cocks did not call on the government to 
rescind the mandate or abandon the policy of establishing of a Jewish national home. Rather, 
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he argued that the British government must ensure that there was no attempt to turn Palestine 
into a Jewish state but only a Jewish national home within Palestine.180 
 
However, Passfield’s White Paper proved controversial and was met with vigorous 
opposition from various quarters, not least from within the labour movement. In parliament, 
Snell denied that the Labour government could be deemed entirely culpable for the outbreak 
of violence given that it had only recently assumed office prior to the incident. Nevertheless, 
he voiced his concerns about the White Paper, claiming that its effect had been to set back 
racial harmony in Palestine.181 Many critics accused the government of breaching the terms 
of the mandate. John Scurr accused the government of failing to carry out the terms of the 
mandate and pledged to challenge the government.182 Poale Zion’s Kaplansky described it as 
‘a humiliation at the hands of a Labour government’, stating that his organisation would ‘not 
accept or submit to the new interpretation of the Mandate’.183 Similarly, the LSI’s Palestine 
committee protested against ‘the spirit and the letter’ of the White Paper. From the 
committee’s perspective. the task ‘entrusted by the League of Nations to the Mandatory 
Power’ was to ‘assist actively… in promoting a large and intensive immigration and Jewish 
colonisation movement aiming at the effecting of the Jewish Homeland as speedily as 
possible’.184 This included facilitating Jewish migration into Transjordan. Writing in the New 
Leader, Brailsford branded the proposals ‘incredibly tactless’.185 Significantly, Brailsford 
now strongly advocated population transfer. He rejected the idea that ‘a wholesale migration 
of the Palestine Arabs to make way for Zionists’ was ‘not feasible’.186 Instead, Brailsford 
considered population transfer to be a viable solution and criticised the Labour government 
for not engaging in a ‘serious discussion of this possibility’.187 Furthermore, Brailsford called 
for the administration of Palestine to be transferred from the Colonial Office to the Foreign 
Office, claiming that the former was in a ‘pathological state of sensitiveness’ on the question 
of Palestine.188  
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MacDonald initially responded by defending the White Paper, repeating his interpretation of 
the mandate as a ‘double undertaking’ and arguing that its proposals were necessary to ensure 
that the mandate would be ‘carried out in such a way that civil disorder is not going to result 
from its operation’. 189 However, in light of the considerable opposition, it was not put to a 
parliamentary vote, and in February 1931, MacDonald then essentially retracted much of the 
white paper in the form of a letter to Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, which was 
subsequently issued as a statement to parliament and sent to the League of Nations as an 
official policy document.190 This was certainly a novel approach, as Michael J. Cohen has 
written, effectively annulling official government policy ‘by method of a letter written by the 
Prime Minister to a private individual, is probably unique in the annals of the British 
constitution’.191 In his ‘authoritative interpretation’ of the White Paper, MacDonald denied 
that Labour’s policy would be detrimental to the creation of the Jewish national home, 
reassuring critics that it was not the government’s intention to end land purchases or curtail 
immigration.192 Furthermore, the Labour cabinet committee ruled out even the limited 
measures towards self-government set out in the White Paper.193 This apparent about-face has 
been attributed to the effective lobbying efforts of the Zionist movement. However, more 
recent scholarship has stressed that other factors such as the need for party unity, the 
international reaction and the critical verdict issued by the League of Nations were also key 
factors in this decision.194 
 
‘A Socialist Policy for Palestine’ and the Mandatory System, 1932-1939  
In August 1931, the Labour government collapsed. The party split and was heavily defeated 
at the subsequent general election and only a handful of ILP MPs were returned to 
parliament. At its conference in July 1932, a majority of delegates voted in favour of the ILP 
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disaffiliating from the Labour Party. The period following disaffiliation was marked by rapid 
and significant decline both in the party’s membership, including many of its leading figures, 
and saw no revival of its parliamentary contingent.195 As we have seen, the anti-colonial 
course pursued by the ILP under Maxton and Brockway’s leadership brought it into conflict 
with the mainstream of the Labour Party and the LSI. Post-disaffiliation, the ILP continued 
this trajectory as part of its ‘revolutionary’ programme, characterising the League of Nations 
as an unalterable capitalist organisation and viewing the mandates system, including the 
Palestine mandate, as an instrument of imperialism. However, the party neglected to 
formulate any kind of detailed policy regarding Palestine and British policy there did not 
command much attention.  
 
Initially, even the Palestinian Arab revolt, which began with a general strike in April 1936 
was seemingly ignored. However, in the summer of 1936, Brockway initiated a symposium 
inviting views from those connected with the IBRSU and under Brockway’s editorship, the 
New Leader began to discuss Palestine and in October, the ILP leadership formulated a 
detailed policy. The ILP’s report on Palestine authored by Brockway, Maxton, Stephen and 
McGovern stated its total objection to both ‘the British administration and the mandatory 
system’ and called for the immediate withdrawal of British troops and the termination of the 
mandate.196 The mandate was ‘annexation’ carried out to protect the route to India, control 
the Eastern Mediterranean and to ‘guard the oil of Mosul’. Parallels were made with other 
recently relinquished British mandates as the report declared that ‘any camouflaged 
independence on the lines of Egypt and Iraq’ must be opposed.197 However, in the short term, 
the goal should be to ‘achieve all possible concessions’.198 As we have seen, the ILP sought 
to influence government policy by submitting its report to the Royal Commission on 
Palestine.199 The ILP view was voiced at the 1936 Labour Party conference by ILPer Gossip, 
who addressed the conference in his capacity as the general secretary of the National 
Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association. He told delegates that he was ‘opposed to the 
mandatory system in every respect’, arguing that Britain had no right to be in Palestine and 
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rejected the notion that such a right could not be conferred upon Britain by other nations.200 
At the IBRSU congress held in Brussels in late 1936, a resolution was passed which 
condemned the mandates system as a ‘hypocritical device for concealing the brutal realities 
of Empire’ and strongly criticised the mainstream labour parties for their support of the 
system.201 The British government’s decision to significantly increase its military presence 
was viewed not as a necessary security measure but rather as a pretext for the ‘concentration 
of British armed forces to protect imperialist interests’.202  
 
However, after visiting Palestine in early 1937, McGovern’s views transformed. Impressed 
by the activities of Labour Zionism, he now argued that Britain, having agreed to the 
mandate, was ‘honour bound’ to carry out its pledge to continue to facilitate Jewish 
immigration into Palestine.203 Indeed, McGovern even argued that the British government 
should permit Jewish immigration into neighbouring British-controlled Transjordan.204 
McGovern’s remarks resulted in the MP being strongly criticised at the ILP national 
conference by delegates who emphasised that ILP policy was ‘for the liberation of all 
suppressed people and opposed to the Mandate system’.205 
 
In the wake of the repression of the nationalist uprising in Palestine, one source of vocal 
opposition to the Palestine mandate emanated from the ILP’s pacifist wing. Reginald 
Reynolds, secretary of the No More War Movement (NMWM), penned several strident 
articles and letters which strongly condemned British rule in Palestine and demanded 
immediate self-determination for Palestinian Arabs.206 Reynolds characterised Britain’s use 
of force to maintain the mandate as ‘governmental terrorism’ comparable to the regimes of 
Hitler and Mussolini.207 He was critical of the Labour Party’s position that the Palestine 
mandate had to be maintained ‘in the interests of peace in the world’, declaring that Labour’s 
position amounted to ‘crude imperialism’ masquerading as internationalism.208 He was also 
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extremely critical of McGovern’s stance, denouncing the latter’s support for British authority 
in Palestine as ‘fascist’.209 In addition, Reynolds echoed Cocks’ arguments from a decade 
earlier that the mandate had come into existence ‘in defiance of the covenant of the League of 
Nations itself’. This was because as an ‘A’ mandate Palestine should have received ‘only 
such outside advice and assistance as the people required and asked for from a Mandatory 
power of their own selection’.210 Instead, the country had been ‘governed as a colony’.211 
Another ILPer and pacifist Ethel Mannin, also resolutely supported the Palestinian Arabs’ 
claim to self-determination.212 Mannin condemned the proposals to partition Palestine and 
protested that ‘Nobody gets a conscience about Arabs whose homes are blown up by British 
troops in Palestine’.213 In the New Leader, Brockway also condemned the British policy of 
collective punishment against Palestinian Arabs as analogous to fascism and ‘Prussianism’.214 
 
When the Peel Commission recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an 
Arab state, the ILP parliamentary group was united in opposition to the policy.215 As 
Campbell Stephen told parliament, ‘Honourable members of my party absolutely refuse to 
accept the principle of partition’.216 He argued that there was ‘no evidence’ to support the 
claim that partition would lead to ‘peace between the two communities’. ‘In fact’, Stephen 
maintained, ‘the evidence is all against it’.217 In addition, he suggested that the British 
government should consider transferring the mandate to the USA or France.218 In the New 
Leader, Brockway outlined the party’s objections. First, he reiterated the claim that partition 
would ‘stabilise the antagonism between Arabs and Jews’. Secondly, he argued that if war 
broke out there was ‘a very real possibility’ that Palestinian Arabs would unite with 
neighbouring Arab states ‘to sweep over the Jewish state’.219 Brockway also attacked the 
PMC for its report which endorsed partition, claiming that its recommendations ‘shows up 
the hypocrisy of the whole mandate system’. Its recommendation that separate Arab and 
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Jewish states would remain under British control ‘for defence and the administration of 
foreign affairs’ would mean that they would ‘remain pawns to be used in the game of British 
Imperialism’.220  
 
In May 1939, the British government once again issued a White Paper on Palestine which 
rejected partition and instead proposed to set a definite limit on Jewish immigration and 
create an independent Palestinian state within 10 years. When the white paper was debated in 
parliament, Maxton rejected the plans and instead called for the immediate end of the 
mandate. Maxton was deeply sceptical of government claims that the situation would be more 
favourable in 10 years’ time, pointing out that it had become a more complex problem in the 
previous decade. Rejecting the philosophy underpinning the mandate system, he maintained 
that it was ‘impertinence’ to assume that Britain was capable ‘either of tutelage’ or 
‘conferring self-government’ in Palestine.  For Maxton, previous pledges were irrelevant: 
‘What does it matter what Balfour said 20 years ago? What does it matter what McMahon 
wrote?’ he asked the House of Commons.221 Instead, he called on the British government to 
demonstrate its professed commitment to democracy by relinquishing its control over 
Palestine. For Maxton, class unity between working-class Arabs and Jews in a democratic 
Palestine could overcome national and racial divisions and there would be a joint struggle 
‘for an entirely new social order’. Regarding the future of the Jewish community in Palestine, 
Maxton argued that Jews would form a relatively significant minority, in conditions which 
were considerably more favourable than those experienced by Jewish communities elsewhere 
in the world.222 Maxton concluded by asserting that the British Empire was in decline: ‘Do 
not let us imagine that in these days the British are capable of managing the affairs of people 
in all corners of the globe’.223 Again, there were divisions in the party. Brockway was not 
entirely in agreement with Maxton, expressing concerns that his colleague may have ‘gone 
too far’ in his stance.224 
 
Conclusion 
Within the Labour movement, diametrically contrasting views on the mandates system 
emerged. As we have seen, some saw the system as necessary to secure peace, others argued 
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that it would inevitably lead to violent repression and war. Some viewed it as a means of 
ending imperialism whereas others maintained that it was an instrument of imperialism. 
 
This complexity of the problem was illustrated by the difficulty of the issue of self-
determination. Unlike in British mandates such as Iraq, the demand for self-government in 
Palestine was complicated by the fact that this would be incompatible with the Jewish 
national home. This prompted Labour intellectuals from very similar political backgrounds 
who had previously championed self-determination as a central principle in the new 
international order to reassess the issue. As we have seen, Brailsford although deeply 
sympathetic to Zionist claims initially supported the right of self-determination for 
Palestinian Arabs before discarding it in favour of population transfer. Nor was this a fringe 
view, as Snell also advocated transfer. Angell came to regard the idea of national self-
determination as too narrow and unworkable. Wedgwood was opposed to self-government 
based upon majoritarian rule, arguing that such a ‘pseudo-democracy’ would be ‘very 
dangerous’.225 He justified this position by arguing that certain preconditions had to be met, 
such as that the native population were capable of participating and that there was no danger 
that the majority would exploit or racially oppress the minority.226 Cocks, however, 
maintained that Palestinian Arab self-determination was paramount and saw Britain’s support 
for Zionism as a violation of that principle. Both sides of the debate often sought to 
demonstrate that their stance was consistent with international law as stipulated by Covenant 
and the articles of the mandate. Despite its severe criticism of Labour’s policy in India, the 
ILP leadership seemed reluctant to criticise the second Labour government over its actions in 
Palestine. Policy was essentially reactive, as serious engagement was largely prompted by 
episodes of violence in Palestine in 1929 and 1936. Arguably, this apparent neglect can be 
attributed to its complex and polarizing nature. The administration for mandates was very 
much an exercise in continuity. In both spells in government there was no fundamental 
change. For example, the suggestions for innovation which would have extended rule to 
colonies were not pursued, nor was the suggestion that mandates should be administered by 
the foreign office rather than the colonial office to indicate that these were international rather 
than colonial matters.227 The League of Nations was one force which contributed towards this 
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continuity, both in general and specific terms. When Roden Buxton raised the issue of 
extending rule to the colonies, representatives of the PMC discouraged the idea. Moreover, 
when an attempt was made by the second Labour government to alter British policy in 
Palestine, the PMC emerged as a major opponent.  
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Chapter 5: The ILP, Anti-Semitism and Palestine, 1918-1939 
 
This chapter will explore how attitudes towards Jews and their experience of anti-Semitism in 
Britain and Europe informed the debate around Zionism and Palestine. There is often an 
assumption that support for Zionism stemmed, at least in part, from a sympathy with Jews 
and anti-Zionism from an antipathy towards Jews. We can see an example of this in Francis 
Beckett’s assessment of Labour MP Hugh Dalton, in which Beckett incorrectly assumed that 
Dalton’s advocacy of Zionism indicated that he had abandoned his anti-Semitic views.1 
However, the reality was considerably more complex. As Sharman Kadish has noted, to 
equate interwar anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism and pro-Zionism with philo-Semitism is an 
oversimplification given that many anti-Semites supported Zionism because it provided a 
pretext ‘for the removal of European Jewry en masse to a glorified ghetto in the Middle 
East’.2 For this reason, amongst others, Zionism proved to be a deeply divisive question 
within the Jewish communities of Britain and Europe. For some Jews, Zionism was deemed 
to be incompatible with their understanding of internationalism. As a Jewish speaker at a 
Poale Zion meeting in 1923 observed, the organisation was attempting to appeal ‘to the large 
number’ of Jews for whom a ‘misplaced ideal of internationalism was an obstacle to them 
becoming Zionist’.3 Indeed, some of the movement’s most ardent sceptics and critics were 
left-wing Jews, such as Joseph Leftwich in Britain and Friedrich Adler in Austria.4 The 
division was illustrated within the Gaster family. Jack Gaster, who joined the ILP in 1926 and 
led the Revolutionary Policy Committee faction post-disaffiliation, was anti-Zionist, whereas 
his father Moses Gaster (the Chief Rabbi of Sephardic Jews in England) was a founder and 
president of the English Zionist Federation.5 Furthermore, Deborah Osmond has noted that 
for many British Jews, the nascent Soviet Union rather than a Jewish national home in 
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Palestine came to be regarded as ‘the safest haven against political anti-Semitism’.6 
Therefore, this chapter will examine the complexities of the relationship between anti-
Semitism and both pro-and anti-Zionist thought. 
 
To understand the origins of several key themes which shaped much of the discourse in the 
interwar years, it is necessary to begin with an examination of the labour movement’s 
attitudes towards Jews in the years prior to and including the First World War. Of particular 
significance are the left’s perceptions of Jewish immigration and its analysis of the Boer War.  
 
Anti-Imperialism, Immigration and Anti-Semitism, 1900-1918 
The extent of anti-Semitism within the British Labour movement at the turn of the century is 
contested. For instance, Colin Holmes, while acknowledging its existence and citing several 
examples, has argued that its prevalence has been exaggerated.7 However, more recent works 
have reiterated the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism. For example, Neil Redfern argued that 
anti-Semitism played a ‘significant part’ in the ILP’s opposition to the Boer War.8 Similarly, 
Stefan Berger concluded that Labour activists in places like London and Leeds ‘spoke the 
language of anti-Semitism’ in their ‘vociferous campaigns’ to oppose immigration.9 Anti-
Semitic concepts unquestionably recurrently featured in debates regarding imperialism and 
immigration. As Paul Ward has shown, in its opposition to the Boer War, the ILP’s paper the 
Labour Leader carried articles claiming that the pro-war, jingoistic newspapers were owned 
and financed by Jews.10 Ward has also noted that J. A. Hobson’s anti-imperialist critique, 
which proved to be profoundly influential within the labour movement, also included anti-
Semitic allusions which ‘seemed to back the antisemitism with empirical evidence’.11 
According to Ward, Holmes ‘underestimated’ the degree of anti-Semitism displayed by the 
ILP.12 Similarly, Stephen Howe concluded that Brailsford adopted a ‘markedly anti-Semitic 
tone’ when opposing the Boer War.13 There is however, some questionable scholarship in this 
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area. For instance, Robert Wistrich erroneously attributed an anti-Semitic quotation regarding 
the nature of imperialism to Keir Hardie.14 
 
British Labour’s response to immigration, which was predominantly Jewish, was deeply 
ambivalent. During the 1890s, the TUC had repeatedly backed legislation to restrict 
immigration, prompting a robust response from Jewish trade unionists.15 The ILP’s response 
was mixed. While the Labour Leader ‘firmly rejected’ the proposals, the prominent ILPer 
trade union leaders Tom Mann and Ben Tillett not only supported immigration controls but 
did so in explicitly anti-Semitic terms.16 In an ILP pamphlet which outlined the party’s 
opposition to immigration restrictions and argued that on the whole, migration was beneficial 
for Britain, Henry Snell wrote sympathetically of ‘the Jewish tailor flying [sic.] from injustice 
and persecution’ and complained that against Jewish migrants in London’s East End ‘there 
exists a prejudice that corrupts all Gentile reasoning’.17 Yet he saw no prejudicial thinking at 
work in his own insistence that ‘The rich Jew... has done his best to besmirch the fair name of 
England, and to corrupt the sweetness of our national life and character’.18 In effect, Snell 
deployed anti-Semitic tropes in an effort to defend Jewish workers. 
 
When the Aliens Act was brought before parliament in 1905, it was opposed by the Labour 
contingent. Keir Hardie’s speech during this debate revealed some of the inherent tensions 
and ambiguities regarding this issue. Although opposed to this particular bill, Hardie made it 
clear that he was not opposed to immigration restrictions in principle. Indeed, central to his 
argument for rejecting the government’s legislation was that it did not propose to refuse entry 
to migrants brought into Britain as strike-breakers or to undercut wages and Hardie had 
moved an amendment to add a clause addressing these issues.19 However, alongside this was 
an unequivocal defence of recent Jewish migrants against the accusation that they were a 
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financial burden on the British state, or possessed a propensity for criminality, as well as an 
impassioned plea to provide refuge to Jews being persecuted in Eastern Europe: 
 
And so those poor creatures who have been shot down in the streets of Warsaw and other 
parts of Russia, those poor poverty-stricken human beings who have been hunted down as 
beasts of prey, are to be condemned by this Bill to remain in a country that does not know 
how to treat them? … Taking the immigrants for last year, you will find the overwhelming 
proportion of the increase is in the refugees from Russia and Poland. It is certain that the bulk 
of those people will be poor people who will be kept out under this Bill, and are we to say to 
those poor creatures that England of all lands under the sun is no resting place for them from 
the conditions now prevailing in their own country? 20 
 
Another noteworthy episode was the anti-Jewish rioting of 1911 in South Wales, which took 
place during the ‘Great Labour Unrest’. This incident has been the subject of scholarly 
debate. Geoffrey Alderman charged ILP activists with playing a significant role during these 
events, by engaging in what he termed ‘rich Jew anti-Semitism’.21 However, William D. 
Rubinstein subsequently challenged this interpretation, arguing that the evidence cited by 
Alderman had failed to support this claim.22 
 
As foreign policy perspectives were developed, many of these themes continued to be 
articulated. In Brailsford’s critique of British foreign policy The War of Steel and Gold, one 
reason cited for objecting to Britain’s alliance with Tsarist Russia was the regime’s 
oppression of its Jewish population.23 However, this was followed by references to ‘Hebrew 
financiers’ and the attribution of Britain’s occupation of Egypt to the ‘Rothschild 
influence’.24 Thus, Brailsford’s political thought provides an instructive example of how a 
particular variant of anti-Semitism could co-exist with pro-Zionist sentiments, as he was an 
early champion of Zionism, endorsing the movement even prior to the publication of the 
Balfour Declaration in a book which outlined his hopes for the post-war international order.25 
Brailsford called for the creation of an ‘autonomous province with a Jewish Administration 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Geoffrey Alderman, ‘The Anti-Jewish Riots of August 1911 in South Wales’, Welsh History Review 6 (1972), 
pp. 190-200.  
22 W. D. Rubinstein, ‘The Anti-Jewish Riots of 1911 in South Wales: A Re-examination’, Welsh History Review 
18 (1997), pp. 683-684.  
23 H.N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace (London, 1914), p. 45. 
24 Ibid., p. 54 and p. 105. 
25 Brailsford, A League of Nations (London, 1917), pp. 172-3.  
185 
 
under an international guarantee’ in Palestine.26 Furthermore, he hoped that the League of 
Nations would promote Jewish immigration which would eventually result in the creation of 
a Jewish state. However, this was a secondary concern compared with securing equal rights 
for Europe’s Jewish populations.27 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, there was a strong current within the ILP which opposed 
the First World War. Some opponents of the war cited the rise of anti-Semitism in Eastern and 
Central Europe as part of their anti-militarist rationale. Fenner Brockway argued that for Jews, 
the conflict had resulted in ‘an increase of the oppression from which their people have for 
generations suffered’.28 Furthermore, he voiced strong opposition to the government’s 
proposals to deport Jewish refugees from Russia who refused to be conscripted into the British 
army.29 Yet, an example of a very different response could be found in Scotland, where 
critiques of the war often centred on protesting against the adverse impact of the war upon 
working-class communities. When criticising the increase in interest rates in an article in the 
Scottish ILP’s paper Forward, John Wheatley, a leading ‘Clydesider’, imbued his analyses 
with overtly anti-Semitic tropes:  
 
Rothschild could pay his share cash down, but as a partner it is necessary for you to borrow 
your share from Rothschild. Since you are poor Rothschild won’t lend you the money so 
therefore the government has to borrow it for you and Rothschild insists on this method of 
carrying out the transaction. Because, with all the shrewdness of Abie, Isaac and Moses on his 
head, he knows that the government is in a better position than he to make the regulations as 
will enforce you to pay the Jew his pound of flesh.30 
 
However, these comments did not go unchallenged. Numerous correspondents criticised 
Wheatley’s anti-Semitic remarks, who responded by issuing what one biographer has described 
as a ‘less than convincing’ apology.31  
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Pro-Zionism, Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism, 1918-1932  
As we have seen, Labour’s War Aims Memorandum made a pro-Zionist stance official party 
policy, which was subsequently reiterated through various resolutions and policy statements. 
Examining the discourse of some of Zionism’s most enthusiastic supporters, it is clear why 
many in the Jewish community expressed concerns about its implications. For instance, 
Wedgwood clearly saw Jews as a separate ‘race’ and spoke of the desirability of ‘Jewish 
repatriation’ to Palestine.32 When addressing a meeting of Jews in the East End of London, 
Wedgwood deliberately referred to his audience as ‘Jews’ as opposed to ‘fellow citizens’ or 
‘Englishmen’, claiming that on this occasion these remarks were met with approval by his 
audience.33 Nonetheless, such rhetoric echoed contemporary anti-Semitic notions of Jews as a 
racialised ‘other’. As Kelemen has shown, despite Wedgwood’s ‘philo-semitism’, he 
nevertheless considered Jews to be ‘unassimilable’ and to possess ‘many of the 
characteristics’ which anti-Semites ascribed to Jews.34 Another example of Wedgwood’s 
stereotyping of Jews can be found in his claim that the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ had many 
similarities with Jews: ‘We are both moneylenders and unpopular; we, too, are wanderers 
among strange peoples; we too are traders, and if we look down on those with whom we 
trade, that is only what the Jews do too’.35 Wedgwood also unsympathetically remarked to a 
Jewish audience that if Zionism was not successfully realised:  
 
‘What’s wrong with them, the world will ask?... Can’t they be men? Can’t they act and do 
things? You complain of anti-Semitism now. I tell you if I were a Jew, I’d rather have the 
anti-Semitism that springs from fear or hatred… rather than the anti-Semitism that would 
spring from pity and contempt’.36 
 
While holding these prejudiced views, Brailsford and Wedgwood did respond forcefully to 
the violent persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe. Brailsford, who had witnessed first-hand 
the persecution of Jews in Poland, wrote a series of articles and letters in the national press 
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decrying the violence, and addressed protest demonstrations.37 Similarly, in parliament, 
Wedgwood repeatedly raised the issue of anti-Jewish persecution in Poland and Hungary.38  
 
These pogroms were significant in two key respects. First, the events strengthened the 
rationale for the necessity of Zionism as a means by which Jews could escape persecution. As 
far as Wedgwood was concerned, contemporary persecution of Jews ‘did not materially 
differ’ from that of the Middles Ages. It was therefore the duty of ‘every fearless supporter of 
human rights’ to assist the Zionist movement in order to ‘insure... the continued existence of 
the Jewish people’.39 On another occasion he told his audience that the ‘Red and White 
terrors in Eastern Europe’ explained why Britain supported ‘establishing a haven for the 
oppressed Jewish people’.40 For Wedgwood, Zionism was a key component in reducing anti-
Semitism in another respect, namely that it would improve life for Jewish communities in 
Europe. He believed that only by Jews having a ‘creditable place among the nations’ could 
they ‘secure recognition and respect for those of their brethren in other lands’.41 
 
Secondly, it framed the way in which violence in Palestine was viewed. When 
intercommunal violence broke out in the early 1920s, rather than viewing the violence as an 
expression of legitimate Arab nationalist sentiment, these episodes were characterised as anti-
Jewish pogroms of a piece with those in Eastern Europe. Thus, Wedgwood described the riots 
in Jerusalem in April 1920 as a ‘pogrom’ and raised the question of British complicity.42 In a 
similar vein, he told parliament that the violence in Jaffa in May 1921 had been incited by the 
Palestinian Arab ruling class to protect their own interests, which was ‘the history of pogroms 
all over the world’.43 Accordingly, any concession to Palestinian Arab nationalism regarding 
the level of Jewish immigration into Palestine would be ‘the worst possible policy to pursue’ 
as it amounted to ‘putting a premium on the pogroms’.44 Furthermore, Wedgwood cited the 
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events to support his claim that Britain must not create genuine self-governing institutions, 
stating: ‘so long as you have pogroms going on in Jaffa and Jerusalem… we cannot possibly 
surrender complete self-government to the people of that country’.45 In denouncing the 
violence which broke out in Jerusalem in the late 1920s, Brailsford recalled the Polish 
pogroms when he wrote that the British government ‘just like the inexperienced Polish 
Republic’ had failed ‘to protect the Jews under its care from organised massacre’.46 
 
After the First World War, like in 1905, the ILP parliamentary contingent opposed the 
attempts to further strengthen the provisions of the Aliens Act, which again 
disproportionately targeted Jews (both the existing community as well as new migrants) and 
was often accompanied by anti-Semitic rhetoric.47 Wedgwood emerged as an outspoken 
opponent of these measures.48 As David Cesarani has shown, in the post-war period there was 
a definite anti-Semitic current in the Conservative party, which caused ‘deep anxiety’ within 
the Jewish community.49 Indeed, on more than one occasion Labour’s first Jewish MP 
Emmanuel Shinwell was subjected to anti-Semitic taunts in parliament by Conservative 
MPs.50 In the House of Commons, ILPer John Scurr repeatedly led unsuccessful attempts to 
amend the government’s immigration legislation.51 A central objection for Scurr was the 
discriminatory impact against ‘one particular section of the community, that is the members, 
and particularly the poorer members, of the Jewish community’.52 Scurr, who represented the 
constituency of Mile End in London’s East End, voiced the concerns of many of his Jewish 
constituents when he told parliament that there was ‘always the danger of this [legislation] 
being used as a weapon of anti-Semitism… The Jewish community in the East End think that, 
not merely the present Home Secretary, but the Home Office, all the way through, has 
displayed a habit of mind which is distinctly anti-Semite [sic]’.53 He was also an advocate of 
Zionism, likening the movement to the Irish struggle for self-determination.54 
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Overtly anti-Semitic discourse persisted into the inter-war period amongst several proponents 
of Zionism, the most prominent of whom was Ramsay MacDonald. Like Brailsford, 
MacDonald’s anti-Semitism coexisted with sympathy for Jews facing violent persecution in 
Eastern Europe and the sympathetic acknowledgement that one ‘spur’ of Zionism was the 
‘physical necessity’ of escaping oppression.55 Nevertheless, MacDonald made a telling 
remark when he informed a Labour Zionist activist that one reason he was interested in the 
Zionist movement was because he wanted to ascertain whether ‘the Jews as a race’ were 
‘capable of constructive economic work’.56 Furthermore, in his reports on his visit to 
Palestine (again, published in Forward), MacDonald invoked numerous anti-Semitic tropes 
in his characterisation of Jews who were opposed to Zionism, including the conspiratorial 
belief in secret Jewish power. MacDonald spoke of: 
  
The rich plutocratic Jew… whose views upon life make one anti-Semitic. He has no country, 
no kindred. Whether as a sweater or a financier, he is an exploiter of everything he can 
squeeze. He is behind every evil that governments do, and his political authority, always 
exercised in the dark, is greater than that of parliamentary majorities.57  
 
Analysing these comments, Gorni has suggested that MacDonald was influenced by the 
notorious anti-Semitic forgery the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’.58 However, it is more 
likely that MacDonald’s inspiration here was Hobson, as we know that Hobson’s arguments 
regarding imperialism, which as we have seen, were infused with this variant of anti-Semitic 
discourse, had influenced MacDonald ‘a great deal’.59 As in the case of Snell, Brailsford and 
Wheatley, provided the anti-Semitic rhetoric was directed exclusively at supposedly affluent 
Jews rather than Jews per se, these sentiments were treated as legitimate anti-capitalist 
discourse. MacDonald expressed similar sentiments when he told a Labour Zionist activist 
that the Conservative government was reconsidering its pro-Zionist policy because it was 
‘more important to win the friendship of the various Arab countries than that of the Jews and 
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their money’.60 He also had these prejudices ‘reawakened’ when there was significant Zionist 
opposition to his government’s Palestine policy in 1930.61 This points to an inconsistency on 
MacDonald’s part in the sense that he had previously characterised ‘capitalist Jews’ as anti-
Zionist.  
 
It is striking that when Poale Zion collated and published MacDonald’s articles as A Socialist 
in Palestine, these unambiguously anti-Semitic remarks were included.62 Presumably, on this 
occasion, securing the endorsement of such a prominent Labour figure for the activities of 
Labour Zionism overrode any concerns regarding the presence of anti-Semitic language. 
Indeed, MacDonald’s anti-Semitic imagination partly informed his support for Zionism. His 
belief was that Jews, having been ‘uprooted’ from their homeland of Palestine were in an 
‘unnatural and unhealthy state of mind’ and had thus become ‘materialist’ and 
‘cosmopolitan’.63 By returning the Jews to Palestine, Zionism would remedy this by 
transforming Jews into ‘patriots’ and ‘idealists’.64 This was a view was shared by 
Wedgwood.65 Furthermore, in the immediate term, Zionism merited support because it 
supposedly challenged the interests of capitalist Jews.66 David Cesarani concluded that 
MacDonald’s remarks indicate that this kind of pro-Zionist discourse was not only informed 
by anti-Semitism but also ‘validated anti-Semitic notions and made it possible for socialists 
who thought themselves opposed to racialism to voice basic slurs against the Jews’.67  
 
Another informative example of the pro-Zionist, anti-Semitic phenomena was that of 
‘Clydesider’ MP Neil MacLean. At Labour’s annual conference in 1921, MacLean seconded 
the Poale Zion motion which committed Labour to a pro-Zionist position. In his remarks, he 
indicated that his pro-Zionist stance stemmed from a sympathy for Jewish people. He was in 
favour of ‘self-determination… for this race which has been wandering the globe for so 
long’. Yet, this was preceded by the self-depreciating but dubious comment: ‘some people 
might wonder why a Scotsman should second the resolution. It was not a question of 
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supposed affinity in money matters’.68 In March 1923, many of the Clydeside MPs opposed a 
government-backed loan for the cotton industry in Sudan on the basis that it would not 
provide a solution for unemployment and amounted to public funds subsidising a capitalist 
scheme. However, MacLean introduced an anti-Semitic dimension. Noting the names of 
some of the shareholders and directors of the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, MacLean remarked 
‘No-one could say that people with names like Eckstein were out for the good of the British 
Empire’. When it was stated that they were from the Highlands, MacLean retorted: ‘Yes, the 
Highlands in Palestine’.69  
 
Thus, it is evident that the anti-Semitic notions developed in at the turn of the century 
persisted well into the interwar period. The pronouncements of Brailsford, MacDonald, 
Wheatley and MacLean provide us with clear examples of what Cesarani has described as the 
left’s propensity to bifurcate Jews into “good” Jewish workers and “bad” Jewish capitalists 
and consequently, to engage in ‘rich-Jew anti-Semitism’.70 Furthermore, the vast majority of 
these figures were openly pro-Zionist. Lansbury and Snell also fell into this category.71 
Indeed, Mann and Tillett, who as we have seen, indulged in anti-Semitism against both 
Jewish working-class migrants and ‘capitalist’ Jews both expressed their support for Labour 
Zionism during the interwar period.72 
 
Anti-Zionist discourse too could be infused with anti-Semitic references. One correspondent 
to the New Leader made the case that the Balfour Declaration was ‘unjust’ citing his 
opposition to secret diplomacy, support for national self-determination and anti-militarism. 
The correspondent insisted that ‘No one wishes anything but good to the Jewish people, 
provided the benefits they receive do not involve injustice to others’. However, this claim 
was somewhat undermined by the inclusion of the anti-Semitic allusion: ‘Far from there 
being any moral duty to persist in… [the Balfour Declaration], the request for such 
persistence sounds like Shylock’s demand for the pound of flesh’.73  Another anti-Zionist 
Labourite was E.N. Bennett MP, who was amongst the contingent of Liberal defectors to the 
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ILP.74 In a letter to the Labour party’s Advisory Committee on International Questions, he 
objected to the party’s pro-Zionist stance on the basis that it was contrary to the principle of 
self-determination and the result of a secret treaty.75 However, it appears that anti-Semitic 
motives were also at play. In an article published in the Jewish Criterion discussing the anti-
Zionist group of MPs in parliament, Bennett was described as ‘the only Labour MP… who 
does not disguise but openly parades his anti-Semitism’.76 Furthermore, by the end of the 
1930s, Bennett was a member of the virulently anti-Semitic ‘Right Club’.77 
 
Nevertheless, the anti-Zionist line pursued by the ILP leadership of Maxton and Brockway in 
the late 1920s was undoubtedly motivated far more by anti-colonialism rather than any kind 
of anti-Semitic attitudes. This was acknowledged by the pro-Zionist Jewish Chronicle which 
characterised Maxton in the following terms: ‘Although he has had doubts about the Zionist 
movement, Mr Maxton it must be admitted has always been pro-Jewish’.78 Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the intercommunal violence in Palestine in August 1929, Maxton addressed a 
mass meeting organised by the English Zionist Federation – not to show support for Zionism 
– but to express his sympathy and solidarity with the grieving Anglo-Jewish community.79 In 
spite of his longstanding opposition to imperialism and militarism, Brockway voted for the 
Labour government’s enhanced security measures in Palestine on the basis that these were 
required to protect the Jewish community in the aftermath of the aforementioned violence.80 
 
Like Maxton, Brockway also placed Palestine in an anti-colonial framework, stating in 1931 
that the ILP had ‘never been satisfied… with the policy which the Labour Government has 
been conducting in Palestine, just in the same way as we have not been satisfied with its 
policy in India’.81 However, he also appeared to echo anti-Semitic anti-capitalist rhetoric, 
remarking in the same interview that the Balfour Declaration had been ‘issued with a view to 
winning the support of Jewish capitalism’ and thus ‘that in itself is a sufficient reason why we 
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should oppose it’.82 This was re-iterated when Brockway wrote that the British government’s 
backing for Zionism was motivated not only by strategic, imperialist considerations but also 
in order to ‘secure the support of Jewish populations and particularly Jewish finance during 
the War’.83 However, at other times, in subsequent statements, the terms ‘Jewish capitalism’ 
or ‘Jewish capitalists’ referred specifically to the capitalist section of the Jewish community 
within Palestine which, along with its counterpart Arab feudalism and Arab capitalism, 
represented a conservative social force in Palestine.84 
 
In the late 1920s, the ILP parliamentary group included a small number of Jewish MPs. The 
most prominent of these was Emanuel Shinwell, who was born in London’s East End before 
moving to Glasgow as a child.85 He went on to become a prominent trade unionist and ILPer, 
playing a leading role in the events of ‘Red Clydeside’ before being elected MP for 
Linlithgowshire in 1922. Shinwell was not prominent in pro-Zionist activities during the 
interwar years. As he acknowledged in his memoirs, he had ‘done little or nothing in public 
to help the [Zionist] movement’.86 While he was not particularly active in the movement 
itself, Shinwell did make efforts to reassure the Anglo-Jewish community that Labour was 
committed to a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. For example, he addressed a meeting of the 
Jewish communal organisation the Independent Order of B’nai B’rith in London where he 
assured his audience that the Labour government would ‘safeguard Jewish interests in 
Palestine’ and thus there was ‘no need for any anxiety’.87  
 
Another Jewish MP was Michael Marcus, who represented Dundee from 1929-31. During his 
short time in parliament, Marcus took a stridently pro-Zionist stance, chairing the all-party 
parliamentary committee on Palestine and participating in Wedgwood’s ‘Seventh Dominion’ 
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initiative.88 For Marcus, his support for Zionism was intrinsically connected to his Jewish 
identity. For instance, intervening in a parliamentary debate in the aftermath of the 
intercommunal violence of 1929, he strongly criticised MPs who questioned the need for 
additional military expenditure for Palestine remarking: ‘when a crime has been committed 
against the Jewish people in Palestine, I, as a Jew and as one who is proud of being a Jew, am 
certainly not going to remain silent’.89 
 
Responses to the Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Europe, 1932-1939  
When the ILP disaffiliated from the Labour Party, there was no consensus within the ILP on 
Zionism.90 In the years immediately following disaffiliation from Labour, the ILP leadership 
continued to reject Zionism. However, no detailed policy on Palestine emerged. Instead, 
Brockway promoted the Soviet Union’s Jewish settlement scheme in Birobidzhan, 
contrasting it favourably with Zionism and lauding it as ‘the one striking contrast with the 
Fascist treatment of the Jews’.91  
 
The ILP certainly treated the rise of political anti-Semitism seriously. The New Leader 
carried several articles alerting its readers to anti-Semitic incidents in Germany.92 Ethel 
Mannin wrote a glowing review of a book by a Jewish author which drew attention to ‘the 
anti-Semitism in our midst’.93 In addition, it provided a platform for writers to challenge 
prevalent anti-Semitic myths.94 Moreover, in 1933, in a move which was reminiscent of the 
ILP’s involvement in the LAI, Maxton and Brockway and Mannin lent their support to the 
transnational, Münzenberg-initiated, Relief Committee for the Victims of German Fascism.95 
Brockway also backed a US-based transnational network which raised financial support for 
Jews in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.96 Individual cases were taken up too, as ILP 
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MPs repeatedly protested against the persecution of Jewish socialist leader Joseph Kruk by 
the Polish government.97  
 
Furthermore, the party played a leading role in the anti-fascist activities that sought to 
physically defend the Jewish community in the East End of London, which was being 
targeted by the British Union of Fascists (BUF). The most notable example of this was the 
so-called ‘Battle of Cable Street’ on 4 October 1936 where, in contrast to the Labour Party, 
the ILP proactively mobilised support for the anti-fascist demonstration.98 On the eve of the 
clashes, the ILP convened a ‘massive gathering’ in London’s East End, at which Brockway 
‘called for an overwhelming demonstration against Mosley’.99 Moreover, ILP publicity for 
the demonstration strongly condemned the violent anti-Semitism of the British and European 
fascist movements.100 In areas such as the North East where the ILP retained a relatively 
strong presence post-disaffiliation, its activists repeatedly mobilised against the BUF.101 The 
ILP’s opposition to political anti-Semitism stemmed from an analysis which saw anti-
Semitism as a means of dividing the working class on racial lines and thus undermining class 
consciousness, as well as misleading workers about the true nature of the capitalist system 
through its focus on Jewish capitalists.102  
 
As we have noted in Chapter Two, Mosley was a leading ILPer prior to his founding of the 
BUF and several ILPers including two additional former MPs – Robert Forgan and John 
Beckett – joined Mosley’s BUF. It raises the question, what part if any did anti-Semitism 
play in this phenomenon? Traditionally, it has been argued that anti-Semitism was not 
initially central to the BUF’s ideology and that it was opportunistically adopted as official 
policy in mid-1934.103 Furthermore, several scholars have claimed that anti-Semitism was 
reluctantly adopted by Mosley as a consequence of pressure from others within the BUF.104 
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However, in a recent study, Daniel Tilles has argued that the BUF was unquestionably anti-
Semitic from the outset and that Mosley himself was a major driving force in the espousal of 
political anti-Semitism.105 To support his claim, Tilles pointed to Mosley’s courting of 
renowned anti-Semites during his short-lived New Party.106 Certainly when Mosley openly 
promoted anti-Semitism, he deployed tropes that were consistent with ‘anti-capitalist’ anti-
Semitism which portrayed Jews as powerful, exploitative capitalists.107 However, his anti-
Semitism was not limited to this, as he also racialised Jews as ‘Orientals’.108 
 
Beckett’s sympathetic biographer has argued that while Beckett’s anti-Semitism was plainly 
present prior to joining the BUF, his anti-Semitism intensified under the influence of 
Mosley.109 Beckett, who resigned from the ILP in 1933 before joining the BUF in March 
1934, remained a leading BUF activist until 1937. Not long after joining, he deployed 
rhetoric which conformed to the language of ‘left-wing’ anti-Semitism, penning an article 
attacking the Tories for serving the interests of ‘cosmopolitan financiers’.110 His biographer 
has speculated that his anti-Semitism had indeed developed during his time in the labour 
movement as a result of his clashes with Jewish industrialist Alfred Mond.111 Neither of these 
figures had expressed a view on Zionism during their time with the ILP. However, as leader 
of the BUF, Mosley advocated what he termed ‘compulsory Zionism’, which meant the mass 
deportation of Jews, but not to Palestine or any other area within the British Empire.112 
 
The intensification of the persecution of Jews in Europe resulted in a reassessment on 
Palestine in some key respects. As Maxton admitted in a speech to the House of Commons, 
the ‘refugee problem’ had altered his perspective on Palestine to a ‘very substantial 
degree’.113 In April 1933, he was one of the few MPs to press for immigration controls to be 
lifted for German Jews migrating into Palestine. Responding to the Nazi regime’s 
introduction of anti-Jewish legislation, Maxton urged the British government to change 
immigration rules, even if only on a temporary basis, to enable Palestine to become ‘an 
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asylum for the Jews’.114 Writing in 1936, while still fundamentally rejecting Zionism and 
remaining deeply suspicious of British motives for supporting Zionism, Maxton argued that 
there was an ‘urgent need for some place or places on the surface of the globe where Jewish 
workers can live without having to face daily danger of imprisonment, torture, starvation or 
butchery’.115 In addition, he acknowledged that even in countries which did not have fascist 
governments, conditions were nevertheless ‘very difficult’ for Jews. Hence, it was ‘easy to 
understand’ why Jewish workers were attracted to migrating to Palestine.116 Maxton’s shift in 
perspective was evident at the ILP’s annual conference in March 1937. When a motion on 
Palestine expressing solidarity with both Arab and Jewish workers only narrowly passed, 
Maxton fumed that such a ‘trivial majority’ was ‘damnable’. It was ‘not good enough’, he 
told delegates, for the ILP ‘to say that Jewish socialists after being driven out of Germany 
and Poland are to be left in Palestine to be murdered with our connivance’.117  
 
During the course of 1936, the ILP’s official policy significantly evolved. In the summer, a 
policy statement on Palestine was issued by Brockway which made no mention of the 
perilous situation for Jews in Europe and counselled left-wing Labour Zionists to consider 
whether further Jewish immigration into Palestine was desirable if it was a potential 
impediment to the successful realisation of Arab-Jewish unity.118 However, this was soon 
followed by a more comprehensive policy document entitled A Socialist Policy for Palestine, 
co-authored by Maxton, Brockway, McGovern and Stephen which struck a markedly 
different tone on the question of immigration. The statement stressed that for many Jews in 
Europe the opportunity to emigrate ‘was a matter of life and death’.119 Birobidzhan, which 
Brockway had previously championed, was now deemed ‘negligible compared with the need’ 
and opportunities in other parts of the world were ‘very limited’. Therefore, the report argued 
that further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be permitted. Nevertheless, even in 
these circumstances, this right was not perceived to be absolute. Revolutionary socialists, it 
was claimed, accepted the principle of freedom of migration so long as it did not adversely 
affect standards of living or ‘economic conditions’.120 Hence, a proviso was added that 
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employment had to be already guaranteed and that Jewish agricultural and industrial projects 
created by new migrants must also employ Arab workers. In the long-term, it was hoped that 
Arab-Jewish workers’ organisations could be established which could organise this process 
and ensure these outcomes. Such proposals did not appear to correspond with the severity of 
the situation which had been outlined at the beginning of the document. In the attempt to 
formulate a policy on Jewish immigration which sought to encompass the diverse range of 
views within the ILP, its leadership produced a contradictory, ambiguous and unrealistic 
solution.  
 
One influence on Brockway’s thinking at this time was George Bernard Shaw. When 
Brockway consulted Shaw on his views about Palestine, Shaw replied with a brief three-act 
playlet which concluded with the playwright himself exclaiming ‘Another Ulster! As if one 
were not enough!’. In it, Shaw imagined a conversation in which Balfour promised Palestine 
to Weizmann (as the de-facto leader of the Zionist movement) in exchange for Weizmann 
using his scientific expertise to create more effective weapons for Britain’s war effort. This 
was based upon Weizmann’s development of synthetic acetone and his war-time work for the 
British Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions.121 The play made several blatantly anti-
Semitic references. One example was as follows: 
 
ARTHUR: Doctor Weizmann, we must have that microbe at your own price. Name it. We shall 
not hesitate at six figures.  
DR WEIZMANN: I do not ask for money. 
ARTHUR: There must be some misunderstanding. I was informed that you are a Jew. 
 
Here, Shaw was expressing his own prejudice rather than satirising the anti-Semitism of the 
British ruling class.122 Brockway’s interpretation of Shaw’s play was that ‘Balfour gave Dr 
Weizmann Palestine in return for a chemical device for killing Germans’.123 Although it is 
unclear whether Brockway was persuaded by this scenario, nevertheless this did broadly 
chime with Brockway’s assessment that the Balfour Declaration was in part, a war-time quid 
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pro quo. Furthermore, Brockway regarded Shaw’s contribution worthy of publication in the 
New Leader, without any critical editorial commentary on its anti-Semitic content.124  
 
Nevertheless, Brockway himself was unequivocal in his condemnation of political anti-
Semitism and was evidently profoundly affected by it. In response to Kristallnacht, Brockway 
issued a letter on behalf of the ILP to the German ambassador protesting against the 
‘barbarity of the attacks upon the Jews’.125 He stated that the persecution of Jews was 
‘barbaric and horrible’ to the point that ‘one feels so angry about this one is almost ashamed 
to write it down’.126 He was critical of the outcome of the Evian conference and argued that 
socialists had a ‘duty to assist the Jewish people in their plight’ by striving ‘to obtain an open 
door to Jewish refugees’ in their respective countries.127 Along with the Soviet Union, 
Palestine was seen as playing an integral role in the solution. Thus, Brockway advocated 
Jewish migration to Palestine, strongly challenging the left-wing anti-Zionist notion that Jews 
in Palestine could be regarded as ‘Imperialist invaders’ who were exploiting the native 
population.128 By this point, Brockway appeared to have discarded his previous concerns 
about Palestine’s economic absorptive capacity, emphasising instead that Jewish immigration 
had resulted in an improvement of the standard of living for Palestinian Arabs. However, 
Brockway seemed not to have appreciated the magnitude of the refugee crisis, believing that 
‘thousands’ of refugees wanted to enter Palestine.129 During this period, Brockway was 
willing to break the law in order to assist refugees, forging passports and other documents to 
help refugees escape Nazi persecution.130 
 
For Maxton, it was simultaneously possible to be opposed to Zionism and to be in favour of 
increased Jewish immigration into Palestine. This was because, in his view, the solution to 
the conflict in Palestine would be achieved through the unity of Jewish and Arab workers on 
a class basis and the eventual inclusion of Palestine within a federation of Arab states. 
Therefore, the size of the Jewish population in Palestine was not deemed to be an impediment 
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to this objective. In fact, the immigration of Jewish socialists and trade unionists would only 
aid this process. Furthermore, contrary to the policy of the Zionist movement, Maxton 
advocated Jewish migration into a variety of countries, not solely Palestine. In fact, such was 
Maxton’s commitment to aiding Jewish refugees that he went so far as to abandon a key tenet 
of his longstanding anti-colonial position, namely the paramountcy of self-determination.131  
 
In the parliamentary sessions immediately following Kristallnacht, he repeated his demand 
that the government explore the option of resettling Jewish refugees in Palestine, as well as 
elsewhere in Britain’s ‘vast colonial empire’.132 Although this request was qualified by the 
proviso that it would be on a temporary basis and would not place ‘undue burdens on the 
district in which they are placed, and without causing additional suffering to the population 
that is already there’.133 Maxton again urged that the government make provisions to enable 
refugees to resettle in Britain and in other areas of the British Empire on a temporary basis, as 
well as adjusting its Palestine immigration policy to provide a long-term solution. He pressed 
the government to act with urgency, indicating his frustration at cases where there had been 
delays in issuing visas, remarking that ‘the merit of the individuals can be looked into after 
their bodies are safe’.134  
 
Maxton argued that Britain, as well as other European nations, were able to provide sanctuary 
for all refugees. Here, Maxton was prepared to concede that it would not be viable to resettle 
500,000 Jewish refugees in industrial areas of Britain where unemployment was already at a 
substantial level. However, he did insist that it was feasible for the Highlands of Scotland to 
accommodate 500,000 Jewish refugees, maintaining that this option ‘had to be considered’.135 
His intervention prompted a rebuke from Germany’s Minister of Propaganda Joseph 
Goebbels, who questioned whether the proposal would be met with approval by the Scottish 
people.136 Maxton emerged as one of the labour movement’s ‘very few’ advocates of ‘a mass 
resettlement’ of Jewish refugees in Britain.137 This contrasted with the Labour Party’s official 
policy, as well as that of Europe’s social democratic parties, which as Kelemen has noted, all 
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refrained from advocating large-scale Jewish immigration into Britain, believing that at a 
time of high unemployment, such a stance would pose too great an electoral risk.138 
 
Therefore, Gorni’s claim that Maxton’s position remained ‘unaffected by the worsening 
plight of German and Austrian Jewry’ is only correct in the sense that he maintained his 
opposition to the continuation of British rule and the creation of a Jewish-majority state in 
Palestine.139 However, Maxton’s views regarding the activities of Jewish socialists in 
Palestine and the necessity of increased Jewish immigration into Palestine and elsewhere 
evidently were revised.  
 
Others, however, remained inflexible on the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine. 
For instance, ILP intellectual Reginald Reynolds argued that ‘our sympathy with Jews in 
Germany and many other countries must not blind us… for one moment to the reactionary 
character of Zionism’.140 He maintained that there was no contradiction in this stance, 
writing: ‘The very reasons that make one pro-Jew and anti-Nazi in Germany, lead logically to 
the pro-Arab anti-Zionist position in Palestine’.141 For Reynolds, it was essential for socialists 
to defend the right of the Palestinian Arabs to ‘determine their own affairs, including matters 
of immigration’.142 He argued that the fundamental question was not one of whether one 
approved of Jewish immigration but rather ‘who shall decide on its extent?’. It was, he wrote, 
currently being ‘determined by a foreign government… at the point of a bayonet’.  Therefore, 
Reynolds argued that Jewish immigration into Palestine had to be distinguished from Jewish 
immigration into other countries – and rejected by socialists – on the basis that it was ‘a 
forcible colonisation of a foreign country’.143 Reflecting on this period in his memoirs, 
Reynolds recalled that a central reason why he was so strongly opposed to Zionism was 
because it ‘exploited the sympathy of decent people for Hitler’s victims and diverted it to the 
justification of an outrage perpetrated on the Arabs of Palestine’.144 In a similar vein, Alex 
Gossip demanded immediate independence for Palestine, accusing the British government of 
‘taking advantage of the hardships that are being inflicted upon our Jewish comrades’ to 
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further its imperialist aims.145 In early 1937, Gossip chaired a meeting of the British Section 
of the LAI which unequivocally backed Arab nationalist demands including the ‘stoppage of 
Jewish immigration into Palestine’.146 George Orwell, who was briefly an ILP member in the 
late 1930s, also remained unconvinced that ‘unrestricted’ Jewish immigration into Palestine 
was ‘desirable’.147  
 
As part of an exchange of views with leading Labour Zionists, Palestinian socialist and trade 
union leader George Mansur was given a platform in the New Leader to make the case 
against further large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine. First, he pointed out that the 
Labour government in New Zealand had recently moved to restrict immigration and argued 
that Palestinian Arabs were entitled to ‘the same self-determination in this matter’.148 
Secondly, Mansur invoked the notion of ‘absorptive capacity’. Essentially, he claimed that 
the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine since 1918 had exceeded Palestine’s absorptive 
capacity, which had seen its Jewish population increase to 30% and moreover, 24% of those 
migrants were unemployed. Mansur argued that Britain and the USA were in a considerably 
better position to provide a solution to the refugee crisis because these nations were not only 
‘far wealthier’ than Palestine but also had ‘infinitely more underdeveloped land to exploit’.149 
As such, he proposed that Britain and the USA should lift its restrictions upon Jewish 
immigration and provide asylum for persecuted Jews. Finally, Mansur emphasised that he 
was not opposed to Jewish immigration per se, rather that Jewish immigration into Palestine 
to secure a livelihood was in accordance with socialist principles, whereas immigration with 
the aim of creating a Jewish-majority state ran contrary to the values of socialism.150 
 
As we have noted in a previous chapter, after visiting Palestine in 1937, ILP MP John 
McGovern significantly shifted his view on Zionism as a result of his admiration for the 
activities of Labour Zionism.151 Shortly afterwards, he visited Europe where he was 
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profoundly moved by the plight of Jewish communities under the Nazi regime.152 In his 
memoirs, he recalled his experience in Vienna where he encountered a ‘fiendishly cruel’ anti-
Semitic exhibition which was ‘designed to instil hatred of the Jewish population’.153 
McGovern detailed how the exhibition claimed that Jews controlled ‘all the banking houses 
of the world’, and included imagery depicting Jews accompanied by the text ‘Every Jew is a 
criminal’. He was angered by this ‘unworthy attempt to whip up bitterness against a 
persecuted race of human beings’.154 On his return, McGovern called on the British 
government to convene a conference of major nations with a view to imposing an economic 
boycott on Nazi Germany to force the regime to cease the ‘vicious terror’ inflicted on the 
Jewish population.155 
 
These first-hand experiences in Europe further reinforced his pro-Zionist standpoint. As he 
told the House of Commons: 
 
I thank God as things have developed that Palestine has been in existence to rescue the large 
number of people who have been the victims of the pogroms and bloody brutality of the 
Hitler regime in Germany. If they are not to be permitted to enter Palestine where are they to 
go? Is the whole world so bankrupt in statesmanship that it cannot solve the simple problem 
of taking 500,000 people and putting them into areas, including Palestine, where they can be 
relieved from the tremendous agony and the blood-bath which is going on in Germany? 156 
 
Therefore, McGovern demanded ‘unlimited’ Jewish immigration into Palestine in order to 
‘rescue the refugees from Central Europe’.157 But he was not in total harmony with the 
objectives of the Zionist movement, as he advocated settlement in various countries not 
solely Palestine and did not explicitly demand the creation of a Jewish-majority state.158  
 
While the increasing persecution of Jews in Europe served to strengthen the pro-Zionist 
position of the Labour Party’s mainstream as well as some ILPers such as McGovern, 
Brockway however, responded in a radically different manner. For Brockway, an anti-Zionist 
 
152 Ibid.  
153 John McGovern, Neither Fear Nor Favour (London, 1960), p. 120. 
154 Ibid. 
155 H.C. Deb., 29 June 1938, vol. 337, cols. 1875-6. 
156 Ibid., 24 November 1938, vol. 341, col. 2060. 
157 Ibid., col. 2067. 
158 Ibid.  
204 
 
stance was intrinsically linked to ensuring that Palestine could become an effective refuge for 
European Jewry. He argued that only by renouncing the demand of a Jewish-majority state 
could Arab fears vis-a-vis further Jewish immigration into Palestine be allayed.159 Therefore, 
to enable Palestine to be a refuge for large numbers of Jewish refugees, an anti-Zionist stance 
was an essential precondition and had to be articulated even more urgently and forcefully. As 
he wrote in the New Leader, ‘If the Jews could prove to the Arabs their desire to cooperate 
without any ulterior Nationalist or racial aims there would be room for millions of Jews 
within the vast expanses of the Arab Federation extending across the near east and northern 
Africa’.160 
 
The rise of fascism in Europe framed the debate on Palestine in another significant respect. 
Several leading Labourites highlighted the apparent links between the Palestinian nationalist 
movement and Nazi Germany and fascist Italy in order to further discredit Palestinian Arab 
demands. Most notably, the general strike and revolt of 1936-9 was characterised as being 
instigated by European fascist powers.161 Thus, any concessions made to Palestinian Arab 
demands for self-government or a reduction in Jewish immigration were framed as 
‘appeasement’.162  Within the ILP, this rhetoric was deployed by McGovern who described 
the uprising as ‘terrorism manufactured by the brutal bandits of Italy and Germany’.163 
Furthermore, McGovern sought to delegitimise Palestinian Arab nationalism by portraying 
the Mufti of Jerusalem as essentially a fascist in the mould of Hitler and Mussolini.164 Thus, 
when Maxton highlighted claims of British atrocities against Palestinian Arab civilians 
during a parliamentary debate, McGovern dismissed these charges as the invention of ‘a Nazi 
agent’ operating in Britain.165 The ILP’s official policy took a more nuanced view. It claimed 
that some of the aristocratic Palestinian nationalist leaders had ‘stimulated anti-Semitism, 
extolled Hitler’ and ‘adopted much of the mentality of Fascist Nationalism’.166 Furthermore, 
in the New Leader, Brockway claimed that there was ‘no doubt’ that ‘Arab terrorists’ had 
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‘received assistance’ from Mussolini.167 However, at the same time, it acknowledged that 
there was also a genuine, politically-conscious nationalist movement which had legitimate 
grievances.168 Through the New Leader, it called upon the Arab socialists to repudiate any 
anti-Semitic elements within the Arab nationalist movement.169 Brockway argued that while 
these fascist ideas had to be opposed, the situation had been caused ‘to a large extent by the 
‘indifference of the European working class movement’ to the anti-colonial struggles.170 
Therefore, the appropriate response was for revolutionary socialists to redouble its anti-
colonial activities to win the support of these movements and influence them towards 
socialism. This line of argument was reminiscent of Brockway’s rationale for socialist 
engagement with anti-colonial movements via the LAI, namely that a failure to do so would 
mean that nationalists would gravitate toward communism. 
 
Reynolds vehemently challenged this narrative. He contended that in fact, it was British rule 
in Palestine that was fundamentally fascist and analogous to Mussolini’s actions in Abyssinia 
and to Hitler’s regime.171 Moreover, Reynolds repeatedly argued that while it was deeply 
misguided for any Arab nationalists to admire or look to European fascism for support, the 
fault for this development lay with British socialists’ support for Zionism and their anti-
democratic rejection of Palestinian Arab demands for self-determination.172 In addition, he 
maintained that it was immaterial whether the Palestinian Arab leadership was reactionary or 
whether there was evidence of European fascist involvement, socialists nevertheless should 
unequivocally support the ‘just demand’ of self-determination.173 Similarly, Mansur 
responded to this argument by making an analogy with German support for the Irish 
nationalist movement during the First World War, rhetorically asking whether this meant that 
Irish nationalist leaders such as Roger Casement were merely ‘pawns in in the hands of 
German Imperialism’?174  
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Reynolds, Mannin and Mansur faced accusations of anti-Semitism during the course of their 
anti-Zionist activism. Mansur faced claims after sharing a platform with British right-wing 
anti-Semites, a charge which Reynolds disputed.175 Emma Goldman claimed that although 
Reynolds did not possess a ‘particle of anti-Semitic feeling’, an article he had written on 
Palestine had lent itself to ‘the impression that he is a rabid anti-Semite’.176 Reynolds 
strongly disputed this and emphasised that his comments had clearly distinguished between 
Zionists and Jews.177 He also contended that he was ‘pro-Jewish’ and pointed out that he had 
supported Jewish refugees.178 Referring to Zionism, he complained that  ‘because Hitler 
regarded all Jews as evil, anti-Fascists were prone to assume that no Jew could ever, in any 
circumstances, do any wrong’.179 However, Reynolds appeared to attempt to obfuscate the 
issue of anti-Semitism when he responded to the charge by pointing out that ‘Arabs are also 
Semites’.180 Moreover, he contended that Zionism not Nazi propaganda was primarily 
responsible for fomenting anti-Semitism in the Arab world.181 
 
Mannin also took a somewhat ambivalent view, arguing that there was a double standard at 
work whereby Hitler’s anti-Semitism was being condemned but not British treatment of 
Arabs in Palestine and British actions in other areas of the empire.182 Thus she wrote: 
 
If the fascist persecution of the Jews moves me less than it does many people, it is not 
because I am not horrified and disgusted by the preposterous racial persecution… not because 
as some may contend I am anti-Semitic… but because I do not forget that all the time… there 
is no less revolting Imperialist persecution of Arabs, Negros and Indians.183 
 
As an ardent pacifist, for Mannin, the priority was to avoid the ‘supreme evil’ of another 
world war. Therefore, she wrote, ‘I cannot believe that if I were Jewish, I should wish 
millions to perish that I and mine might be saved’. Consequently, Mannin appeared reluctant 
to highlight the issue of anti-Semitic persecution on the basis that there was a danger that it 
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‘obscured’ other important issues (such as the brutality of imperialism) and could involve 
Britain in war.184 Moreover, she was criticised by fellow activists in the pacifist movement 
for making a reference to ‘Jewish war-mongering’.185 
 
Many anti-Zionists were evidently conscious that expressing opposition to Zionism could 
result in accusations of anti-Semitism. Therefore, they often sought to pre-empt any such 
claims by prefacing their critique of Zionism with an insistence that it was not motivated by 
anti-Semitism. Thus, Mansur was adamant that he had ‘no quarrel with Jews as such’ and 
would ‘welcome as brothers any Jews who will throw themselves into the fight for the 
liberation of our country from British rule’.186 Similarly, Gossip claimed that his anti-Zionist 
stance had the support of the ‘great majority’ of Jewish members of his trade union.187 In a 
speech which argued for immediate independence for Palestine, Maxton referred to the 
Jewish members of his constituency as ‘a friendly, decent section of our community’ and 
emphasised that he was not disregarding their views, as he had not received any 
correspondence from them concerning Palestine.188 When Reynolds organised an anti-Zionist 
motion censuring McGovern at the ILP’s annual conference, he deliberately ensured that it 
was moved by an anti-Zionist Jewish delegate.189 
 
The racial imagination was significant in the way that anti-Arab racism pervaded arguments 
in support of Zionism. The prevailing discourse routinely essentialised Arabs and, as 
Kelemen has noted, many leading Labourites subscribed to the historicist racist notion that 
development could only come from the outside.190 The belief that Arabs were inherently 
inferior to Europeans in the hierarchy of civilization was widely held. Accordingly, by virtue 
of being European, Zionist Jews would bring ‘civilisation’ to Palestine. Thus, the conflict was 
repeatedly framed as one between the forces of Western modernity and progress, versus 
Eastern backwardness and reaction.191 Contrasting the camel with the motor-car was a device 
which was repeatedly deployed by various figures to illustrate this apparent clash.192 Another 
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motif was to frame the conflict as one between the twentieth century and the Middle Ages.193 
Brailsford even evoked H.G. Wells’ novel The Time Machine to underscore this point.194 
MacDonald’s writings on Palestine and the Middle East more generally, reveal that he 
subscribed to many archetypical Orientalist tropes.195 Likewise, as David Feldman has noted, 
Wedgwood essentially saw Palestinian Arabs as ‘decadent Orientals’.196 Indeed, 
Wedgwood’s racialised worldview caused him to draw a distinction between ‘European’ and 
‘Oriental’ Jews, remarking: ‘It is not the Oriental Jew who is bringing Western civilisation 
into Palestine’. According to Wedgwood, Jews in Russia were ‘An Eastern race’ whereas 
Zionist Jews in Palestine were ‘the pioneers of Western civilisation’.197 On some occasions, 
these ideas were expressed in overtly racist terms. Brailsford for instance, referred to 
Palestinian Arabs as ‘degenerate semi-savages’ and a ‘backward, illiterate and very dirty 
people’.198 Similarly, McGovern claimed that Zionism was ‘sending the torch of progress into 
the East to inflame the minds of the Arab population… to rouse them from their filth’.199  
 
Crucially, these ideas had important political implications. For example, Brailsford derided 
the idea that Palestinian Arabs possessed a ‘political consciousness’ comparable to that of 
‘European races’ and consequently opposed proposals for the creation of self-governing 
institutions.200 As far as he was concerned, the vast majority of Palestinians were ‘much too 
ignorant and submissive to take any real part in government whether local or national’.201 
Furthermore, Brailsford’s belief in the ‘backwardness’ of Palestinian Arabs explicitly 
informed his defence of Labour Zionism’s racially exclusivist policies in Palestine.202 
However, Brockway and Maxton framed the beneficial effects of Jewish immigration into 
Palestine principally in terms of socialism and trade unionism rather than a higher 
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‘civilisation’ or ‘race’. In their analysis, Jews and Arabs were regarded as ‘belonging to the 
same race’ i.e. ‘Semitic’.203  
 
Yet Orientalism was not the preserve of those who sympathised with Zionism. In her novel 
Comrade O Comrade, which satirised the left of the 1930s, Mannin, who was an ardent 
supporter of Palestinian nationalism, introduced a character named Munir El-Yasin in a 
chapter entitled ‘An Oriental Outing’. El-Yasin, who was presumably a representation of 
Mansur, was described as ‘like all the Princes of Arabia rolled into one’ who, in a comic 
scene, was depicted horse-riding after addressing a demonstration in Trafalgar Square.204 
Notwithstanding the fact that the tone of the novel was satirical and presented its Palestinian 
Arab character and the Palestinian nationalist case in a positive light, it nevertheless deployed 
Orientalist stereotypes.  
 
Conclusion 
During the interwar years, anti-Semitism was a pervasive force across the political spectrum. 
Zionism was frequently presented as another component of the ‘Jewish conspiracy’. 
Accordingly, the right-wing press often saw Labour’s pro-Zionist position as a product of 
‘Jewish power’. For instance, The Morning Post queried: ‘Why do politicians of the Left 
embrace with so much enthusiasm the Zionist cause?... It is impossible not to ask what 
influence has induced the Labour party to throw over thus all the zeal for imperial economy 
and self determination (sic.)’.205 The Labour-supporting Catholic Herald explained the 
party’s ‘betrayal of the Arabs’ by claiming that ‘in the quarrel between the Jews and the 
Arabs, the Zionists had MacDonald’s ear, influenced by a clever Jewish secretary’.206 This 
was a reference to Rosa Rosenberg, MacDonald’s private secretary, despite there being no 
evidence to suggest that Rosenberg had been involved in pro-Zionist activism or in any way 
informed MacDonald’s views on the issue.207 
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207 For an outline of Rosa Rosenberg’s political career, see ‘Secrets of Premier Entrusted to Girl’, The 
Pittsburgh Press, 27 July 1930. 
210 
 
Anti-Semitism was often present in the rhetoric of several prominent pro-Zionist advocates, 
largely informed by the anti-Semitic dimension of Hobson’s influential ‘anti-imperialist’ 
arguments which had been formulated at the turn of the century. Similarly, anti-Zionism, 
although motivated primarily by an anti-colonial ideology, could on occasion also be infused 
with anti-Semitic notions which stemmed from supposedly ‘anti-capitalist’ and ‘anti-
imperialist’ ideas which saw ‘Jewish capitalism’ as an especially malevolent force.  
 
There was, however, unanimous revulsion at outbreaks of violent anti-Semitism in Europe. 
Moreover, this clearly did inform support for Zionism. Feldman has argued that support for 
Zionism ‘did not stem from an appreciation of the necessity of Zionism for Jews’, rather it 
was based on the notion that Zionists were ‘European colonists’ who brought a higher level 
of civilisation and its apparent socialism made it ‘especially attractive’.208 Yet, these 
arguments were not mutually exclusive. For example, as we have seen, Brailsford repeatedly 
emphasised the benefits of Zionism in ‘civilizational’ and socialist terms, but he also argued 
that Zionism was justified as a ‘partial return for the many world-wide injustices’ suffered by 
Jews and, after visiting Palestine, highlighted the contrast between Jewish experiences in 
Eastern Europe and the settlements in Palestine.209 Wedgwood, who similarly deployed such 
arguments, framing Zionism as a uniquely benevolent form of colonialism, also explained his 
support for Zionism as a ‘duty’ of ‘every supporter of human rights’ because of the ‘atrocious 
and discriminating manner’ in which Jews in numerous countries were treated.210 Zionism for 
Wedgwood, represented ‘a chance to put an end’ to this persecution.211  
 
In the 1930s, the intensification of violent anti-Semitic persecution in Europe prompted a 
reassessment for some on the anti-Zionist left regarding the level of Jewish immigration into 
Palestine. In the case of McGovern, it proved to be a major factor in his conversion to a pro-
Zionist stance. However, in many cases this did not result in a conversion to a pro-Zionist 
position, in fact, as we have seen in the case of Brockway it strengthened his anti-Zionist 
views, as anti-Zionism was posited as an essential prerequisite to allow Palestine to become a 
refuge on a necessary scale. Maxton too maintained his anti-Zionist stance while being a 
consistent advocate of Jewish migration into Palestine. But anti-Zionism was not monolithic. 
 
208 Feldman, ‘Zionism and the British Labour Party’, p. 206. 
209 Brailsford, ‘Today in the Holy Land’, New Leader, 26 December 1930.  
210 ‘Colonel Wedgwood Visits Pittsburgh in Interest of United Palestine Appeal’, Jewish Criterion, 29 January 
1926. 
211 Josiah C. Wedgwood, ‘The Beginning of Wisdom’, The Hebrew Standard of Australasia, 20 June 1924. 
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For other left-wing anti-Zionists, such as Reynolds and Mannin, aiding Jewish refugees could 
not mean supporting significant Jewish migration into Palestine because it violated the 
principle of self-determination and facilitated colonisation.  
 
The debates exposed the tension between support for the right of self-determination and 
support for the right of asylum. It revealed that even in such extreme circumstances, the right 
to migrate was not deemed absolute. For both Palestine and Britain, the potential impact upon 
the current population had to be considered. Post-disaffiliation, ILP leaders and activists were 
forced to almost continuously reassess their thinking on Palestine in response to the 
worsening plight of European Jewry.  
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Conclusions 
 
For the socialist politicians, intellectuals, and activists of the ILP, it was axiomatic that 
they were internationalists. However, what this signified could substantially vary, despite 
the same terminology often being used. Moreover, internationalism was not just a 
theoretical notion, it was also practiced, and accordingly, significantly different 
interpretations of internationalism produced considerably different practices. Responses to 
Palestine were firmly rooted in these pre-existing understandings of what constituted 
internationalism and as such, involved questions of imperialism, colonisation, nationalism, 
and race. For instance, in the 1920s, according to MacDonald and Brailsford’s 
interpretation of internationalism, Labour was duty-bound to implement the League of 
Nations mandate on behalf of the international community. By contrast, later, in the 1930s, 
for the interpretation adhered to by Maxton and Brockway as revolutionary socialists, 
internationalism when applied to Palestine meant advocating the end of the mandate on the 
basis that it was an instrument of imperialism and supporting the creation of independent 
working-class organisations in Palestine at a non-state, transnational level.1 
 
It is evident that those ILP anti-colonialists who aligned with the LAI were cohesive in 
their arguments. These centred on three key issues, namely that empire was inherently 
exploitative to the subject peoples, that it impoverished British workers and was a threat to 
peace. Although some anti-colonialists may have sought to appropriate Hardie and Morel 
in order to lend legitimacy and continuity to the policy, this variant of anti-colonialism was 
a new direction. Moreover, the election in May 1929 of ILPers associated with the LAI 
such as Maxton, Brockway and other ILP MPs created an unprecedented situation whereby 
members of a party of government were simultaneously active in an organisation 
committed to ending the British Empire. That said, there was a certain limitation to their 
anti-colonialism. Brockway at least did not advocate immediate and unconditional 
independence for all nations. Furthermore, once Labour was in power, the response was 
inconsistent, as although outspoken on India, the anti-colonial argument was not as 
seriously pursed in the cases of Egypt or Palestine. Thus, although there was a rhetorical 
shift, Imlay overstates the degree to which the ILP in the mid to late 1920s can be 
 
1 ‘Socialists and Palestine’, New Leader, 30 October 1936.  
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considered anti-colonial given that its official policies and editorial line still subscribed to 
more paternalistic notions.2  
 
The conduct of the ILP leadership in the years leading up to its disaffiliation with Labour 
and its subsequent trajectory has often been criticised in labour historiography. However, 
in terms of colonial matters, it should be recognised that the ILP argument that Labour’s 
colonial policy, despite pretensions of being anti-imperialist was in fact one of continuity, 
is now supported by many scholars. Furthermore, the ILP leadership was perceptive 
enough to realise that anti-colonial nationalism was an emerging force, eventually proving 
irresistible, which the labour movement could not afford to ignore. 
 
An analysis of figures within the interwar ILP allows us to trace discussions within the 
British left more broadly. It provides an insight into the perspectives of mainstream 
statesmen such as MacDonald and intellectuals such as Angell, as well as more radical 
activists like Brockway. Indeed, Brockway continued to be a prominent figure on the 
British left for many subsequent decades. A study of the interwar years provides a snapshot 
of the origins of his involvement in the anti-colonial movement and, at the same time, 
advances our understanding of British anticolonialism more broadly.3 By exploring the 
ILP’s interactions with communist-inspired networks, the thesis has also allowed us to gain 
insight into some of the key internationalist perspectives of the communist left. 
 
During the interwar years, Palestine posed considerable difficulties for some of the labour 
movement’s most committed internationalist thinkers. By his own admission, Brockway 
found Palestine the most difficult of all international questions.4 We can see that 
throughout the interwar period, he frequently reassessed and shifted his position. Similarly, 
Brailsford grappled with the issue and revised his views in several key aspects. When it 
came to the case of Palestine, whichever form of internationalism was pursued, some 
found that the existing theoretical frameworks were inadequate, as arriving at a solution 
was fraught with complexities. For example, MacDonald, who adhered to the belief that 
socialist governments could and should administer mandated countries, found that in 
 
2 Imlay, Practice of Socialist Internationalism, pp. 235-6. 
3 For Brockway’s account of his anti-colonial activism see Brockway, The Colonial Revolution (London, 
1973). 
4 Fenner Brockway, Inside the Left (London, 1942), p. 291. 
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Palestine, the terms of the mandate were unlike Iraq or any other British mandate. Before 
coming to power, MacDonald had consistently espoused a conventional pro-Zionist 
position. However, once in government, the upsurge of Palestinian Arab nationalism 
forced him to pursue a more balanced policy. This approach was then met with a flurry of 
criticism including from the PMC, the LSI and many in his own party, compelling him to 
once again shift tack. Similarly, in the late 1930s, for Brockway, despite his strong 
sympathy for anti-colonial nationalist struggles against imperialism, the solution could not 
be a simple case of aligning himself with Palestinian Arab nationalist demands for 
immediate independence as he did in India and other colonies. This was because in his 
view, such a development would likely result in preventing Palestine from providing 
refuge for Jewish workers persecuted in Europe and, a substantial number of Jews in 
Palestine were socialists rather than exploitative colonisers.5 Instead, the focus was to unite 
Jewish and Arab workers in a joint struggle against imperialism and the nationalist 
elements within their own community.  
 
Even where socialists agreed upon a broad framework, it did not follow that there was 
agreement regarding the specifics of policy. MacDonald, Brailsford and Snell all shared 
the view that the self-described ‘anti-imperialist’ dimension of their internationalism 
demanded administering Palestine as a mandate, ultimately with a view to granting self-
government. Yet when Labour was in power in 1929-1931, disagreements emerged over 
the optimal way to pursue this in terms of concrete policy. MacDonald approved of the 
introduction of some measure of self-government in the form of a legislative council, 
whereas Brailsford rejected this move on the basis that the majority of Palestinian Arabs 
remained incapable of participating in such a system and that self-government at that 
juncture would jeopardise the creation of a Jewish national home.6 His preference was for 
the British government to provide more active support for the creation of a Jewish national 
home, which would in turn hasten the time when the self-government could be ‘safely’ 
permitted and thus the mandate could eventually be terminated.7 Snell also believed that 
the introduction of self-government in the form of a legislative council was premature and 
instead there had to be intermediate steps. This revealed that although there was agreement 
that the mandate could not be held indefinitely and that preparing Palestine for self-
 
5 Brockway, ‘Socialist View of Palestine’, New Leader, 25 November 1938. 
6 H.N Brailsford ‘The Future of Zionism’, New Leader, 4 April 1930. 
7 Ibid. 
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government was an internationalist obligation, there was no consensus about precisely at 
what stage and in what form self-government should be developed. The examples of Snell 
and Brailsford also show us that at this time, it was within mainstream socialist 
internationalist thinking to advocate population transfer. 
 
The competing claims in Palestine forced Labourites who were steeped in a tradition of 
liberal internationalism to debate central tenets of their ideology. Self-determination was 
one such concept. MPs such as Bennett and Cocks insisted on the paramountcy of the 
Palestinian Arab claim, essentially predicated on the fact that they constituted the majority 
of the population. But for others such as MacDonald, Brailsford, Angell and Buxton, the 
right to self-determination could not be justified solely in majoritarian terms. Instead, it 
was contingent upon several factors, such as the capacity to utilise the land productively, 
whether the majority of the population were ‘capable’ of exercising self-determination and 
whether it prevented an international problem from being solved.8 Brailsford summed up 
this view when he wrote ‘if we believe in any system of rights at all, an organized 
humanity must preserve to itself the power to override the particular race or tribe in the 
interest of the great society of mankind’.9 Therefore, for these reasons, Zionism was often 
given precedence over the Palestinian Arab claim. Furthermore, Wedgwood and Angell 
argued that Zionism was a fulfilment of internationalism because Jewish self-determination 
via Zionism was a necessary precondition for Jews to develop an internationalist 
consciousness.10 For socialists such as Reynolds, the right to self-determination was 
absolutely paramount, as he stated:  
 
For my part I will say that if the cause of self-determination is not a just cause, then the 
word justice no longer has any meaning for me and can be left out of the discussion. I only 
know that self-determination is the basic principle of socialism… and that I will fight every 
system of society in which this principle is not fundamental.11 [My emphasis]. 
 
Analogies were deployed to demonstrate the coherence of socialists supporting Zionism as 
a nationalist struggle for self-determination. But the existence of two competing nationalist 
 
8 For Brailsford see: ‘Three Opinions about the Zionist Movement’, Jewish Criterion, 16 January 1931. 
9 ‘Says Limit Jewish Palestine Influx to Half of Population, to Calm Arab Fears of Encroachment’, JTA, 29 
December 1929. 
10 ‘Col Wedgwood’s Work for Zionism’, Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1922.  
11 Reginald Reynolds, ‘Letter to The Editor’, Spain and the World, 16 September 1938. 
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movements within the same territory meant that the same analogy could be used to validate 
diametrically opposing stances. Thus, Wedgwood and Scurr saw a continuity in Labour’s 
support for Zionism and its previous support for Irish self-determination, whereas for Ethel 
Mannin, the obvious parallel was between Irish nationalism and Palestinian Arab 
nationalism.12 Explaining his support for Labour Zionism, Wedgwood remarked ‘We [the 
Labour Party] first fought for freedom of the Irish and now we fight for freedom of the 
Jews’.13 The central character in Mannin’s satirical novel Comrade O Comrade remarked: 
‘The Arabs… wanted their own country for their own people; they wanted to be free. If 
you were an Irishman that was something you could understand’.14 
 
Another contested question was Zionism’s relationship to colonialism. Again, analogies 
were frequently used, but in this case, they were often deployed to illustrate the 
exceptionalism of Zionism. Brailsford argued that Zionism had to be distinguished from 
other forms of colonisation because of its use of exclusively Jewish labour, which he 
claimed prevented Zionist colonisation becoming ‘a colony of the African type’ in which 
‘white overseers direct native labour’.15 For Wedgwood, while Zionism was undoubtedly 
colonisation, it could not be compared with previous forms. Instead, it was historically 
unique. As he explained: 
 
In America, Australia, Africa, particularly South Africa, and even in Ireland our 
colonisation has been at the expense of the people who occupied the country that we were 
colonising… but this [Zionism] is the first case in which we have colonised without 
injuring the native population.16 
 
Brockway also concluded that Zionism could not be equated with conventional colonialism 
as it differed in from that practiced by white colonialists in ‘India and the tropics’ in 
important respects.17 Yet for Reynolds, there could be no question that Zionism was typical 
colonisation.18 Furthermore, this anti-colonial stance was the fundamental basis of his 
 
12‘British Labor Movement Backs Zionist Endeavours, Party Leaders Declare’, JTA, 17 July 1928. 
13 ‘Col. Wedgwood Addresses Reception Honouring Palestine Workers’ Delegation’, JTA, 17 January 1926. 
14 Ethel Mannin, Comrade O Comrade: Or Low Down on the Left (London, 1944), p. 140. 
15 H. N. Brailsford, ‘Can Jews and Arabs Live Together?’, New Leader, 2 January 1931. 
16 H.C. Deb., 22 May 1939, vol. 347, col. 1995. 
17 Fenner Brockway, ‘Socialist View of Palestine’, New Leader, 25 November 1938. 
18 See Reginald Reynolds, ‘The Pawns in Palestine’, Spain and the World, 3 June 1939 and Reynolds 
‘Conspiracy on Palestine’, Spain and the World, August 1941. 
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opposition to Jewish immigration into Palestine, as he was equally opposed to Jewish 
immigration into any other colony such as Madagascar.19 Here, Reynolds differed from 
Maxton and Brockway who as we have seen, were prepared to advocate the use of British 
dominions and colonies (including Palestine) to provide refuge.20 
 
The presence or absence of anti-Semitic views was not a reliable indicator regarding an 
individual’s position on Zionism. There was no correlation between those having positive 
attitudes towards Jews and holding pro-Zionist views; in fact, many leading Labourite pro-
Zionists espoused anti-Semitic tropes. Anti-Zionist views were also occasionally imbued 
with anti-Semitic phraseology. But for most left-wing anti-Zionists, anti-colonialism rather 
than anti-Semitism was the key factor in accounting for opposition to Zionism. When we 
consider the examples of Maxton, Reynolds and Gossip, their rejection of Zionism was 
rooted in an anti-colonial worldview. As we have seen, with the debate that took place at 
the British Commonwealth conference in 1925, when there was criticism of Zionism, it 
was often because it was perceived to contradict internationalist principles. Even 
Wedgwood, who as a we have seen, was a committed champion of Zionism, came into 
conflict with Labour Zionists over their preference for a voting system for municipal 
elections in Palestine which Wedgwood argued contravened the values of socialist 
internationalism.21 
 
Anti-Semitism was also relevant insofar as it related to a broader internationalist 
worldview which demanded support for persecuted minorities. Brailsford and Wedgwood 
argued that there was a moral imperative to support Zionism in order to provide a refuge to 
Jews persecuted by pogroms. But the same impulse could result in a very different 
conclusion. In the late 1930s, Brockway argued that an anti-Zionist stance was essential to 
allow the maximum amount of Jewish immigration into Palestine and its surrounding 
areas, and therefore provide refuge for Jews persecuted under fascism in Europe.22  
 
A racialised worldview was significant in explaining a preference for Zionism over 
Palestinian Arab nationalism. In this view, Jews by virtue of being European, were 
 
19 ‘Reg Reynolds Replies’, Ibid., 16 September 1938, p. 28 
20 Gorni, British Labour Movement and Zionism, p. 159. 
21 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
22 Fenner Brockway, ‘Is it Too Late Now for Jewish-Arab Unity?’ New Leader, 10 March 1939; Brockway, 
‘When Jews and Arabs Unite’, New Leader, 4 August 1939. 
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perceived to be a ‘civilising force’, able to develop and modernise Palestine in ways that 
Palestinian Arabs could not. Furthermore, there was a tendency to essentialise and 
homogenise all Arabs and refuse to recognise distinctive national identities. This 
strengthened the Zionist claim because it was argued that whereas the Jews only had 
Palestine in which to settle, Palestine amounted to only a small fraction of Arab territory.23 
Moreover, this mindset led some to advocate population transfer of Palestinian Arabs into 
neighbouring Arab territories as a viable solution to the conflict. 
 
Responses to Palestine were often characterised by an inconsistency. For example, when 
the Labour government proposed to revive a legislative council, Brailsford denied that 
Palestinians were capable of self-government, despite it being an ‘A’ mandate. This was at 
odds with his view that the populations of Iraq and Egypt were capable of self-rule, and 
indeed contrary to his own previous claim that regarding Palestine, ‘England can no longer 
adopt the old-time imperialist policy of ruthlessness and ride rough-shod over a relatively 
advanced group of people, such as for example, the Arabs’.24  
 
This view was indicative of a significant trend, as while nationalist movements in India, 
Iraq and Egypt elicited sympathetic responses from ILPers throughout the period, 
Palestinian Arab nationalism was frequently omitted from the discussion. Despite the anti-
colonial turn signified by their involvement in the LAI in 1927, Maxton and Brockway did 
not view the events of August 1929 as a legitimate anti-colonial nationalist uprising. This 
suggests that although they sympathised with anti-colonial aspirations, their pacifist 
ideology meant that they were unwilling to support political violence. Furthermore, in the 
ILP’s revolutionary socialist phase, the party leadership gave only qualified support to the 
nationalist uprising in Palestine which took place from 1936-9 as this time, sympathy for 
anti-colonial nationalist came into conflict with humanitarian concerns for Jewish refugees. 
This tension is but one of the many examples in which nationalism, and internationalism 
shaped the ILP’s ambivalent position vis-à-vis Palestine. The study provides an insight into 
the key concepts which intellectuals and activists across the spectrum of the British left 
were forced to grapple with as they sought to comprehend, and propose solutions to, the 
often-tumultuous situation in Palestine.  
 
23 ‘Says Limit Jewish Palestine Influx to Half of Population, to Calm Arab Fears of Encroachment’, JTA, 29 
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